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INTRODUCTION
Should there be pain-and-suffering damages in tort law? Most legal
economists who wrote on the subject thought there should not be pain-and-suffering
damages in tort law. An importa nt minority of scholars thought the decision of
whether tort law should provide pain-and-suffering damages is an empirical, or an
experimental, question that cannot be armchair-theorized. Yet, all scholars who have
done empirical or experimental work to explore the desirability of pain-and-suffering
damages reached the conclusion that it is undesirable. In short, in this paper I argue
that the majority’s arguments are flawed and therefore cannot serve as a policy
making aid. I side with the minority of scholars who argue it is an empirical or
experimental question, yet, I provide experimental evidence that in fact it may be
desirable to have pain-and-suffering damages in tort law.1
Before the rise of the law and economics movement, the predominant
compensation paradigm in tort law was the “make whole” doctrine. This paradigm
included compensation for losses due to pain and suffering. 2 But this paradigm is not
dominant in the economic analysis of law. Over the past decades, legal economists
have been debating whether tort law should provide (on efficiency grounds) pain-andsuffering damages to injured parties. In particular, whereas most tort law and
economic scholars justified pain-and-suffering damages on efficient care taking (or
deterrence) grounds (i.e. parties should bear the full social costs of their conduct,

1

Below I classify scholars along the lines mentioned in the main text. The term “tort law” should be
interpreted to include “product liability law” as well, where injurers and victims are in some
contractual relationsh ips. In fact, the paradigm that this paper adopts, which asks whether consumers
prefer more expensive products which include the extra costs associated with pain and suffering
insurance, is most intuitively understood when product liability law, and not tort law, is what one has in
mind. Yet, it is straight forward to extend the paradigm to parties that are not in contractual
relationship, by asking whether consumers are willing to bear the extra first party insurance premium
associated with providing pain and suffering damages in tort law. The idea is the same- there is no free
lunch, pain and suffering awards do not fall from the sky, but rather are purchased, in one form or
another, by the class of potential victims.
2
Traditionally, scholars used the co rrective-justice theory of tort law to explain and support pain-and suffering damages. The idea was, as Justice Traynor explained, that pain-and -suffering damages are ‘a
means of punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those who had been wronged.’ Seffert v.
Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d. 337, 345 (Cal. 1961). See also, JULES C OLEMAN, M ARKET
VALUES AND THE LAW (1988). But see W ILLIAM M. L ANDES & R ICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF T ORT L AW 187 (1987) (arguing that lack of pain-and-suffering damages was a
shortcoming of the common law). The term “pain-and-suffering damages” includes all non-pecuniary
costs recognized in the literature and by courts. The most obvious items include “non-economic
losses,” “loss of consortium,” “hedonistic damages,” “emotional distress,” “mental anguish and
damages,” and “emotional losses.”

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art11

6

Avraham:

PAIN-AND-SUFFERING DAMAGES

6

including the non-pecuniary costs),3 the picture is much more vague with respect to
the efficient risk-bearing (or insurance) grounds, the other goal of an efficient tort law
system. 4 Following Guido Calabresi, most legal economists accept the paradigm
whereby tort law (which is virtually a system of third-party insurance) and the firstparty insurance markets are alternative institutions that deal with the problem of
accident costs. 5

The economists, therefore, conclude that from a purely optimal

insurance perspective, the optimal level of compensation (including non-monetary
damages) should equal the efficient level of first-party insurance. This is coverage
that an independent, rational and fully informed consumer (“sovereign consumer”)
would have bought in a world without legal mechanisms of recovery of damages due
to torts; a world with no tort law at all. 6
Indeed, scholars who have supported at least some pain-and-suffering damages
on efficient insurance grounds, justified doing so by claiming that such a consumer
3

WILLIAM LANDES AND R ICHARD P OSNER , T HE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF T ORT LAW at 186-7 (1987).
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC A NALYSIS OF ACCIDENT L AW 133-4 (1987); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., NonPecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 39 (1982). In contrast, Jennifer Arlen
argued that even on efficient deterrence grounds tort awards should not include compensation for painand -suffering losses. Jennifer Arlen, Recons idering Tort Rules For Personal Injury: The Case of
Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41 (1990). In Arlen’s model, parties impose
“bilateral risks” on each other, as both are victims and both are injurers. Thus, the benefit that each
individual has from the system of tort law, is the option to engage in a risky activity. This benefit by
itself entails that full damages may not be necessary or available for an efficient recovery of tort
damages. Id. at 45-51. Note, however, that this by itself does not say which component of the different
types of damages should be eliminated. This dilemma is answered by Arlen, when she adopts Cook &
Graham’s result that rational individual would not insure for pain-and-suffering losses. Id at 248.
Arlen never explains however, why she thinks that the optimal damages calculated for efficient care
reasons will match the reduced optimal damages calculated for efficient risk spreading reasons.
Similarly, Paul Rubin argued that since there are other forces for deterrence in the economy such as
direct regulation and reputational effects, tort law must not carry the entire deterrence burden alone.
PAUL R UBIN, T ORT R EFORM B Y C ONTRACT at 82-4 (1993).
4
Economic analysis of law views legal rules in an instrumental manner, i.e. the way they affect our
lives. Specifically to tort law, the conventional premise is that “[t]he only important economic effects
that any legal policy can have are effects on level of investments in prevention of losses and of
insurance for losses not prevented.” George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law , 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1537 (1987).
5
G UIDO CALABRESI, T HE C OST OF A CCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC A NALYSIS (1970).
6
If an analysis on optimal insurance grounds reveals that pain and suffering damages are indeed
desirable, then it seems that the debate is settled because then, on both grounds, optimal insurance and
optimal deterrence, pain and suffering damages are warranted. Whether tort law should be tuned only
towards ach ieving optimal deterrence, or alternatively towards achieving optimal insurance, or trying
to simultaneously achieve both, is beyond the scope of this article. Paul Rubin, for example, argued
that regulatory regimes and reputational effects weaken the need to focus on optimal deterrence. See
Rubin, supra note 3. Richard Posner and William Landes on the other hand, believe that the major
function of tort law is deterrence. See Landes and Posner, supra note 3. As an example of an
intermediate approach consider Kip Viscusi’s claim that “[t]he competing objectives of deterrence and
compensation in tort liability consequently result in pain and suffering damages that will typically
range from zero [the optimal insurance amount for pain and suffering according to Visucsi] to
deterrence values associated with the injury.” W. KIP VISCUSI, R EFORMING PRODUCT LIABILITY 114115 (1991).
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would demand, and pay for, at least some coverage for their pain -and-suffering losses
in a hypothetical (first-party) insurance contract.7 In contrast, a second group of
scholars, while not disputing the efficient deterrence rationale for pain-and-suffering
damages, argue that these sovereign consumers would prefer not to pay for any
coverage at all. 8 A third group of scholars concede that whether these consumers
would buy pain -and-suffering coverage in a hypothetical first-party insurance market,
is an empirical question that could not be addressed a priori . 9
Given the significance of pain-and-suffering damages – usually thought to
account for up to about 50 percent of the total tor t damages paid in products liability
and medical malpractice cases – and the various attempts to reform the tort system 10,
it seems important to clarify the debate. The project of this Article could be
summarized in once sentence: Scholars who argue that pa in-and-suffering damages in
tort law should be eliminated based on optimal insurance grounds (people would not
demand such coverage in a hypothetical insurance market), whether they rely on pure
theory, or on any empirical or experimental work, are wrong. I am not dealing in this
paper with the question whether pain-and-suffering damages should or should not be
7

Steven. P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Non-Pecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and -Suffering
Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. R EV. 1785 (1995) (concluding that consumers are likely to
demand some level of pain-and-suffering insurance, and therefore tort law should provide some level
of pain-and-suffering damages). See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and The Role of Government in
Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 533 (1984) (based on her observations of the
market arguing that serious pain-and-suffering injuries should be awarded).
8
Priest, supra note 4, at 1546-7, 1553; Robert Cooter, Towards Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75
VA . L. REV. 383, 392 (1989) (arguing that “a rational person would insure only against that pain-andsuffering that curtailed earnings”) [hereinafter Unmatured Torts]; John E. Calfee & Paul Rubin, Some
Implications of Damages Payments for Non Pecuniary Losses, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1992).
9
Shavell, supra note 3, at 228-31 (arguing that whether an individual would demand pain-and suffering damages depends on her post-accident marginal utility). See also, Alan Schwartz, Proposals
for Product Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 362-7 (1988) [hereinafter
Proposals for Reform ]. Alan Schwartz as well as Jennifer Arlen agrees it is an empirical question, but
nevertheless oppose pain-and-suffering damages in tort law. Arlen, supra note 3.
10
The 104th Congress has examined a number of bills for tort reform in general and non -pecuniary
damages specifically. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have passed tort-reform bills,
yet no comprised legislation has been found. Parts of the bills came together in the ‘Common Sense
Products Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995’. This act was vetoed by President Clinton and was
then sustained by the congress. See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory
of Tort Compensation , 75 T EX. L. REV. 1567, 1582 (1997). President Bush has recently urged Congress
to impose substantial nationwide restrictions on medical malpractice cases, including a cap on pain and
suffering damages of $250,000. See Mike Allen and Amy Goldstein, Bush Urges Malpractice Damage
Limits; Plan Includes Goals Sought by Business, W ASH. POST, July 26, 2002, at A4. Bush's plan would
override laws in states that have set higher limits. He demanded legislative action by late fall. Indeed,
on September 26th 2002 the House passes H.R. 4600 - The Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely
Health Care (HEALTH) Act of 2002 . The HEALTH Act includes a cap of $250,000 on non-economic
damages in medical malpractice case and places limits on the contingency fees lawyers can charge. The
measure passed the House by a 217 to 203 vote, and will be referred to the U.S. Senate. Yet, starting in
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abolished on any other grounds, such as high administrative costs perceived to be
associated with them, although I think they should not.

11

Part I of this Article presents the two major schools of thought- those who
object to pain-and-suffering in tort law and those who think it is an empirical
question- and criticizes the arguments supporting them.12 It starts first with scholars
who theorize that people do not demand pain-and-suffering coverage at all . It is worth
pausing for a second in order to briefly mention some of the arguments mentioned by
these scholars to support their claim of lack of demand for pain-and-suffering
coverage. Several scholars take the loss of a child as the paradigmatic case of pain and-suffering loss. George Priest and Robert Cooter point out that parents do not
typically purchase insurance on the life of a minor child because “the child’s death
will not affect the flow of money into the family.” John Calfee and Clifford Winston
present a somewhat similar intuition and argue that parents who send their child to a
swimming camp would pay a substantial amount for even a marginal reduction in the
risk of death of their child, but would probably pay very little for insurance against
such a risk. Alan Schwartz distinguishes between pecuniary losses and non-pecuniary
losses by comparing and contrasting “replaceable” and “irreplaceable” losses: a
replaceable loss should be fully compensated (because it has an equivalent
commodity in the market so monetary award can make the victim whole), while an
irreplaceable loss may only be, at best, partially compensable (because money can
never compensate for that loss). Pain-and-suffering, Schw artz argues, is an
irreplaceable loss. Schwartz has also argued that a business executive who runs
recreationally and who loses a foot in an accident could substitute reading for running,
which means that her post-accident need for money has decreased and therefore the
executive would not want to insure against such a pain-and-suffering loss. In a similar
manner Kip Viscusi wonders why one would need pain-and-suffering compensation
for an extremely severe injury, for example when she is comatose. He then shifts to
the case of a minor injury, such as food poisoning which interrupts a planned evening
out, and wonders whether people really need extra money for that state of affairs. Part

1995, the House has passed legislation about a half-dozen times that would impose caps on malpractice
awards. Each of those efforts died in the Senate.
11
In a recent working paper I discuss these issues as well and argue that pain-and-suffering should not
be abolished on any other ground. Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A
Critique of the Current Approaches and a Proposal for a Change (on file with the author).
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I discusses all this and much more, and makes the argument that this armchair
theorizing type of approach cannot be defended.
It then continues by discussing the approach taken by Steve Shavell. While
agreeing with Shavell that whether people would demand pain-and-suffering coverage
is an experimental, or empirical, question as well as agreeing with Shavell’s formal
economic analysis of this question, I argue that Shavell’s interpretation of his
mathematical results has no normative grounds because it relies on assumptions that
most economists do not make, especially not when dealing with an individual’s
decision theory. These assumptions, as will be explained in detail below, are cardinal
utility and interpersonal comparability of utility. This part concludes that: a) the
question of whether a “sovereign consumer” would demand full coverage for pain and-suffering damages, partial coverage or no coverage at all, cannot be answered a
priori by means of theoretical analysis; b) it is an empirical, or experimental, question
that cannot be fully answered by investigating the markets; and c) once adequately
articulated could receive at least some prima fascie support in laboratory studies.
Indeed, scholars recognized the need for empirical or experimental studies
regarding the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage. Patricia Danzon, Kip Viscusi
and John Calfee & Clifford Winston are among the few who have attempted to do
so. 13 The third part criticizes the methodology of these attempts, and questions their
results. It makes the argument that these studies’ recommendations cannot serve as a
policy making aid for denying pain -and-suffering coverage in tort law.
12

I will not discuss the approach taken by Croley and Hanson who do a lot of armchair-theoretical work
to argue that people will demand pain-and-suffering coverage. See Croley and Hanson supra note 7
(who provide also some empirical observations to support their claim). The reason I do not discuss
their work is that I try to write this paper as much as possible within the conventional law and
economics assumptions. Croley and Hanson argue that people’s marginal utility of income is
dependent, among other things, on their overall utility. A utility function which satisfy this requirement
is the exponential utility function which marginal utility is equal to its overall utility. But this means
that the utility function is convex in wealth, implying risk liking attitude towards wealth, which
contradicts their assumption of people’s risk aversion. This difficulty to formalize their otherwise
interesting insight is why I ignore their approach. As I believe I am able to show within the
conventional framework that indeed there is a demand for pain and suffering coverage, I reach the
same conclusion they do, but without inconsistently making implicit assumptions about people’s risk
aversion.
13
George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be Defended?, 9 YALE J. REG. 237, 247
(1992). W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Has Voodoo Economics Come To Courts?, 3 J. OF
FORENSIC ECON. 1, 13 (1990); Viscusi’s work attempts to measure people’s perception of their post
accident marginal utility. See for example: W. KIP V ISCUSI, R EFORMING PRODUCT LIABILITY (1991).
Calffee and Winston’s study compares the difference between people’s willingness to pay to prevent an
accident, and their willingness to pay to insure the resulting. John E. Calfee & Clifford Winston, The
Consumer Welfare Effects of Liability for Pain and Suffering: An Exploratory Analysis, B ROOKINGS
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Part three presents the methodology and results of three experimental studies I
researched in order to study the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage. Most
importantly, I was interested to know whether participants perceive any difference
between monetary and non-monetary coverage. In my studies, participants faced four
insurance decisions involving the purchase of four different types of products:
padding for roller skates ($40), a portable saw ($100) computer monitor ($250), and
tires for a car ($800). For each product, participants had to state the price they were
willing to pay, above the price of the product, for monetary and for pain-and-suffering
insurance. Before answering the questions, participants were told that they had no
other rights whatsoever to a remedy for any loss as result of an accident besides the
insurance coverage that they were about to buy. I then compared the demand for
monetary coverage with the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage.
My results in all studies show that the vast majority of the participants (90% in
Study 1, 75% in study 2 and 71% in study 3) treated the two types of insurance the
same- either they buy them both or they buy neither. Moreove r, on average, in all
studies the majority of participants (in the state of full information 14) treated both
types of insurance exactly the same- namely, they paid exactly the same amount of
money for both types of insurance. Of those who did not treat it the same, the vast
majority preferred monetary to pain-and-suffering insurance.
The third part then concludes that there is prima fascie evidence of some
demand for pain-and-suffering coverage in the context of product liability. Unifying
conclusion, avenues for future research and further theoretical inquiries are presented
at the last part.
I. THE C ONTEMPORARY THEORITCAL F RAMEWORK FOR DEALING
WITH PAIN - AND-SUFFERING
The basic theoretical framework adopted in this paper is a welfarist one, which
asserts that policy decisions be made solely based on their effects on the welfare of
individuals in society. 15 The welfare of individuals may be understood through the

PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS Vol 1993(1) at 133, which will be discussed
below.
14
T he studies differed with respect to their informational structure, one study was a “between” subject
design and the other was a “within” subject design vis -à-vis the information subjects had about the
probability of a product failure and the magnitude of loss.
15
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 H ARV . L. R EV. 961, 988 (2001).
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“consumer sovereignty” norm.16 Under the consumer sovereignty norm, the State
should increase individuals’ welfare by responding to their preferences. Thus, if it is
found through analysis that individuals have a preference for pain-and-suffering
insurance, that is that they demand pain-and-suffering coverage in a hypothetical firstparty insurance market (in a world without legal remedies for torts committed), then
the State should respond accordingly, absent conflicting interests. This is the
“insurance theory” of tort law.
There are many implications in adopting the “insurance theory” to tort law.
Some of these implications will be discussed herein.
First, we should ignore all sorts of efficiency arguments. Pain-and-suffering
damages could cause manufacturers to internalize the full costs of their tortious
conduct and control their care level. It would also signal uninformed consumers to
the full social costs of the products, thereby controlling the activity level. These are
efficiency arguments, which for our purposes should be ignored. 17
Second, and related, the first-party insurance externalities should also be
ignored. Hanson and Logue coined the term “[f]irst-party insurance externality.” This
refers to two related phenomena. It relates to the fact that insurers rarely segregate
insureds into risk pools according to their risk. As a result, high-risk insureds are
cross-subsidized by low-risk insureds. 18 It also relates to the fact that individuals’
insurance decisions include externalities such as the cost of care-giving that family

16

See for example, R. Musgrave, T H E T HEORY OF P UBLIC F INCANCE 14 (1959).
Recall that the deterrence implications of pain-and-suffering damages are hardly controversial.
Furthermore, Geistfeld has analytically shown that once deterrence considerations are taken into
account and when relaxing the assumption of perfect information by consumers, rational individuals
will always demand some pain-and-suffering coverage. Mark Geistefeld, Placing a Price on Pain and
Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Non-monetary Injuries, 83 CAL.
L. R EV. 775, 797-800. Viscusi argued that “the primary rationale presumably should be that of
deterrence.” The reason lies in the fact that “the linkage of pain-and -suffering at the time of injury to
optimal insurance is unclear. At the time when the insurance will be paid, the pain-and -suffering
related to the injury will have already been experienced. Compensation will be paid when the accident
victim is healthy. In such a context, it is difficult to justify the award of pain-and-suffering based on the
structure of individual utility functions after the victim’s recovery.” W. Kip Viscusi, A Comment on
Calfee and Winston, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS Vol 1993(1), at
175, 179. Viscusi seems to ignore the fact that victims may take out loans, while relying on future
compensation they expect to receive in the form of pain-and -sufferin g damages.
18
John D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First- party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification
for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. R EV. 129 (1991). (“[f]irst-party insurers rarely and imperfectly
adjust premiums according to an individual consumer’s decisions concerning exactly what products she
will purchase, and how carefully she will consume them….This failure by first-party insurers to adjust
premiums according to consumption choices gives rise to a first-party insurance externality.”). Id. at
136.
17
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members and volunteers have to bear, the psychological effects of disability on the
family of the disabled, society members, etc. 19
Third, we should avoid an alternative, paternalistic, approach that objects to
understanding the individual’s welfare as satisfying their preferences. Under the
alternative approach, an efficiency-oriented policymaker should not check whether
people’s ex-ante perception is that accidents would increase or decrease their welfare
(more specifically, their post-accident marginal utility), but whether their actual
welfare has increased or decreased. One argument for the alternative approach is that
people lack sufficient information and/or mental capabilities to make calculated
decisions regarding possible pain -and-suffering losses. 20 Perhaps a more radical
version of this argument would be that the neoclassical notion of “preference
satisfaction” should not serve as the measuring tool for designing tort law, because
well being and preference satisfaction can diverge. 21 Thus, according to this radical
view, society should consult people’s desir es, but respond to them only to the extent
that it would actually increase their well-being. 22
Fourth, we should ignore the corrective justice rationale concerning tort law.
As demonstrated below, a major argument in the insurance theory is that individuals
would never demand pain-and-suffering coverage for accidents in which their post-

19

Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, And the Kingdom of the III: A Critique of the
Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. R EV. 9, 139-142 (1993).
20
See also, id . at 91. Laboratory-studies (in which participants are asked for their preferences) elicit
non-informed, in fact ignorant people’s, preferences and thus should not serve as an aide for the
policymaker. Field-studies (in which different markets are observed to see whether there is a demand
for pain-and-suffering damages) could not provide the answer because in addition to people’s inherent
ignorance with respect to pain-and -suffering there are different forms of supply-side market failures
(like moral hazard and adverse selection) that prevent pain-and-suffering damages from emerging in
real markets. See, Croley and Hanson, supra note 7. In addition as Viscusi admits there are
methodological problems with eliciting people’s State-dependent utility functions from market
evidence.
21
Thomas Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. OF PHIL. 659 (1975); Amartya K. Sen, Rational
Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. A FF. 317 (1977);
John Broome, Choice and Value in Economics, 30 OXFORD ECON. P APERS 313 (1978); Allan Gibbard,
Interpersonal Comparisons: Preference, Good, and the Intrinsic Reward of a Life, in F OUNDATIONS OF
SOCIAL C HOICE T HEORY 165, 173-75 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986); See also, Feldman,
supra note 10, at 1582. Feldman argues that the divergence is not just for children, addicts and alike,
but for people in general. “It is possible that a fully informed, rational person might prefer to sacrifice
some of his own well-being in return for another good, such as art, environmental conservation, or
other’s well being.” Id at 1583. Feldman warns against the circularity in claiming that whatever people
desire increases their well-being. Id. In her view, “it might be paternalistic to disregard people’s
preferences when assessing their well being, doing so may also benefit them.” Id. at 1584. In her view,
“for any given person, satisfying his preferences and establishing his well being may be identical,
overlapping, or wholly at odds.” Id. at 1585. Sen has made a similar point. Amartya Sen, Interpersonal
Comparisons of Welfare, in CHOICE , WELFARE AND M EASUREMENT 264 (1982)
22
Feldman, supra note 10, at 1582
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accident marginal utility of money decreases. This is because under that state-of-theworld they would require fewer funds. Consider, for example, the case of a victim of
severe burns, where her post accident marginal utility of money has decreased. If this
person has a non-pecuniary loss of $50,000, insurance theory advises that the victim
would receive less than the full $50,000. In this case, the very injury that is wrongful
and that we seek to redress under principles of corrective justice is itself the insurance
theory’s justification for reducing compensation even further.23
Again, we should ignore each of these problems and adopt, as legal
economists do, the most basic insurance theory for pain-and-suffering losses. The
next part of this paper explores several leading approaches taken by legal economists.
A. The approach taken by Scholars who deny pain-and-suffering damages in
tort law.
1. The approach taken by Alan Schwartz

Alan Schwartz developed a theoretical background showing why the relevant
theoretical framework needs to be based on the question of what an (hypothetical)
“optimal contract” between a “sovereign consumer” and her first-party insurer should
be. In his classic paper, Schwartz analyzed the “consumer sovereignty norm” as a
basis for policymaking. Based on this framework, Schwartz set forth a list of
proposals for reforming tort law. One of his main proposals is that tort law should not
provide pain-and-suffering damages.24
In his detailed analysis, which was designed to provide the theoretical support
for his list of proposals, Schwartz makes a fundamental error which renders his entire
analysis indecisive.25
23

Pryor, supra note 18, at 137-39.
In his introduction, Schwartz argues that “tort recoveries for pain-and-suffering and the like should
be abolished.” Proposals for Reform, at 356. Schwartz goes on to argue that “courts…should deny
strict liability for nonpecuniary harm for three reasons.” Id. at 411. One of the reasons he offers is that
“denying liability will result in consumers purchasing the appropriate amount of insurance.” Id. Both
the conclusion and the argument for it contradict his views as expressed in the main parts of this article.
As one of his conclusions, Schwartz argues that “firms should be strictly liable only for pecuniary
harm.” Id. at 414 and that there is a need for “eliminating strict liability for non -pecuniary losses.” Id.
at 415.
25
His language in this section is much less decisive than his language in the list of proposals for
reform. For example, when analyzing the “optimal contract” that a well-informed consumer will
demand, Schwartz argues that this contract would “probably not compensate him for nonpecuniary
harm.” (Italic added). Id. at 361. When summarizing the insurance decision Schwartz argues that “it is
unlikely, though not certain , that this contract would require any insurance against …pain-and24
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Schwartz’s starting point is a basic economic theory that “consumers will
insure against risks whose materialization would increase their marginal utility for
money.”26 This occurs either because consumers have a lower post-accident wealth,
i.e., when they suffer the loss of a valuable asset, whether a tangible item or future
income; or because they would have greater post-accident need for money. 27 The
former represents a “replaceable” monetary loss, which can be wholly remedied with
sufficient monetary compensation. The latter represents only a “substitutable” loss,
usually a non-monetary loss, which may never be completely replaced. However, the
loss could be somewhat mitigated by monetary compensation.
The degree of required coverage for a substitutable loss depends on the nature
and value of the substitute. Schwartz admits that the ex-ante demand for pain-andsuffering damages is an empirical question which is dependent upon whether the
victim’s post-accident marginal utility increases or decreases as a result of the loss. 28
Until this point, Schwartz’s approach is not significantly different from the
approach taken by other economists, like Steve Shavell for example. However, unlike
Shavell (whose approach will be discussed below), Schwartz adopts the “no demand
for pain -and-suffering insurance view.” The reason is that he believes that people will
not demand pain-and-suffering coverage even in cases where the post -accident
marginal utility increases. Schwartz argues that scholars failed to recognize “income
effects” which enter the equation and change the individual situation. Specifically, his
argument is that “accidents make people poorer in a utility sense” and thus their postaccident demand for normal goods and services will decrease. 29 Anticipating this,
Schwartz argues that informed consumers will purchase less than full coverage for
non-pecuniary losses, even with respect to losses that increase the marginal utility of
money. 30

suffering…” then he goes on to say that “the appropriate default rule, then, probably should allocate
the risk…of incurring nonpecuniary harms to consumers.” Id. at 367 (italics added).
26
Id. at 363.
27
Id. at 362.
28
For example, Schwartz argues with respect to pain-and-suffering losses, that “whether people
actually want the ability to console themselves …[by consuming consoling goods], and so will buy
insurance to permit such consolations, or whether people would choose just to suffer is an empirical
issue.” Id. at 364.
29
Id. at 366.
30
Id.
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Unfortunately, this is the only argument Schwartz provides to support his
surprising conclusion. This argument is flawed. 31
First, Schwartz’s argument is not part of the neoclassical framework, despite
his efforts to make it so. Equating a decrease in wealth with a decrease in health and
imputing to the latter “income effects” is wrong. A decrease in health has nothing to
do with income effects, but more with the unknown nomenclature of “health
effects.”32
Second, by merely assuming that a decrease in the utility reduces consumption
of goods and services, Schwartz does not derive his conclusion from basic premises
(as economists usually do), but rather initially assumes what he desires to prove.
Schwartz has neither a sound theoretical framework nor empirical evidence to support
his assumption. 33
Third, there is no reason not to apply the same “income effects” to monetary
losses. The argument would be that informed consumers, anticipating the income
effect, will purchase less than full coverage for pecuniary losses even though these
loses increase the marginal utility of money. If that were so, Schwartz should oppose
full monetary compensation as well. Since he does not seem to do that, he is not only
wrong, but also inconsistent. 34

2.

The approach taken by George Priest & Robert Cooter

Both Priest and Cooter have independently written about the question of pain and-suffering damages in tort law. Both argue that tort law should not (in general)
provide pain-and-suffering damages since people would never buy pain-and-suffering
31

Other scholars have already observed the fallacy in this argument. See the footnotes below.
Ellen Pryor has made the same point. See P ryor, supra note 18, at 103 n.41. Hanson and Logue also
criticized Schwartz for making this argument, but for different reasons. Hanson and Logue showed a
neglected second, offsetting income effect, due to a liability rule requiring that manufacturers
internalize, on deterrence grounds, non-pecuniary losses. See Id. at 185-6.
33
Indeed as Feldman argues, “Schwartz’s thesis about “income effects” depends upon doubtful
psychological premises regarding the connection between nonpecuniary loss, total utility, and the
marginal utility of money.” Feldman, at 1576.
34
Moreover, what economists call “income-effects” cannot go hand in hand with the assumption that
utility from wealth and utility from health are independent of each other, or additive separable. But this
is exactly the assumption that economists made in their model where they derived the results that the
demand for pain-and-suffering insurance depends on the post accident marginal utility. Another
problem with Schwartz’s approach is, although he is aw are that the mismatch between product prices
and product real risks is due to market imperfections, he argues that risk information would have to be
disseminated to consumers in order to provide optimal incentives for purchases of risky products.
32
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insurance in a first-party insurance market. Their first argument to support this view is
that bec ause we do not observe individuals’ voluntarily purchasing pain-and-suffering
coverage in the insurance markets, the State should not provide it in tort law.35
However, as Priest himself admits, and as will be discussed below, the first-party
insuranc e market suffers from several “supply -side” impediments to providing pain
and-suffering coverage. For example, the fact that the market does not supply us with
$10 laptops does not mean that there is no demand for such a product. Rather, there is
a problem supplying it. Inherently, insurance markets are regulated and thus
imperfectly competitive. In addition, they suffer from problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection, especially with respect to non-pecuniary losses. The convention is
that if there are flaws that prevent the market from providing something, the
policymaker should intervene and provide what the market cannot. It is flawed logic
to admit that there are market failures and still claim that the fact there is no pain-andsuffering coverage in the market demonstrates that there is no demand for such
coverage. 36 The relevant question, therefore, is whether there is a demand for painand-suffering coverage in a hypothetical insurance market in which consumers are
assumed rational and fully informed. 37
Priest’s and Cooter’s next claim is that even when assuming away any supply side impediments, rational individuals will not demand pain-and-suffering coverage.
Priest and Cooter reach this conclusion in several ways. First, they presuppose that
non-monetary losses do not generally increase an individual’s post-accident marginal
utility for money. Thus, they arrive at the conclusion that individuals will never
purchase indemnity against these losses. However, as other economists have admitted,

However, in most circumstances there seems to be no efficient way of communicating risk levels to
consumers. Calfee and Rubin, at 402.
35
Margaret Radin argued that what precludes purchase of insurance may not be irrationality but rather
incommensurability. (“If it is empirically true that consumers do not insure themselves against their
own pain and suffering, the best interpretation of their failure to insure may be not that they are
maximizing how much they value their money over different possible states of their health, but rather
that they are affirming the incommensurability between pain and suffering and dollars. Perhaps the
purchase of pain and suffering insurance would signify to people that their own pain and suffering is a
commodity replaceable with money. Perhaps people reject this conception of their own pain and its
connection to themselves.”) Margaret Jane Radin, Essay: Compensation And Commensurability, 43
DUKE L.J. 56, 70. This argument is beyond the scope of the Article.
36
Again, there is also the problem of consumers not having perfect information about the products. As
Viscusi admits individuals are not fully aware of the risks they are facing and thus do not make optimal
insurance purchasing decisions. Viscusi, Reforming Product Liability, at n.7. As mentioned above I
ignore consumers’ imperfect information.
37
Indeed, this is the question that Steve Shavell and W. Kip Viscusi ask. See the discussion in Part B
below.
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it is not clear whether optimal insurance should provide people with pain-andsuffering coverage. This is because it is not clear a-priori whether pain-and-suffering
losses increase, decrease, or have no impact on, an individuals’ post -accident
marginal utility for money. 38 Priest and Cooter simply assume that which they desire
to prove.
Priest then raises a distributive justice justification for not having pain-andsuffering damages in tort law. 39 In his view, tort law, which is essentially third-party
insurance, “requires low-income consumers to subsidize high-income consumers”. 40
This occurs because manufacturers must lump consumers into undifferentiated risk
pools, charging consumers the same premiums regardless of their income. Since highincome consumers impose a higher expected loss (because the future loss-of-income
component is larger), low -income consumers cross-subsidize them. This is a
regressive result.
While this might well be true, it is not clear how it relates to pain-andsuffering damages. Priest responds by saying that pain-and-suffering damages cause
this regressive result because they correlate with the consumer’s income.41 But Priest
does not provide any empirical support for this claim.42 Moreover, even if there were
sound empirical evidence showing that jury awards pain and suffering damages on the
basis of the victim’s income, from a normative perspective this seems wrong. Why
should victims’ income have any effect on the pain and suffering awards they receive

38

Cooter, however, restricts this no -demand claim to “minor accidents.” Cooter claims that in major
accidents, if the pain-and-suffering loss is “serious” then it might “curtail earnings” and thus justify
compensation as a “regular” monetary loss. Cooter’s analysis is problematic on two grounds. First, the
important distinction is between major and minor losses, and not whether it is a monetary or a nonmonetary loss. As he admits, a rational individual will not insure even against a small monetary loss
(because of high administrative costs for small claims as well as for controlling moral hazard). Id.
Second, there is no reason to assume that any large non -monetary loss curtails individual’s earnings.
For example, if someone negligently severely scars Cooter’s face, Cooter might suffer only a negligible
monetary loss yet still a large non-monetary loss. Cooter, Unmatured Torts, at 392. Priest, in his turn
cannot possibly mean what he says. Priest claims that insurance is a mechanism of equalizing utility
from money over different States of the world, which leads him to the conclusion that there is no room
for pain-and -suffering coverage (and thus for pain-and-suffering damages in tort law). If at all,
insurance should be seen as a mechanism for maximizing utility from money (which is tantamount to
equalizing the marginal utility from money) and not of equalizing it.
39
Priest and Cooter also suggest an additional intuition to support their conclusion. Their argument,
which builds on the lack of life insurance for children, will be discussed in section 3 (a) below.
40
Priest, at 1559.
41
Id.
42
One may even argue, if at all, that it is negatively correlated with individuals’ income because life
teaches us that in awarding pain-and-suffering damages, a jury can express charity towards a poor
victim whose life has been hard enough even before the accident.
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for their injury? Therefore, since none of Cooter’s and Priest’s arguments are valid,
their view cannot serve as an aid in the making of public policy.
3. Intuition

Economic models aside, there still remains the issue of intuition. Indeed,
scholars have tried to persuade the legal academia that pain-and-suffering coverage is
unwarranted by appealing to their intuition. This part surveys these intuitions,
explores their nature, and offers alternative intuitions to consider. The last section
presents an intuition concerning another prevalent doctrine in compensation law that
cannot be easily reconciled with the scholars’ intuition regarding pain-and-suffering
losses.
a. People do not insure their children’s lives.
The lack of demand for insurance on children’s lives is perhaps the most
prevalently cited intuition that supporters of the elimination of pain-and-suffering
damages discuss. 43 For example, Priest and Cooter support their claim of lack of
demand for pain-and-suffering coverage by pointing out that parents do not typically
purchase insurance on the life of a minor child. They reason that “the child’s death
will not affect the flow of money into the family.”44 As prevalent as it is, this
observation, even if correct, could not serve as a valid argument for the lack of
demand for pain-and-suffering coverage for the following reasons.
Priest and Cooter draw their conclusion based on their observation of the
market, despite their understanding that observing the market is problematic. This is
due to a variety of failures within the market (which were discussed above).
Specifically, in regard to our case, what Priest and Cooter overlook is that there might
be other forces that prevent a substantial market for children’s life insurance from
43

See for example, STEVE SHAVELL, ECONOMIC A NALYSIS OF A CCIDENT LAW 134 (1987) and more
recently, Louis Kaplow & Steve Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, N.B.E.R. working paper 6960
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6960 at 8. Calfee and Winston bring this intuition to demonstrate the
deadweight loss associated with pain-and-suffering damages. See Calfee & Winston, supra note 12, at
13.
44
Id. at 1546; See also, Cooter, U nmatured Tort, at 394. Shavell argues that both the pecuniary and the
non-pecuniary components of awards for the death of children is often zero. Id at 134 n.14. This might
lead one to the conclusion that as the total loss associated with the death of children is zero, parents
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emerging. As Croley and Hanson demonstrate, social norms may serve to impede the
supply-side development of such markets. Simply put, there are social norms against
being in a position in which a person may receive a benefit from the death of a child,
regardless of whether the death results in a monetary or non-monetary loss. 45
Unlike Cooter, Priest admits that if the child were an adult providing financial
support to the parents, it would make sense to purchase insurance on her life. Despite
Priest’s admission, even this type of insurance is not regularly observed in the market.
This provides further evidence that markets do not operate as the economic theory in
this case seems to predict. Moreover, Priest apparently neglects the fact that most
minor children eventually become adults who most like ly will support their parents, if
needed. Thus, according to Priest’s own logic, parents should purchase insurance on
the life of their minor child even to merely cover their lost monetary support when
they grow old. In fact, US courts, in determining damages in child mortality cases,
tend to assess the future support parents would have received from their children upon
aging. 46
should not be compensated at all, as they have not lost anything valuable. However, Shavell does seem
to support the awarding of damages for the death of children. Id at 134.
45
Consider a question that a neighbor might ask you: “So now, when your kid has di ed and you got a
million dollars, are you REALLY sad?” Even Croley and Hanson, not to mention Viscusi, seem to not
realize that the social norms may prevent the emergence of even monetary insurance on your beloved
ones. Viscusi, Sounding Rationale, at 156.
46
In wrongful death actions where the victim was a child, courts and/or legislatures guide juries to
calculate the “pecuniary value” of the child by considering what the parents would otherwise have
received in their expected later years from their (then) adult children. This is calculated in terms of
what it would cost to obtain comparable care from nurses and comparable advice and counseling from
advisers and therapists. See Green vs. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210 (N.J. 1980). Indeed, one may argue that
children may be, in addition to anything else, a good insurance mechanism for the costs associated with
aging. While this is conventional wisdom in some non-western societies, where in such societies the
children, or at least the older child, traditionally take care of the parents’ needs when they age, it is less
obvious in modern western societies. First, in modern western societies one can purchase long-term
care insurance so the need for support upon aging could be taken care via the insurance market. Yet, in
a recent paper Meier argued that it may be irrational for young people to purchase long-term care
insurance. Volker Meier, Why the Yong do Not Buy Long -Term Care Insurance, 18 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 83 (1999). In addition, aging people need care, which is comprised of many expenses
not covered by long-care insurance. Indeed, in 1993 there were only 3.4 million private policies sold,
which accounts for five to six percent of the elderly. Edward C. Norton, Long Tern Care, H ANDBOOK
OF HEALTH ECONOMICS (V OLUME 1B) 978. A Second reason why in western societies it is less likely
that children serve as an economic investment against aging is that, one might argue, the cost of raising
children in a western society is much higher than the expected costs associated with aging and
therefore it does not make sense to view children as an insurance mechanism for aging. Saving the cost
of raising them would have been financially wiser, or at least so goes the argument. But that the cost of
raising children is much higher than the expected costs associated with aging is not necessarily true.
Focusing again on just part of the cost associated with aging, nursing home care costs about $55,000 a
year. General Accounting Office. “Long-Term Care Insurance: Better Information Critical to
Prospective Purchasers.” Sept. 2000: GAO/T-HEHS-00-196:1. As the average stay is around three
years, aging parents will need about $330,000, only for that purpose. The cost of raising a child,
assuming no inflation within the children's lifetime, is about $165,000, in 2000 dollars, for a middle-
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Moreover, upon careful examination, life insurance for children could be
justified by economic reasons.

One such reason would be to preserve a child’s

insurability. A child’s insurability is preserved because the underwriting process is
fairly minimal at such an early age. Beyond basic questions on an application form,
no medical exam is performed. 47 A parent can then purchase additional policies when
the insured child reaches certain ages. 48 Because these additional policies can be
purchased several times over the insured’s life, a policy with a small initial face
amount can turn into several policies that could become a substantial part of the
insured’s life insurance portfolio. 49 Importantly, if at the time of the additional
purchases the insured child became totally disabled the parent will still be able to
purchase the additional policies. 50 Thus, the insured’s family (either her parents or her
spouse or kids, if any) is afforded much higher protection than it might otherwise
receive, such as if the insured has become totally disabled and therefore uninsurable

income family. Lino, Mark. 2001. Expenditures on Children by Families, 2000 Annual Report. U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion. Miscellaneous Publication No.
1528-2000. http://www.usda.gov/cnpp/Crc/Crc2000.pdf. Meidcare pays just part of these costs and
only for days 21 to 100. The chances of needing long-term care are more than 2 in 5. (Compare to the
chances of needing to use one’s homeowner’s insurance which are 1 in 88 and the chances of having an
auto accident which are 1 in 47.) Robert Dawson,“Long-Term Care Insurance: A Product for Today,”
Journal of the American Society of CLU & ChFC Sept. 1999: 72. If these numbers are correct,
assuming, as the common law does, that children will support their parents when they age, it may be
beneficial, after all, from a purely self-interest economic perspective, to have children. Some may
object to this entire line of analysis refusing to believe that parents possibly make such ‘cold blooded’
calculations regarding their economic benefit of raising children. Yet, it is enough for our purposes to
assume that parents act ‘as if’ they take all this into account. Indeed, it is conventional in health
economics literature to think about different forms of interactions between aging, children and
insurance. See for example Norton, Long Tern Care, id. at 979, who describes different such studies
one of which argues that people do not buy long care insurance because it reduces the price to the
children of institutionalizing a parent, relative to the cost of giving personal attention.
47
Unless conditions are raised on the application which attract the underwriter’s attention. See for
example a policy application for an infant with the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company (on
file with the author) which contains standard medical treatment questions, but requires no medical
examination.
48
The amount of these additional policies is specified at the time of application. For example, a policy
with the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company on an infant issued in 1995 with an initial face
amount of $25,000 allows additional policies to be purchased on the policy anniversaries occurring
closest to the insured’s 22nd, 25th, 28th, 31st, 34th, 37th, and 40th birthdays.
49
For example, in the policy at note ???, supra, the owner of the policy may purchase additional
policies with a $20,000 face amount on each specified policy anniversary dates. If this option is
exercised every time it becomes available, this would result in $140,000 of additional coverage, so the
initial $25,000 policy could eventually reach a face amount of $165,000. The only underwriting that
occurs when the additional purchase option is exercised is that the premium amount is adjusted based
on the insured’s cigarette smoking habits if the initial policy was purchased before the insured’s
eighteenth birthday.
50
And the premium will be waived for these new policies – es sentially, the insured is able to receive
additional coverage for free if they have become disabled since the first policy was issued.
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since the first policy was issued. There could be other economic reasons that justify
life insurance on children. 51
Indeed, despite all the impediments, one is able find a demand for this type of
insurance. 52 Children’s life, or accident, insurance is especially prevalent when there
is no fear of moral hazard as schools’ filed trips’ accident insurance.
Calfee and Winston present a somewhat similar intuition. They argue that
parents who send their child to a swimming camp would pay a substantial amount for
even a marginal reduction in the risk of death of their child, but would pr obably pay
very little for insurance against such a risk. 53 Although Calfee and Winston are
probably correct in their intuition (indeed their empirical work, for whatever it is
worth, confirms this), the example itself is irrelevant to whether there exists a demand
for this type of pain -and-suffering coverage. The reasoning is that the same intuition
applies to monetary losses as well. Elementary economic principles teach us that even
risk- neutral individuals would pay to reduce risks of even monetary losses for which
they might not otherwise insure. 54 The same logic applies for risk-averse individuals.
Accordingly, people are willing to pay more to efficiently prevent losses than to
insure against them. This is true regardless of the nature of the loss. As an alternative
example of this type of intuition, consider the case in which a farmer would pay more
to efficiently prevent the theft of his milking cow than to insure against her theft. 55
Here, the loss is monetary and Calfee and Winston’s intuition would still apply. 56

51

There may be some tax benefits for such life insurance.
Croley and Hanson argued that 14 percent of all ordinary life insurance policies are for the lives of
children under the age of fifteen, and the average benefits from those policies is $22,000. Id. at 1880.
At n.302 they provide couple of examples. E.g., Student Accident Insurance (1989-1990) (underwritten
by the Equitable Life Assurance Society), Athletic Accident Insurance Program (1989) (underwritten
by the All American Life Insurance Company).
53
Calfee & Winston, supra note 12, at 134.
54
Consider the following example. Suppose that a house is worth $300,000 and there is a 1:1000
chance (0.1%) that it would burn down in a fire. Further, suppose that a smoke detector reduces
expected loss by $100.00 and that a sprinkler system reduces the expected loss by another $100.00. If
the smoke detector costs $90.00, and the sprinkler system $110.00, a rational risk-neutral person will
purchase a smoke detector system and not a sprinkler system. However, a rational risk-neutral person
would have no incentive to buy insurance that offered $100,000 in compensation for a premium of
$100.00 (which is the minimum the insurance company would be required to offer). The point here is
that a rational risk-neutral person will undertake all risk reduction activities up to the point where the
incremental benefit of the activity is equal to the incremental cost.
55
The reason is that if there are cost-justified precautions that the farmer does not take, then insurance
companies would charge much higher premiums; this is the problem of moral hazard.
52
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b. What would you need the money for anyway?
Viscusi appeals to our intuition by discussing why one would need money for
an extremely severe injury, for example when she is comatose. He then shifts to the
other extreme, and delves into a case of a minor injury, such as food poisoning which
interrupts with a planned evening out. Viscusi wonders whether people really need
extra money for that state of affairs. 57
We must first observe that Viscusi presents two extreme injury cases (very
minor and extremely acute). He then attempts to extrapolate from that presentation in
order to analyze cases in the middle of the spectrum. This logic is flawed. There is no
logical reason to assume that even if people did not demand pain-and-suffering
coverage both for minor and extremely severe injuries, they would not demand it for
ordinary ones as well.
Second, Viscusi’s example of a minor pain-and-suffering loss is appealing
precisely because the loss is minor and not because it is one of pain-and-suffering. It
would be equally appealing if we replace the example of minor food poisoning with a
minor monetary loss such as losing the theatre tickets for that evening. Most people
would probably not have insurance for such a loss, even if it increases their marginal
utility of money. If Viscusi’s example involved a major pain-and-suffering loss such
as facial burns, it is not so obvious that one would not prefer to receive funds in that
situation.
Third, Viscusi’s example of a comatose victim is intuitive, not because it is a
pain-and-suffering loss (indeed, it is not clear that one suffers at all in such a
situation), but because the loss is so acute. To be sure, the same intuition applies when
one considers purchasing medical insura nce, a form of monetary coverage.
Individuals might purchase health insurance to cover medical costs for every possible
health risk, save for the event of a coma. 58 Individuals may well think that they prefer

56

The insurance company, too, for reasons related to moral hazard would prefer that cow owner spend
her first dollars on prevention before she purchase insurance.
57
He asks “do you live it up in order to compensate for the welfare loss you have suffered or do you
skip the planned evening out, saving the money until you are well?” Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering:
Damages in Search of a sounder Rationale, 1 M ICH. L. & POL. R EV. 141, 156 (1996) (Hereinafter
Viscusi Sounder Rationale).
58
Feldman argues that courts should compensate comatose plaintiffs not only for their medical
expenses but also with a sum of money to increase the plaintiffs’ mental state, thereby increasing their
capacity to flourish. Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort
Compensation, 75 TX L.R. 1567, 1593.
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to have more money in the present than in the event of being in a comatose state,
despite the possibility that money would be required to sustain their life.

c. A pain-and-suffering loss is irreplaceable and, therefore, should not
be compensated.
Building on Philip J. Cook and Daniel A. Graham’s observations and theories,
Alan Schwartz distinguishes between pecuniary losses and non-pecuniary losses by
comparing and contrasting “replaceable” and “irreplaceable” goods. 59 A replaceable
good is one that has an equivalent commodity in the market. Here, a monetary award
can make the victim whole. An irreplaceable good is one that has only a substitute
commodity in the market. In this case, although money can almost never fully
compensate for the loss, it can perhaps mitigate it. In summary, a replaceable loss
should be fully compensated, while an irreplaceable loss may only be partially
compensable. 60
However, the test to determine whether an asset can be replaced is either
under -inclusive or over-inclusive.61 If the replaceability test is applied to the original
loss as a whole (such as a paralyzed body or a loss of mental and functional capacity),
then even the costs associated with basic medical care cannot be viewed as pecuniary
under the replaceability test.

This is because the medical treatment is ofte n not

completely restorative. 62 The test is then rendered under-inclusive.
Nevertheless, this result cannot be the intention of legal economists, as they all
support compensation for basic medical expenses. In contrast, if the replaceability test
were applied in such a way that restoration itself was the equivalent commodity to the
injury, then much expenditure that traditionally was not considered pecuniary (i.e.
recreation and physical therapies, psychological counseling, professional retraining,

59

The distinction is based on Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for insurance and
Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities , 91 Q.J. Econ., 143 (1977).
60
Shavell acknowledges that the question of irreplaceability depends on technological progress in
medical care: “[C]ertain types of injury that at one time might have resulted in permanent loss of health
or in disfigurement might today be largely remediable and thus involve mainly pecuniary losses (costs
of medical care and forgone income).” Shavell at 133.
61
Pryor, supra note 18 at 128-130.
62
As Feldman observed, “[a] fake arm, an assistant, or any other surrogate for the victim’s lost limb is
just a substitute, and not a return to actual status quo ante.” Feldman, at 1580.
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etc.) would then be viewed as pecuniary. 63 This would appear to most legal
economists as over-inclusive.
One might think that to overcome this ambiguity, it would be possible to
follow Schwarz’s approach. Schwartz has suggested that the optimal degree of
compensation for non-pecuniary loss would depend on the individual’s preferences
for substitutes. For example, a business executive who runs recreationally and who
loses a foot in an accident might be forced to switch to other forms of recreational
activities which entail that her post-accident demand for money (and thus her postaccident marginal utility) has increased. Alternatively, she could substitute reading for
running, which means that her post-accident need for money has decreased. In the
first case, Schwartz argues, the executive would want to insure against a pain-andsuffering loss, whereas in the second she would not.64
Observe that this ‘functional approach’ does not support eliminating pain-andsuffering damages (as Schwartz ultimately advocates), but rather it becomes
dependent on individual preferences. 65 One problem with this approach is that it
makes the question of national policymaking dependent on citizens’ lifestyles and
routines. This approach sends the wrong signals to individuals, i.e. the mor e they
inflate the costs associated with their alternative activities, the more compensation
they are entitled to from the defendant. Schwartz provides the victims with two
inappropriate incentives, i.e. the development of extravagant lifestyles, and second,

63

Pryor at 130-1. As Pryor correctly observes, when several possible substitute rehabilitative choices
are available with respect to a given loss, the problem intensifies. Id. at 132 -6.
64
Id. at 364. In the latter case, she might even demand a cessation of insurance, Schwartz argues. Id.
65
An approach like Schwartz’s was termed “functional” by the English commentator A.I. Ogus back in
1972 because it attempts to assess the physical arrangements which can make a victim’s life more
endurable. A.I. Ogus, Damages for Lost Amenities: For a Foot, a Feeling or a Function?, 35 M ODERN
L. REV. 1 (1972). Ogus has suggested that there are three theoretical approaches to the problem of
pain-and -suffering loss. The "conceptual" approach, or the “diminution of value” approach, which
treats each faculty as a proprietary asset with an objective value, independent of the individual's own
use or enjoyment of it. This was the ancient tariff system, which prevailed in ancient Babylonian and
Jewish law, up to the days of King Alfred, when a thumb was worth 30 shillings. Modern
compensation law sees such a solution unsubtle. The "personal" approach values the injury in terms of
the loss of human happiness by the particular victim. Then, the "functional" approach accepts the
personal premise of the “personal” approach, but attempts to assess the compensation required to
provide the injured person "with reasonable solace for his misfortune." Id. The functional approach is
not without merit. It was adopted in 1978 by the Supreme Court of Canada in three decisions, widely
referred to as “the trilogy.” Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta LTD, [1978] 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452; Arnold
v. Teno, [1978] 83 D.L.R. (3d) 609 Thornton v. Board of School Trustees of School District No. 57,
[1978] 83 D.L.R. (3d) 480. The Court explained that this approach provides a rationale as to why
money is considered compensation for non -pecuniary losses. “Money is awarded because it will serve a
useful function in making up for what has been lost in the only way possible, accepting that what has
been lost is incapable of being replaced in any direct way.” Andrews, 83 D.L.R. (3d) at 89.
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the opportunity to report inflated subjective damages which cannot be verified by the
courts.
A second problem with the functional approach is that it increases the
unpredictability and causes high administrative costs, the two main problems with the
current tort system. 66 As was observed by the Canadian Supreme Court, there are
infinite numbers of alternative activities that could be thought as improving the lot of
the victim. 67 The more the awards meet the specific circumstances of the individual
case, by taking into account her substitute pleasures, the less predictable these awards
are, and the higher the administrative costs associated with determining them. 68
A third problem with the functional approach is that under a consistent
application of the approach some absurd results might emerge. For example, there
will not be compensation for past pain and suffering. 69 And, second, victims’ damages
should be decreased to reflect the savings resulting from having to give up their high
expenditure hobby. 70
Lastly, the experience with the functional approach is not a happy one. In
Canada, where the Supreme Court has explicitly adopted the functional approach,
most judges have continued to apply the traditional ‘diminution of value’ approach to
their assessments. Indeed, for all these reasons, in its recommendation for a reform in

66

In another paper I discuss the main problems with the current tort system. Ronen Avraham, Putting a
Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches and a Proposal for a
Change (on file with the author). It is enough to mention here that the advantages of a predictable tort
system include both efficiency and fairness consequences.
67
“[T]he claim of a severely injured plaintiff for damages for non-pecuniary loss is virtually limitless.
This is particularly so if we adopt the functional approach and award damages according to the use
which can be made of the money. There are an infinite number of uses which could be suggested in
order to improve the lot of the crippled plaintiff. Moreover, it is difficult to determine the
reasonableness of any of these claims. There are no accurate measures available to guide decision in
this area.” Lindal v. Lindal, [1981] 129 D.L.R. 263, 271 (emphasis added).
68
One might argue that victims should therefore be compensated for the reasonable substitute
activities. Yet, as the citation in the previous footnote indicates, there is no reasonable way for courts to
decide what reasonable substitute pleasures would be. Id.
69
On first blush, as some have observed, there is something anomalous in providing victims with funds
for substitute pleasures that act as a solace for what has already been experienced. See for example the
Australian High Court Justice Windeyer who argued that “It may be that giving damages for physical
pain, that is wholly past, not continuing, and not expected to recur, is simply an anomaly, for there can
be no solace for past pain.” Skellton v. Collins, [1966] 114 C.L.R. 94, Yet, no one has ever defended
the proposition that there should not be compensation for past pain and suffering. To state one reason,
it will provide incentives for defendants to prolong the trial.
70
This approach was explicitly adopted by all Lords Justices in Fletcher v. Autocar and Transporters
Ltd, yet is rarely cited and probably for good reasons generally ignored. 2 QB 322 (1968). Lord
Denning MR and Lord Diplock, in the majority, and Salmon LJ, dissenting all agreed on this point.
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the compensation for pain and suffering damages, the Law Commission in the UK has
rejected the functional approach and preferred the traditional approach. 71
In sum, and in viewing the entire picture, we try here to distinguish between
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. The problem is that from a practical point of
view, simply calling a loss non-pecuniary does not solve any problem; nor do the
distinctions between a replaceable (or substitutable) loss and an irreplaceable (or nonsubstitutable) loss, or between losses that increase or decrease the marginal utility.
Those distinctions raise issues concerning the various relationships between money
and pain but do not solve them. 72

d. A counter intuition.
Consider the doctrine that states that tort law should compensate victims for
their loss of income. This prevalent doctrine is undesirable for two distinct reasons.
First, since manufacturers cannot distinguish between consumers with different
income levels, below -average-income consumers cross-subsidize above-average income consumers. This adverse selection problem leads to inefficiency in
consumers’ incentives to buy the products, and then handling it with due care.
Second, this cross-subsidization is regressive. 73 Despite its undesirability, hardly
anyone has argued that tort law should provide compensation to victims without the
loss-of-income component. 74

71

See The Law Commission, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY: NON-PECUNIARY LOSS
(1999), http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lc257/lc257.pdf at paragraph 2.7.
72
Viscusi admits that even absent evidence on preferences after injuries, one possible rationale for
pain-and-suffering damages is that various expenditures like an elevator or a ramp in a victim’s house
are needed to promote individual’s welfare. Viscusi, Sounding Rationale at 151. However, Viscusi
does not see it as pain-and-suffering damages but as rehabilitation expenses that are part of the existing
tort system. Id. For him, pain-and -suffering damages are compensation for “general consumption
purposes” and not for anything designed to address the consequences of an injury. Id. Similarly,
Schwartz argues “any medical and other tangible costs associated with mental distress constitute
compensable pecuniary harm under the rule argued for here.” Proposals for Reform, at 367 n.24. In
that case, there might be less disagreement between scholars than what was originally thought.
73
Calfee and Rubin recognize this fact but neglect it. Supra note 8, at n.41. But see Logue and Hanson,
who claim that manufacturers do distinguish between high-income and low-income consumers by
marketing the same product in different packing. Supra note 23 .
74
But see Atiya who argued that first-party insurance should replace tort law altogether, among other
things, for this reason. See P ATRICK S. ATIYA, T HE DAMAGE LOTTERY (1997) .
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B. The approach taken by Scholars who think that the demand for pain-andsuffering coverage is an empirical question.
1. The approach taken by Steven Shavell
a. Introduction

In Steven Shavell’s analysis of what constitutes socially optimal insurance
coverage for non-pecuniary losses, he observes that such losses can alter individuals’
need for money. Some losses result in individuals valuing money to a lesser extent
“because spending money is less pleasurable and more difficult.” Other losses will
result in individuals attaching a higher value to money, “because of the desire to
obtain household help, special transportation services and the like.” He thus concludes
that “[t]he amount of insurance coverage against non-pecuniary losses that an
individual will wish to purchase will clearly depend on whether such losses will affect
the utility he would derive from receiving additional money.” Shavell argues that
based on expected utility maximizing insurance policy, one will only arrange for
coverage against non-pecuniary losses if such losses would result in a higher
evaluation of money by the individual. 75
Intuitive as this approach may seem, the conventional wisdom among
contemporary economic theorists is that this approach does not rest on sound
normative grounds. The following section reveals a number of theoretical problems in
this approach.

b. Ordinally measurable, cardinally measurable, comparable, and noncomparable utility functions.
i. Introduction76

75

STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A CCIDENT LAW 228-9 (1987).
The introduction is far from being a comprehensive description of utility theories. To the contrary, it
is a sketchy presentation of the relevant components that are needed for the development of the
argument in this part. Readers who are interested in more rigorous history of utility theory can turn to
the following sources and the references they cite. George Joseph Stigler, The Development of Utility
Theory, 58 J. P OL . ECON . 307 (1950) reprinted in UTILITY T HEORY; A BOOK OF READINGS 168 (A.N.
Page ed., 1968); Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong? 22 J. ECON. LIT.
507 (1984); Herbert Hovenkamp The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4
(1994).
76
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The early conception of utility in economic thought can be characterized in the
following ways: First, for the purposes of understanding markets, it was believed that
rational individuals act in ways which maximize their utility functions, thereby acting
in ways which maximize their number of “utils.” Second, utility itself was perceived
as a physical attribute, one subject to the laws of quantity. It represented a measure of
hedonic satisfaction, overall happiness, or well-being. This measure was then used in
determining how much one prospered from a specific outcome.77 It was perceived as
something quantifiable; just as knowing how many hairs one has on his body allows
us to know how hairy he is, so too it was believed that knowing how many “utils” one
has enables us to know how happy an individual is. Third, the mainstream hypothesis
was that the utility an indiv idual derives from an outcome steadily increases yet in a
decreasing rate, implying a concave utility function. 78 Lastly, for purposes of
understanding social policy, utility was perceived as something that can be compared
across individuals, just as number of hairs can. 79 Indeed, for all these reasons much
effort was exerted in the 19th century to try and measure individuals’ utility
functions. 80 These efforts, however, proved fruitless.
Modern utility theory began late in the 19th century when Vilfredo Pareto
introduced his concept of utility functions. This new concept went on to influence all
four of the characteristics noted above. 81 The main points of his argument were as
follows: First, he showed that it was enough to use individuals’ indifference curves
between bundles or states to analyze their choices in the markets. Today, it is
77

JEREMY B ENTHAM , THE PRINCIPLES OF M ORALS AND L EGISLATIONS (1789), and JOHN S. M ILL,
UTILITARIANISM 9-14 (E.P. Dutton ed., 1951) (1863), are traditionally thought to be the first to bring
the notion of ‘utility’ in a similar sense to the forefront of discussion. They did so in England at the
beginning of the 19th century. Some of Bentham’s known propositions are: 1) Each portion of wealth
has a corresponding portion of happiness, 2) of two individuals with unequal fortunes, he who has the
most wealth has the most happiness, and 3) the excess in happiness of the richer will not be so great as
the excess of his wealth. B ENTHAM, at 103.
78
See for example: JEVONS , T HE T HEORY OF POLITICAL E CONOMICS 173 (3d ed. 1879).
“It is almost self evident that the [marginal, RA] utility of money decreases as person’s total wealth
increases.”
79
Indeed, as Roemer notes “[w]hen Bentham wrote that the social goal should be to achieve ‘The
greatest happiness for the greatest number,’ his principle of utility, he clearly conceived of utility as
something the summation of which it is meaningful to perform across individuals.” JOHN E. ROEMER,
T HEORIES OF D ISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 14 (1996).
80
The Weber-Fechner law is a psychological rule stating that noticeable increment of pleasure to any
stimulus is proportional to the stimulus. Many references to the Weber-Fechner law can be found in
psychology and psychophysics literature. This law was construed as proof of the concavity hypothesis,
identifying stimulus with income and sensation with pleasure. Stigler at 88. Maurice Allais is the only
economist today who holds similar views about the notion of utility. See E XPECTED U TILITY
HYPOTHESIS AND T HE A LLAIS PARADOX 3-11 (Allais and Hegen eds., 1979).

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2003

29

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 11 [2003]

PAIN-AND-SUFFERING DAMAGES

29

commonly accepted that individuals’ indifference maps represent ordinal preferences
over different states such that the more preferred states are associated with higher
curves. For Pareto’s theory to work, it is sufficient that preferred states be associated
with higher numbers, regardless of the intensity of preference or the magnitude of
those numbers. 82 Second, Pareto reversed the causal link between choices and utility
functions. He showed that it is not that rational people make choices in order to
maximize their utility functions, but rather that rational people’s choices could be
characterized as if they maximize their utility functions. Utility functions, therefore,
are nothing more than the economists’ representation of people’s preference orderings
over alternative states. Third, it was shown that there is no need to assume that people
express diminishing marginal utility from resources in order to represent their ordina l
choices. 83 Lastly, he showed that for purposes of social policy there is an optimality

81

PARETO, MANUEL D’ECONMIE POLTIQUE (1906). Relevant parts of the second edition from 1927 are
reprinted in UTILITYT HEORY; A B OOK OF R EADINGS 168 (A.N. Page ed. 1968).
82
For example, suppose that an individual prefers bundle A to bundle B, one possible way to represent
this preference under Pareto’s ordinal utility functions would be that U(A)=7 and U(B)=3. Another
way would be that U’(A)=49 and U’(B)=9. Nothing else could be inferred from these two
representations, U and U’, except that both represent the preference ordering in which bundle A is
preferred to bundle B. How strong the preferences are in each case, is not part of the information
embedded in the numbers. Interestingly, Pareto himself labeled them as “I”, attempting to rid utility of
any interpretive meaning. (Gross & Tarascio, Pareto’s Theory of Choice, HISTORY OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 30(2) at 171 (1998) (hereafter- Pareto).
83
About three decades later, in 1934, John Hicks and R.G.D Allen offered “A reconsideration of the
theory of Value.” John Hicks & R.G.D. Allen, A reconsideration of the theory of Value, ECONOMICA
N.S 1934 at 52-76, 192 -216. They substituted the concept of marginal utility with marginal rate of
substitution, which is an ordinal concept. Marginal rate of substitution is the negative of the slope of an
indifference curve at some point: MRS= - d(Y)/d(X) (at U=U1). The assumption of diminishing
marginal rate of substitution is equivalent to assuming a convex set (or that the utility function is quasiconcave). The assumption is needed to ensure that the second derivative in a constraint maximization
problem is negative- namely that the extreme point is indeed a maxima. The economic interpretation is
that an individual prefers balanced bundles of commodities to bundles that are heavily weighted toward
one commodity. In contrast, the assumption of diminishing marginal utility means that the extra utility
obtained from slightly more of bundle X, while holding the amount of all other commodities constant,
continues at a decreasing rate. Both the diminishing margi nal utility (DMU) and the diminishing
marginal rate of substitution (DMRS) seem to be based upon the same intuition; that of an individual
becoming relatively satiated with a good the more s/he consumes it. The two concepts, however, do
differ in several regards. As will be shown below, MRS is an ordinal property whereas MU is not. A
key difference between the von-Newmann-Morgenstern and Bernoulli theories on the one side, and the
Pareto ordinal utility theory on the other is the transformation they can legitimately be subject to.
Whereas marginal utility is dependent on the particular scale used to measure utility, hence the concept
is not measurable in any unique way, marginal rate of substitution is not and therefore is an ordinal
property. Thus, the assumption of DMRS is not equivalent to the assumption of DMU. An individual
can have a DMRS but either constant, increasing, or decreasing marginal utility. To illustrate this point
consider the following utility function: U(X,Y)=XY. The marginal utility from X is MUx=Y which is a
constant rate (that is, no matter how much more we add from X, we always increase our utility by Y
units). But the marginal rate of substitution for this utility function is MRSx=Y/X, which is a
decreasing rate. Next consider an increasing transformation of the original utility function.
U(X,Y)=X^2*Y^2. here MUx=2X*Y^2, which is increasing with X, but the MRSx=Y/X, which is
decreasing with X. Lastly, consider another transformation of the original utility function:
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concept, known as a Pareto optimal, which does not require any interpersonal
comparison. 84
In sum, in contrast to the old conception of utility functions as absolutely
measurable and fully interpersonally comparable, which people (expressing
diminishing marginal utility from resources) seek to maximize, Pareto introduced
pure ordinal measurable and non-comparable utility functions, which helped in
understanding markets and contributed to the social choice literature. 85 Furthermore,
there is no place for the diminishing marginal utility assumption in this new concept. 86
Indeed, the old concept was abandoned. 87
U(X,Y)=ln(X) + ln(Y). Here the MUx=1/X is decreasing, and the MRSx=Y/X is also decreasing. As
the example shows, whereas the MRS has not changed with the transformations of the original utility
function, the marginal utility has changed from constant to increasing and then to decreasing marginal
utility. This example shows that MRS is an ordinal property whereas the MU is not. One might object
to this argument and argue that a person with convex preferences shows a preference towards
diversification, and therefore is risk averse. This, however, would be the same mistake of mixing
notions from different theories. The fact that one prefers one parcel of 2 acres of land in Ann Arbor,
over 2 parcels of 1 acre each, does not necessarily mean she is risk liking. Analytically, such a
preference has nothing to do with her behavior under risk. Another way to see this distinction is to
recognize that if we are willing to assume, as is the standard assumption in economic analysis of
portfolios, that the individual cares about the mean and variance of a prospect and therefore gains from
diversification, under the EUT framework this could be represented by a quadratic utility function. Yet
in quadratic function the marginal utility eventually becomes negative. This is an unacceptable
implication in economic analysis, if we perceive the utility in its Bernoullian sense. See Hirshlifer at
71.
84
About three decades later, in the late 1930s, Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks developed another
criterion which was intended to overcome the impracticability of the Pareto criterion for policy
analysis. The problem with the Pareto criterion was that most changes fell into the category of ‘changes
that improved the welfare of some people yet injured the welfare of others,’ implying indeterminate
welfare effects. Under the "potential" Pareto criterion, also known as "Kaldor-Hicks criterion,” a
change increases welfare if the gains to the gainers from the change exceed the losses to the losers. It is
irrelevant whether those who profit from the deal actually compensate those who lose because the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion is only concerned with the overall amount of wealth, not with how it is
distributed. Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of
Utility, 49 E CON. J. 1939 at 549. John Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 1939
at 696.
85
For an economist who seems to hold the classical views on utility see Yew -Kwang NG, Utility,
Informed Preference, or Happiness: Following Harsanyi’s argument to its logical conclusion, 16
SOCIAL C HOICE WELFARE 1999 197, 213.
86
Friedman and Savage criticized the “strong introspective belief in diminishing marginal utility”
years after Pareto showed it was unnecessary. People do, however, share the intuition that a dollar for
the poor means more than a dollar does for the rich. Why else would a poor man walk in the rain while
a rich man takes a cab? This intuition served as the thesis for justifying progressive taxation in the
beginning of the 20th century. F. Y. Edgeworth, The Pure Theory of Taxation, 7 ECON. J. 1897, 550.
Could that be explained without resorting to the assumption of diminishing marginal utility? Friedman
and Savage provided intuition to explain how rich people would spend more than poor people to avoid
any given amount of pain or discomfort even when it is assumed that they have increasing marginal
utility from goods. “It is only necessary to suppose that the avoidance of pain and the other goods that
can be bought with money are related goods and that, while the marginal utility of money increases as
the amount of money increases, the marginal utility of avoiding pain increases even faster.” See
Friedman Milton and L.J Savage The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risks, J. POL. ECONOMY
1948 56, 279 r eprinted in UTILITY T HEORY ; A B OOK OF READINGS 234, 239 (A.N. Page ed. 1968)
(Hereinafter Friedman and Savage 1948). Savage sees the whole idea of diminishing marginal utility in
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An important corollary of Pareto’s new concept is that the classes of utility
functions that can describe people’s preferences are infinitely large. The reason is that
as the specific numbers associated with the indifference curves do not matter, any
particular utility function which describes a particular preference or dering could be
subject to any increasing transformation and still fully represent individuals original
preference ordering. 88 In contrast, under the old conception of utility, utility functions
could not be subjected to any type of transformation. 89
Not until the 1970s did economics reach a stage where it showed analytically
that between the 19th century conceptions of utility functions (as absolutely
measurable and fully interpersonal comparable which therefore could not be subject
to any type of transformation) and the Paretian conception of utility functions (as only
ordinally measurable and interpersonal non-comparable which therefore could be
subject to any increasing transformation) exist intermediate conceptions of utility

the domain of certainty as “nonsensical.” “The law of diminishing marginal ut ility has been very
popular, and few who have considered utility since Bernoulli have discarded it, or even realized that it
was not necessarily part and parcel of the utility idea.” Savage, supra sec 5.6. Savage uses conventional
tools of consumer theory to understand the discrepancy between the value of a dollar to the poor and
that of a dollar to the rich. He explains “that the rate of exchange between circumstances producing
physical discomfort and money depends on the wealth of the person involved.” Id. at 96.
87
There were several reasons for abandoning the old concept. First, economists could not provide
meaningful interpretations to quantifying the amount of utility associated with choice. More
specifically it was not clear what it means to argue that a bottle of juice would give us twice as much
utility when compared with an extra cucumber than a chocolate bar would. Economists doubted
whether utility and its units have any independent meaning other than being what people maximize.
See for example Jevons, as cited by Stigler, supra note 2, at 69 -“I have granted that we can hardly
form the conception of a unit of pleasure or pain, so that the numerical expression of quantities of
feeling seems to be out of question.” Second, the only operation that could elicit measurable utility is
an operation that is strongly based on person’s self report. Introspection analysis was not considered to
be a satisfying method to provide reliable and comparable data. Third, there was no need to stick with
the old concept when the new concept could explain individuals’ behavior in a better fashion. Indeed,
half a century later Arrow and Debreu presented their general equilibrium theory where they showed
that it was possible to describe the economics of the market using only the concept of indifference
curves of individuals, without measuring utility or making any interpersonal comparisons of utility. K.
Arrow and G. Debreu, The Existence of an Equilibrium for a competitive economy, ECONOMETRICA
1954 22, 265.
88
For example, suppose that an individual prefers bundle A to bundle B, one possible way to represent
this preference under Pareto’s ordinal utility functions would be that U(A)=7 and U(B)=3. But then any
increasing transformation of the utility function would also represent the same preference ordering. For
example, if we power the utility function so that U’(A)=49 and U’(B)=9, the new function, U’,
represents the same preference order as the original U.
89
Or, more accurately put: besides the identity transformation. Once we are interested in the exact
amount of satisfaction (measured in units of ‘utils’) the number has intrinsic significance; we cannot
transform it and expect it to remain meaningful. Under the old conception, if an individual receives 7
utils from bundle A and 3 from bundle B, it means, among other things, that she would give up bundle
A for 3 bundles of B. Yet once we transform her utility function and, for example, we power it so that
U’(A)=49 and U’(B)=9, then it would not be true anymore that the individual would be willing to part
with her bundle in return for 3 bundles of B. The transformation changed some of the cardinal
information that was embedded in U, and is therefore illegitimate.
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functions. Most of these intermediate conceptions are considered by most economists
to be purely theoretical in the sense that their basic assumptions are non-realistic.
These intermediate conceptions vary with respect to two of their basic assumptions.
First, the extent at which the utility was considered to be measurable. As will be
explained below, the type of measurability determines the type of transformation
these utility functions could be legitimately subjected to. Second, whether utility is
assumed to be interpersonally comparable.

ii. Measurability, information and transformations.
Starting with the measurability property, modern economists have shown that
at least in theory, utility functions could be assumed to be cardinally measurable , a
notion which lies between a pure ordinally measurable utility and an absolutely
measurable utility. 90 A cardinally measurable utility function conveys more
information than that which is presented by an ordinal utility function but less
information than that which is conveyed by an abs olutely measurable utility function.
An ordinal utility function conveys information only with regard to whether bundle A
is preferred over bundle B. An absolutely measurable utility function conveys
information as to how happy an individual is from possessing these bundles.
The following is an example of a cardinal utility function. Consider a family
of utility functions where differences in utility levels between states are assumed to be
meaningful for each individual but where absolute levels of utility are meaningless. 91
This family of utility functions is characterized by the fact that they convey
meaningful information (beyond the ordinal preference ordering of the bundles) about
individuals’ relative preference for the bundles. In this family, if a utility function is
concave in relation to a certain amount of bundles, then its cardinal property means
that this individual expresses a diminishing marginal utility from the bundles: the
“bang” she gets from an extra bundle decreases as her overall number of bundles
increases. I call this family of cardinal utility functions ‘Bernoulli utility functions,’

90

I follow John Roemer’s taxonomy. See JOHN E. ROEMER , T HEORIES OF D ISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 1519 (1996).
91
Consider the case where U(A)=7, U(B)=3, and U(C)=1. If utility differences are assumed to be
meaningful, then it can be said that our individual would prefer the move from bundle B to bundle A
then to move from bundle C to bundle B.
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after the 18th century mathematician Daniel Bernoulli who is most famously
associated with this family of utility functions.92
Another example of cardinal utility functions is presented as follows.
Consider the family of von-Newmann-Morgenstern utility functions, named after the
20th century mathematicians John von-Newman and Oscar Morgenstern. 93 This family
of utility functions is characterized by the conveyance of meaningful information
(beyond the ordinal preference ordering of the bundles) about individuals’ preferences
for lotteries over these bundles. 94 In this family, if a utility function happens to be
concave in relation to a number of bundles, then its cardinal property means that this
individual is risk averse: she prefers some sure number of bundles over a lottery for
these bundles, fixing the expected number of bundles in both cases constant.
Cardinal utility functions could be subject to fewer types of transformation
than ordinal utility functions. The intuition is simple: the less information the utility
function is assumed to convey (the closer it is to pure ordinally measurable utility
function), the less we fear that different types of transformations would change the
information embedded in the original preference relation. Indeed, we already saw that
ordinally measurable utility functions could be subject to the largest group of
transformations, that is, any increasing transformation, as opposed to absolutely
measurable utility function which cannot be subject to any type of transformation
whatsoever.
92

Although Bernoulli proposed an absolutely measurable utility function and not just a cardinal one,
his heritage is associated with this family of utility functions. Daniel Bernoulli (1700-1782, a Swiss
mathematician, was a professor of physics and philosophy in Basle, Switzerland) is thought to be the
first to suggest a hypothesis about people’s utility function. In the early 1710s Nicolas Bernoulli (16871759), a professor of law at the University of Basle, Switzerland, submitted five problems to the French
mathematician Pierre Remomd Montmort (1678-1719). The last of these problems was a coin toss
game known as ‘the St. Petersburg paradox.’ In 1738 Daniel Bernoulli, provoked by his cousin Nicolas
Bernoulli’s coin toss game, hypothesized that people maximize some concave function of wealth. See
Bernoulli at 209. The exact function proposed by Bernoulli was U(x)=b*LOG[(a+x)/a], where x is the
expected income, b is some constant and a is the minimum wealth that an individual derives from it
when utility equals zero. As Bernoulli himself admitted, however, Gabriel Cramer (1704-1752, a Swiss
mathematician famous for his contribution to linear algebra) had developed a similar solution several
years before Bernoulli. The difference being that Cramer had suggested two solutions, one of which
was a utility function that is the square root of wealth. Id. at 211. Although Bernoulli proposed an
absolutely measurable utility function and not just a cardinal one, his heritage is associated with this
family of utility functions.
93
JOHN VON NEWMANN & OSCAR M ORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
(1944, 3d ed. 1953). Amazingly, the Expected Utility Theory is just a small part, a means for another
end, of Von Newmann & Morgensterns’ Theory of Games . The Expected Utility Theory is described in
merely thirty pages of the 630 pages compiled in the 3rd edition.
94
For example, if in the family of von -Newmann-Morgenstern utility functions U(A)=7, U(B)=3, and
U(C)=1, then it could be meaningfully said that our individual prefers a lottery where she can get
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Both the Bernoulli utility functions and the von-Newmann-Morgenstern utility
functions are cardinally measurable because they convey new infor mation on
individuals’ preferences beyond the ordinal preference ordering. Both families of
cardinal utility functions are subject to the same intermediate type of transformation,
the affine transformation. 95 But this fact is coincidental. A key point here is to realize
that these two functions convey entirely different information. The Bernoulli family
of cardinal utility functions conveys information regarding relative preference of
bundles in risk free situations. On the other hand, the family of von-NewmannMorgenstern utility functions conveys information regarding preference for lotteries
over bundles in risky situations.96 To emphasize, the von-Newmann-Morgenstern
utility is not measurable in the sense that it is correlated with any significant economic
quantity, such as quantity of satisfaction. Rather, the differences of utility between
outcomes A, B and C are numerically meaningful only for the purpose of describing
bundle A and bundle C with 50% chance each over bundle B for sure (50%*(7+1)>3). We call this
individual risk lover.
95
An affine transformation transforms a utility index to another index that is only different in scale and
origin. In other words, any point U on the original index corresponds to a point F in the new index so
that F=a*U+b, where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are constants and ‘b’ is positive. This transformation is sometimes
loosely called “linear transformation.” Yet, a linear transformation is a special subset of affine
transformations in which ‘b’ is equal to zero. Indeed, a special feature of affine transformations is that
it leaves the proportions of utility differences unchanged after the transformation. This property keeps
the concavity of the function alive. For example, suppose the affine transformation is of the form
F=3*U+2, then if [U1(X)-U1(Y)]<[U1(Y)-U1(Z)], then indeed F1(X)-F1(Y)<F1(Y)-F1(Z) because
[3*U1(X)+2]–[3*U1(Y)+2]<[3*U1(X)+2]-[3*U1(Z)+2].
96
This insight was recognized by many theorists: “Thus, Von Newmann & Morgenstern utility should
not be interpreted as measuring strength of preference under certainty, being quite different in this
regard from neoclassical cardinal utility.” Schoemaker on page 533 cites Stigler (1950); “It is not the
purpose of the Newmann-Morgenstern utility index to set up any sort of measure of introspective
pleasure intensity.” Baumol, The Cardinal Utility Which is Ordinal, ECONOMIC JOURNAL 1958 68,
665; “Even today, the distinction between V(x) (neoclassical utility) and U(x) (Von Newmann &
Morgenstern utility) is often unrecognized. Textbooks in economics and management science
occasionally discuss the Von Newmann & Morgenstern function as if it only measured intrinsic
pleasure under conditions of certainty. For example, a concave U(x) might erroneously be interpreted
as implying that equal increments in money (under certainty) contribute to utility at a decreasing rate.
Of course, V(X) is confused here with U(x).” Schoemaker at 535. “The connotation not withstanding,
the (EUT) utility function does not measure the decision maker’s well being.” EDI K ARNI , DECISION
M AKING UNDER CERTAINTY, THE C ASE OF STATE DEPENDENT PREFERENCES 115 (1985). Savage,
when dealing with utility in the domain of risk wrote: “…the now almost obsolete economic notion of
utility in riskless situation, a notion still sometimes confused with the one under discussion”. SAVAGE,
T HE FOUNDATION OF STATISTICS sec. 5.6 (2d ed. 1972) . “The most enduring interpretational problem of
the Von Newmann-Morgenstern theory has been the extent to which it embodies a notion of
comparable preference differences either between pairs of outcomes or between pairs of probability
distributions on outcomes.” Fishburn at 133, he adds that: “Bernoulli’s…main proposition, the riskless
intensity view of outcome utility, has no place in their (Von Newmann & Morgenstern, RA) theory.”
Fishburn at 135. Robbins L, author of: Robbins L, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of
Economic Science (1937 [1932]) (Hereinafter Robbins) was the most influential scholar to deny the
existence of measurable Bernoulli utility. Harsanyi is the most prominent scholar to accept it. Harsanyi
John, Cardinal Utility, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 1955 63, 309.
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preferences in the domain of risk. 97 For many years the debate as to whether a von
Newmann-Morgenstern utility function was a risk free Bernoulli utility function was a
“sizzling” controversy. The debate has long been decided and as Camerer summarizes
“It’s not a riskless value function.”98

iii. Risk Aversion.
An important consequence of this analysis is that the notion of risk aversion
has completely different meaning in these two theories. Nineteenth century
economists dealt with risk aversion by assuming a concave psychological reaction to
wealth, known as the principle of diminishing marginal utility. If individuals’
97

See T heory of Games supra note 90, at 18. Von Newmann & Morgenstern’s contribution was not that
they developed a reliable technique to measure the Bernoulli utility. As was shown above Von
Newmann & Morgenstern’s index represents something different. “Many have interpreted the Von
Newmann & Morgenstern experiment as a more precise or practical, though indirect, approach to the
results of the Jevonsians Experiment: i.e., basically to the result of the subjective calculation of
satisfaction…[I]n general the two operations do not produce even approximately the same results.
…Thus we can state: The Von Newmann & Morgenstern and Jevons-Marshall operations do not
measure the ‘same thing’.” Ellsberg at 550-551. True, the von-Newmann-Morgenstern utility
represents a person's ordinal preferences over the outcomes of riskless situations; yet it is cardinal only
with respect to people’s preferences over lotteries of the outcomes. Ellsberg summarizes that “[i]t
would be “cardinal” (“measurable”) only to the extent that the numerical operation of forming
mathematical expectation on the basis of these numbers would be related to observable behavior, so as
to be empirically meaningful.” Ellsberg at 539. Indeed, Von Newmann & Morgenstern themselves
never had any intention, nor do their axioms allow, to apply their Expected Utility Theory to the
dimension of certainty, as is noted by Ellsberg. See Ellsberg at 556. (Ellsberg indicates that
Morgenstern himself told him that.) Ellsberg modestly argues several times over the course of his paper
that Von Newmann & Morgenstern exaggerated when describing the scope of the measurability
property of their index. See Ellsberg at 551-2. Allais, is less forgiving. “In their Theory of Games Von
Newmann & Morgenstern asserted that it is possible to determine cardinal utility by the observation of
the choices made among random prospects. But this assertion was completely false since it confused
two distinct effects, the curvature of cardinal utility and the preference for risk or security.” Allais,
Cardinal utility- History, Empirical findings, and applications, an overview ???. Perhaps a comparison
of the meaning of utility differences between the theories could be helpful. In Pareto ordinal utility
theory if v(A)-v(c) =2[v(B)-v(C)] (assuming v(A)>v(B)>v(C)) this does not mean that A is twice as
good as C than B is. However, when dealing with Bernoulli’s utility theory, this is precisely what that
means. In the context of Von Newmann & Morgenstern’s Expected Utility Theory: u(A)-u(c) =2[u(B)u(C)] means that a lottery that gives either A or C, each with probability 0.5, is indifferent to B for
sure, but does not mean anything about the intensity of preference for the sure outcomes. See Kreps at
77. To see it one should move u(C) to the left side of the equation and get: ½[u(A)+u(C)]=u(B).
Indeed, Luce & Raiffa mention this confusion as one of the fallacies in understanding von-NewmannMorgenstern utility theory. “Fallacy 3- Suppose that A>B>C>D and that the utility function has the
property that u(A)-u(B)>u(C)-u(D), then the change from B to A is more favorable than the change
from D to C.” LUCE & RAIFFA, GAMES AND D ECISIONS 32 (1957), (hereaft er Luce and Raiffa); See
also, Mass-Collel at 174 for the same conclusion.
98
Handbook at 619. For an opposite view see Harsanyi, Essays on ethics, social behavior, and
scientific explanation, (1976) (hereafter Harsanyi). Hirshlifer and Riley seem also to agree with
Harsanyi. See Hirshlifer on pages 12-29. Ken Binmore is another scholar who seems to believe that
there is a strong connection between strength of preferences for some outcomes under certainty and
individual’s von-Newmann -Morgenstern utility function over lotteries over these outcomes.
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Bernoulli utility from dollars is continuously-diminishing, in the sense that the first
$100 provide them with 100 utils whereas the second $100 only with 80, then people
would prefer $100 for sure to a 50% chance to get $200 because the latter provides
them, on average, only with 90 utils. This type of preference is tantamount to risk
aversion.

Bernoulli Utility

180

100
90

100

200

$

Observe that the Bernoulli utility curves, from which risk-behavior predictions
are implicitly derived, were not established from any observed behavior under risk,
and did not depend on any sort of rational consistency in that behavior, but rather are
assumptions based on people’s psychological reaction to wealth99.
In contrast, the von-Newmann-Morgenstern framework views the utility
function as a representation of individuals’ choices under risk, not a presumption
about their psychological satisfaction. Thus, risk aversion is a preference which is not
different in principle from a preference between the music of Wagner and
Beethoven. 100 It is represented in a concave von-Newmann-Morgenstern utility
function and not explained by it. Moreover, according to von-NewmannMorgenstern’s framework, risk aversion is derived without necessarily assuming
diminishing marginal “bang” from sure consequences. 101 Thus, the prevailing
See KEN B INMORE , G AME T HEORYAND T HE SOCIAL C ONTRACT CH. 4 (VOL. I 1994)
Ellsberg at 535.
100
See Binmore, supra note 24, at 269.
101
When explaining risk aversion under von-Newmann-Morgenstern’s theory Kenneth Arrow wrote:
“The utility assigned are not in any sense to be interpreted as some intrinsic amount of good in the
outcome (which is a meaningless concept in any case). Therefore, all the intuitive feelings which led to
the assumption of diminishing marginal utility are irrelevant, and we are free to assume that marginal
utility is increasing.” K. Arrow, Alternative approaches to the theory of choice in risk taking situations,
99
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conception that wealthy decision-makers make more risky choices, which is based on
the principle of diminishing marginal utility, is not part of von-NewmannMorgenstern’s expected utility theory. It is an extra assumption, which from an
empirical perspective is not necessarily true.102

iv. Interpersonal comparability
With respect to the other assumption, whether utility is assumed to be
comparable amongst all individuals, modern economists have shown that, at least in
theory, utility functions could be ordinally measurable and yet fully comparable. This
means that the analyst believes that it is meaningful to argue that individual 1 is better
off in state X than individual 2 in state Y.103 In this case, if we want to be able to
ECONOMETRICA 19(4) 404, 425 (1951). Remarkably, when Von Newmann & Morgenstern introduced
the Expected Utility Theory, some 20th century economists rejected their framework because by
accommodating risk taking behavior it violates the principle of diminishing marginal utility. What
these economists failed to realize was that, as mentione d above, this principle was not part of VonNewmann & Morgenstern’s theory at all. See references in Friedman and Savage, supra note 85, at
239. Even Friedman and Savage, while mocking others for rejecting Von Newmann & Morgenstern’s
EUT for this reason, could not capitulate to the principle of diminishing marginal utility, and found a
way to combine it together with Von Newmann & Morgenstern’s EUT. Id. Several years later,
Friedman and Savage seem to retract from this approach. See Milton Friedman and L.J Savage, The
Expected Utility Theory and the Measurability of Utility, J. POL. ECONOMY 60, 463 (1952). A few
years later Savage wrote that: “One thing that should be mentioned before this chapter is closed is that
the law of diminishing marginal utility plays no fundamental role in the Von Newmann & Morgenstern
theory of utility, viewed either empirically or normatively.” Savage, supra note 85, at 104.
102
The intuition for the prevailing conception would be that if the utility curve is concave, then rich
people, being on the more moderate right side of the curve face the more linear parts of the curve.
Implied then, is a risk neutral attitude. Nicholson summarizes it: “Intuitively, one might assume that the
willingness to pay to avoid a given fair bet would decline as wealth increases, since diminishing
marginal utility would make potential losses less serious for high wealth individuals. Such an intuitive
answer is not necessarily correct, however, because diminishing marginal utility also makes these gains
from gambles less attractive. So the net result is intermediate.” NICHOLSON, M ICROECONOMIC T HEORY
at 225. As Arrow has shown, based on von-Newmann-Morgenstern expected utility theory people can
have increasing, or decreasing, risk aversion with wealth (absolute or relative). For example, IRRA
(increasing relative risk aversion) implies that people may be more risk averse to risks that are
proportionate to their wealth as their wealth increases. KENNETH ARROW , THE THEORY OF R ISK
AVERSION (1965) reprinted in A RROW , ESSAYS I N T HE T HEORY OF R ISK B EARING (1971). Arrow’s
analysis in in state-independent expected utility theory. In state-dependent expected utility theory,
which is considered to be the case where pain-and-suffering loss is involved, entails a much more
complicated analysis of risk aversion than that of state-independent expected utility theory. See Karni,
supra note 95.
103
That is, that U1(X)>U2(Y). Usually it is referred to as interpersonal comparability of utility levels.
See for example John Harsanyi, Interpersonal utility Comparisons, in T HE N EW P ALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMIC 955, 956 (Vol. 2 1988). Kenneth Arrow eventually admitted that such
comparisons are not entirely meaningless in Kenneth J. Arrow, Extended Sympathy and the Possibility
of Social Choice, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 1977 at 219. The idea is that one can put herself in someone
else’s shoes in order to see things from her point of view. In this way interpersonal comparisons are
reduced to less problematic intrapersonal ones by appealing to one's own preference as to possible
states of herself. See also, Binmore, supra note 24, at 285-296. Nevertheless, economists and
philosophers remain skeptic about this possibility, at least when dealing with preference-based theories
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transformations, we must transform everyone’s utility function by the same
transformation.
Modern economists have also shown that utility functions can be cardinally
measurable and unit comparable. This could mean, for example, that utility
differences between states are meaningful and comparable amongst all individuals,
but that absolute levels of utility for individuals can never be ascertained. 104 Here
only increasing affine transformations are allowed for all individuals.105
For our purposes, it is important to note that it is conventionally accepted in
economic theory of individual choice under risks to consider the normative
framework as consisting of the family of von-Newman-Morgenstern utility functions,
in which utility functions are cardinally measurable and interpersonal noncomparable.106 Starting with the latter, most economists and many philosophers reject
interpersonal comparability. 107 Following Robbins, economists concluded that Adam
could not compare Eve’s pleasure with his own because he knows only his own mind
of well being. For economists, see for example, Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare
Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV . 1419, 1448 (1998). For philosophers see, for example,
HOUSMAN & M CPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS A ND M ORAL PHILOSOPHY, 86 (Cambridge University
Press, 1996).
104
For example, U1(X)-U1(Y)> U2(X)-U2(Y) meaningfully asserts that individual 1 is in a better
position than individual 2 when both parties move from state Y to state X. Usually it is referred to as
interpersonal comparability of utility differences. Id.
105
More generally, a pure ordinalist is free to reject all types of interpersonal comparisons or,
alternatively, to admit comparability of utility levels (but not of utility differences). A cardinalist is also
free to reject all types of interpersonal comparisons, or to admit both. He cannot, however, admit
comparability of utility levels while rejecting comparability of utility differences. Id. at 957; See also,
John Weymark, A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism, in I NTERPERSONAL
COMPARISONS OF WELL B EING 255, 300-303 (Elster & Roemer eds., 1991).
106
As Roemer explains, von-Newmann-Morgenstern utility function provides no information about
intensity of preferences. If we have a population of individuals, each of whom has some preference
ordering over lotteries and “we are given no meaningful way of making interpersonal comparisons- if
the conception of utility does not include a way of comparing welfare levels interpersonally, there is no
way we can deduce such interpersonal comparability by mathematical manipulation. The information is
simply not there to be had.” Roemer, supra note 78,at 142.
107
See for example: "most economists think interpersonal welfare comparisons are nonsense." Robert
A. Pollak, Welfare Comparisons and Situation Comparisons, 50 J. ECONOMETRICS, 1991, at 31; Daniel
Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 104 M IND 473, 475 (1995) (“Most
economists believe that interpersonal comparisons of utility are untestable, evaluative or even
meaningless”); JACK HIRSHLIFER, P RICE T HEORY AND APPLICATIONS 59 (1976) ("Economists today
generally believe that summation of the utilities of different people is meaningless . . . ."); RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 79 (1983) ("The 'interpersonal comparison of utilities' is anathema to
the modern economist, and rightly so, because there is no metric for making such a comparison."). For
philosophers, see Joseph Raz, THE M ORALITY OF FREEDOM 328 (1986); but see Amartya Sen,
Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare, in C HOICE, WELFARE AND M EASUREMENT 264 (1982) and
John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,
63 J. POL. ECON . 309, 319 -21 (1955) for the opposite view. Although Robbins is traditionally
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and not that of Eve. 108 One cannot compare the utility rich Adam derives from figs to
that which poor Eve derives from figs by simply counting their daily consumption of
figs. Adam may consume more simply because he is richer, yet Eve may still derive
more utility from each fig. Moreover, if Adam cares only for apples then, even if the
market is legitimized, the rate at which apples and figs are exchanged tell us little
about the utility Adam and Eve derive from their consumption. This is because
markets reflect the exchange-value, not the use-value. That is, markets are driven by
the relative scarcity of the goods traded. 109
Even more important, in this context however, is the exact way in which vonNewmann utility functions are assumed to be cardinally measurable: they convey
information about individuals’ choices under risk. Yet, Steven Shavell interpreted the
von-Newmann-Morgenstern family of utility functions as conveying information
regarding relative differences in utility between different states of the world, in
addition to conveying information about preference ordering under risk. That is, he
assumed that all utility functions belonging to the family of von-NewmanMorgenstern utility functions also belong to the family of Bernoulli utility functions.
The result is that Shavell essentially assumed interpersonal comparability of both the
von-Newmann-Morgenstern and the Bernoulli utility functions.

2. Shavell’s deviations from the conventional normative framework.

a. Bernoulli vs. von-Newmann-Morgenstern utility functions.
The easiest way to show that Shavell made the implicit assumption that
individuals’ utility functions are cardinally measurable in the Bernoullian sense is to
examine how his analysis would work without such an assumption.

associated with the interpersonal critique, the problem was recognized as early as 1892. See Arthur T.
Hadley, The Theory of Dynamic Economics, 7 P OL. SCI. Q. 562, 562 (1892) (book review).
108
Inspired by the philosophy of Carl Popper, Robbins, a positivist, believed that economics was
entitled to call itself a science only if it could separate fact from value. Falsifiability was the criterion
for characterizing a proposition as scientific. What could not be falsified, such as the proposition that
Adam obtains more utility than Eve from an additional fig, was simply not part of economic science.
109
Binmore, supra note 24, at 283-5.
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Following Kenneth Arrow, Shavell applied a state -dependent framework. 110
Accor ding to this framework, individuals’ von-Newmann-Morgenstern utility
functions change when their health changes. The reason is simple: in the pre-accident
state of the world, the individuals’ preferences are represented by some type of vonNewmann-Morgenstern utility function, but then once they are injured, their
preferences change and are then represented by a completely different von-NewmannMorgenstern utility function. (By completely different, I mean one that is not an
affine transformation of the original utility function.) It is then assumed that the
individual would purchase insurance coverage as if maximizing her expected utility
over both states of the world, both pre-accident and the post-accident. Put differently,
an individual’s total utility is assumed to be a weighted sum of two components: her
utility in the pre-accident state of the world and her utility in her post-accident state of
the world. 111 The individual is assumed to act as if she maximizes the weighted
average of these two components. This means that she would purchase insurance in a
way that equates her marginal von-Newmann-Morgenstern utility over both states of
the world. This is because maximizing utility always means equating the margins of
all its components.
What does the fact that our individual equates her marginal von-NewmannMorgenstern utility over both states of the world imply? If the post accident vonNewmann-Morgenstern utility function is locally steeper than the original utility
function, then the individual will purchase insurance; if the post-accident vonNewmann-Morgenstern utility function is more moderate, she will not. The next
graph demonstrates this point.
VNM Utility

Pre accident curve
1
3

Post accident curve
4

2

$
110

Kennth Arrow, Optimal Insurance and Generalized Deductibles , SCANDINAVIAN ACTUARIAN
JOURNAL 1-42 (1974).
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The graph represents an accident with no monetary loss at all. As a result of
the accident, the individual’s utility is lower; she has moved from point 1 to point 2.
Before the accident occurred, the individual contemplated whether to purchase
insurance against such a loss. Purchasing coverage is represented by a move left along
the pre -accident utility function from point 1. In this specific example, the
individual’s post -accident utility function is assumed to be steeper. Anticipating a
steeper post accident utility function, the individual would move left (purchase more
coverage) up to the point where the pre-accident marginal utility is equal to the postaccident marginal utility; this happens at point 3. At point 3, the individual’s marginal
utility (represented by the slope of the pre-accident curve) is equal to the marginal
utility at point 4 (represented by the slope of the post accident curve). This is the point
at which an individual’s total von-Newmann-Morgenstern utility is maximized. 112
So far the analysis does not deviate from conventional thought in economic
theory and is in reality a state -dependent extension of the von-Newman-Morgenstern
expected utility theory and not of the Bernoulli theory. The problem is not in the
mathematical result, which states that rational individuals will purchase insurance
only if their post accident von-Newman-Morgenstern utility function is steeper than
their original utility function. Rather, the problem is found in the economic
interpretation Sha vell gives to this result.
Shavell argued that the individual’s “bang” from the next dollar has increased
but under a pure von-Newmann-Morgenstern framework it cannot be said that a
steeper post accident utility function means that the individual’s demand for money
has increased. 113 In order to make such an assumption one must first assume, contrary
to conventional thought amongst economic theorists, that the individual’s utility
function not only belongs to the von-Newmann-Morgenstern family of utility
111

This assumption (that utility is additively separable across different states of the world) will not be
disputed in this paper, although it is not self-evident that it holds true.
112
Had the individual purchased more coverage (and thus moved even further left then point 3) she
would not have maximized her total utility because she would have lost more units in her pre-accident
state than she would have gained in her post-accident state.
113
If at all, it could only be said that the individual in the post-accident state of the world is more risk
averse. Risk aversion is defined, by the Arrow -Pratt index, as the negative of the ratio of the first
derivative to the second derivative. Roughly speaking, it represents the degree of concavity (or
steepness) of the utility function. But even under this interpretation it is not clear why anticipating to be
more risk averse in the future leads one to purchase more coverage today. Furthermore, the relevant
theoretical framework to analyze this problem is that of state-dependent expected utility theory. As
Karni showed, the analysis completely changes once shifted from state-independent to state-dependent
expected utility theory. EDI KARNI, DECISION M AKING UNDER C ERTAINTY, THE C ASE OF STATE
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functions,114 but also, at the same time, belongs to the Bernoulli family as well. Only
if the utility function is Bernoullian can one meaningfully conclude an increase in
post accident “bang” from the next dollar. By making this assumption, Shavell has
stripped his results from carrying the normative weight associated with vonNewmann-Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. 115

b. Interpersonal comparability revisited.

A key feature of state-dependent utility theory is that the pre-accident and
post-accident utility functions are different. Different utility functions, however, mean
that the preferences of the individual have dramatically changed. In that case, the
individual’s problem in allocating resources between both states of the world is
equivalent to the policy maker’s problem (in the welfare economics literature) in
allocating resources between two different individuals. In both cases resources are
divided between two entities that have different preferences. Just as one cannot
meaningfully maximize a utilitarian social welfare function (with heterogeneity of
individuals) without assuming interpersonal comparability, it would be illegitimate to
meaningfully maximize a state -dependent utility function without assuming
something tantamount to interpersonal comparability. This is a controversial
assumption that economists try to avoid, at least in individual’s preference-based
decision theories. It is especially bothering in the pain-and-suffering context, because
the economic analysis assumes that individuals spend their money on insurance
premiums to accurately equate their state-dependent marginal utility of income in the
pre- and the post-accident states of the world. Even those who believe that some

DEPENDENT PREFERENCES (1985); See esp ecially pages 52-58 for state-dependent health insurance.
Karni is careful not to confuse von-Newmann -Morgenstern utility theory with the Bernoulli theory.
114
This assumption is necessary because otherwise it is be legitimate to assume that the individual
maximizes the weighted average of the pre-accident utility and the post accident utility.
115
Ole Hagen described six logically possible positions on the relationship between Bernoulli utility
theory and von-Newmann-Morgenstern’s utility theory. Shavell’s approach matches that in which
“One could accept the existence of both of a cardinal utility in the classical sense (operating in riskless
contexts) and the von-Newmann-Morgenstern utility index as describing actual behavior. This would
imply either that they were identical or that they were independent or that the effects operating besides
utility in the classical sense transformed this into a new function having the von-NewmannMorgenstern characteristics.” In contrast, the approach most economists take is that “One could deny
the existence of classical cardinal utility and accept the existence and descriptive power of a vonNewmann-Morgenstern utility index.” Ole Hagen, Introductory Survey in EXPECTED U TILITY T HEORY
AND THE ALLAIS P ARADOX 13, 18 (1979).
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‘rough’ interpersonal comparability is non meaningless, will be unlikely to extend it
to the type of comparability assumed in the pain -and-suffering context. 116
As von-Newmann and Morgenstern themselves admitted: they “have not
obtained any basis for a comparison, quantitatively or qualitatively, of the utilities of
different

individuals.”117

More

importantly,

the

problem

of

interpersonal

comparability is even stronger here because Shavell assumes that individuals’ utility
belong not only to the family of von-Newmann-Morgenstern utility functions but also
to the family of Bernoulli utility functions. He assumes that it is meaningful to
simultaneously compare people’s preferences over lotteries in risky situations and
their relative preferences over bundles in risk free situations. 118

116

While it may be sensible to believe that global interpersonal comparability is feasible, it is probably
even more sensible to believe that local interpersonal comparability is not. Matthew Adler, who made
the distinction between global and local comparability, may be correct to argue that “[i]t is a platitude
about welfare that sometimes we can compare small losses or gains to one person with large gains or
losses to another, and conclude that overall welfare has improved or decreased even though the
welfare-changing move is not a true Pareto-improvement or the opposite.” [Emphasis added]. Matthew
Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1371, 1403 (1998). But as
he himself admits, the platitude about global interpersonal comparability ‘is a platitude that “large
enough” welfare changes for one person will outweigh “trivial” changes in the opposite direction for
that person or another, not that any welfare change for one person is comparable with any welfare
change in the opposite direction for that person or another.’ Id. at 1404. But when the individual
contemplates about the optimal allocation of resources between the pre-accident self and the postaccident self, the individual must face the problem of local incomparability, which even Adler, who
otherwise believes that interpersonal comparability is not meaningless, admits seems impossible. Thus,
the fact that “[i]n everyday life we make, or at least attempt to make, interpersonal utility comparisons
all the time," as John Harsanyi argued, by itself, is not relevant to my claim here. John C. Harsanyi,
Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, in U TILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 49 (Amartya Sen
& Bernard Williams eds., 1982); and see also John Harsanyi, Cardinal utility in Welfare Economics
and in the Theory of Risk Taking (1955) reprinted in HARSANYI, ESSAYS ON ETHICS, SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR , AND SCIENTIFIC E XPLANATION 3 (1976). As Housaman put it, “[p]eople do, of course,
make interpersonal comparisons of how well off people are and of how much worse or better off they
might become. But these facts are no embarrassment to the strong negative conclusions just defended
[that interpersonal comparability is unfeasible in ordinal preference-based theory of welfare, RA], since
there is little reasons to believe that interpersonal comparisons people make are interpersonal
comparisons of preference satisfaction. The fact that even the most distinguished economists and
philosophers have had so much trouble holding consistently to the view that well being is the
satisfaction of preference is evidence for this claim.” Housman, supra note 107, at 479. To be fair,
Housman talks about interpersonal comparisons of ordinal utility, yet he holds the same view with any
non-bounded cardinal utility. Id at 485.
117
Theory of Games, supra note 90, at section 3.3.4.
118
For example, under this magnified type of interpersonal comparability problem, when
[U1(X)+U1(Y)]/2 > [U2(X)+U2(Y)]/2 it means a) that individual 1 is better of with a 50:50 mix of
bundles X and bundle Y than individual 2 with the same mix, and b) individual 1 is better off with a
lottery of getting either bundle X or bundle Y with 50%, than individual 2 with the same lottery.
Roemer distinguishes between expected utility and average utility. A von-Newmann -Morgenstern
utility function is a representation of ordinal preferences over lotteries, and “averages of a function
representing ordinal preferences have no interpretation in terms of average of some underlying quantity
associated with those state.” Roemer, supra note 78. Interestingly, Robbin acknowledged the principle
of diminishing marginal utility (in the sense of the value of the “bang” from the next dollar) but only as
relating to individuals. To extend it to different individuals (as those who promoted the progressive
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To summarize, Shavell assumes that people’s utilities are cardinal (in both
Bernoulli and von-Newmann-Morgenstern sense) and interpersonally comparable (in
both senses). These assumptions have never been made in individual choice theory.
3. Response to Objections .

There are several possible objections to the above line of argumentation and
especially to the claim that Shavell has deviated from conventional economic theory
of individual’s choice. The following sections will describe these objections and then
respond to them.

a. Von-Newmann and Morgenstern wrote a set of axioms which
formalize Bernoulli’s theory; particularly that risk aversion is
equivalent to diminishing marginal utility.
This claim, that the von-Newmann-Morgenstern theory and the Bernoulli
theory are equivalent is simply wrong. The two theories of utility do coincide in three
important ways. First, they both use the term “utility.” Just as Bernoulli defined
utility’s meaning, so did Von Newmann and Morgenstern. Bernoulli defined utility
numerically, as the logarithm of one’s monetary possessions that is independent of
any consideration of probability of risk,119 whereas von-Newmann-Morgenstern
defined utility as being that “thing” for which the calculation of mathematical
expectation is legitimate.120

As was explained above, utility has a completely

different meaning in each theory. 121 As economic theorists agree, “[t]he confusion
with respect to utility measurability is partly due to the use of the same term ‘utility’

taxation did), or to different “selves,” “begs the great metaphysical question of the scientific
comparability of different individual experiences.” Robbins, supra note 95, at 137.
119
At least that’s how von-Newmann-Morge nstern understood it. See Theory of Games, supra note 90,
at 28.
120
Theory of Games, supra note 90, at 28. Von Newmann & Morgenstern never argued that the
individual makes her choice by a similar calculation but simply the implications of her behavior are
examined as though she behaved in this manner. This view is later reflected in Milton Friedman’s
famous billiard player. Friedman claims that an expert billiard player makes his shots as if he knew the
complicated mathematical formulas that would give the optimum directions of travel, could estimate by
eye the angles, make lightning calculations from the formulas, and make the ball travel in that
direction. This example was presented at least in two different papers. See Utility Analysis on page 260
and see also M. Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS (Chicago 1953), reprinted in short in A. KATZ, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO THE LAW 32 (1998).
121
“Note that utility, in the Von Newmann & Morgenstern context, is used to represent preferences
whereas in neoclassical theory it determines (or precedes) preference.” Schoemaker at 532.
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both as a measure of subjective satisfaction and as an indicator of objective choice or
preference.”122 In fact, as Savage has argued “[t]he confusion arises only because Von
Newmann & Morgenstern use the already preempted word ‘utility’ for what I
[Savage, RA] here call ‘Von Newmann & Morgenstern utility.’”123
Second, Von-Newmann and Morgenstern have indeed formalized the fact
(which was known even before Bernoulli) that a gamble, which includes several
probabilistic payoffs, could be reduced to, or represented by, a single number, which
is the weighted average of those probabilistic payoffs. Indeed, Bernoulli and his
followers (such as the French mathematician Laplace) fixed the idea that a rational
individual chooses the action with the highest mathematical expectation as the basic
decision rule when dealing with risky prospects. 124 Yet, before von-Newmann and
Morgenstern formalized this in an axiomatic manner, there was no normative reason
to think, for example, that one should not multiply the payoffs rather than take their
mathematical expectations. As Ellsberg summarizes, before von-NewmannMorgenstern there was a “feeling that the emphasis on mathematical expectation was
arbitrary and unrealistic.”125
Third, they both used a concave utility function when dealing with risk
aversion. They did this, however in entirely different ways. The Bernoulli theory
explained risk aversion through the use of a concave utility function, whereas the vonNewmann-Morgenstern theory used concave utility function to represent risk
aversion. There are several major implications that follow from this difference. First,
under von-Newmann-Morgenstern’s framework one cannot know what causes people
to behave in a risk aversive manner. Based on this framework, there is no necessary
dependence linking one’s receiving of a diminishing bang from their next dollar to

122

YEW K WANG NG, WELFARE E CONOMICS 13 (1979).
Savage, supra note 85, at 98. See also Fischburn who argues that “Utility is one of the strangest
words in the annals of economics and decision theory,” Fishburn, Retrospective on the utility theory of
Von Newmann & Morgenstern, JOURNAL OF RISK AND U NCERTAINTY, 2, 127 (1989). (HereafterFishburn) and that “[n]ot a little confusion w as shown when Von Newmann & Morgenstern endowed
utility with an entirely new meaning.” Fischburn id. at 128. In fact Bernoulli himself did not use the
term utility but “moral expectations.”
124
Historically, it was this contribution – the notion of choosing the action that has the maximum
mathematical expectation – alone, and not the notion of concave cardinal utility function of riskless
wealth (as a cognitive operation over sure consequences) that served as the birthplace for Von
Newmann & Morgenstern’s Exp ected Utility Theory.
125
Ellsberg at 537. Savage wrote: “Bernoulli gives no reason for supporting that preferences
correspond to the expected value of some function…Why should not the range, the variance and the
skewness…of the distribution of some function join with the expected value in determining
preference?” Savage, supra note 85, at 97.
123
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behaving in a risk averse manner. 126 Second, under Bernoulli’s framework, a person
who performs risk-taking behavior is considered to be irrational, because he does not
maximize his concave utility function. 127 In contrast, under von-Newmann-

126

See supra citations by Savage in fn 96 and by Arrow in fn 100. As Roemer wrote “it is not hard to
imagine persons…(who)..get decreasing marginal satisfaction from each unit of incremental
consumption, but ..(who)..enjoy gambling….The opposite situation can also be imagined, of people
who do not enjoy the uncertainty of lotteries…but they have increasing marginal satisfaction in
income….” Roemer, supra note 78, at 151. Note, that under the old conception of utility this is not
imaginable. Thus, under von-Newmann-Morgenstern’s framework risk aversion behavior could be a
result of a) people indeed having a diminishing bang from the next dollar, b) people misperceive low
probabilities in a way that causes them to be risk averse, c) people hate to be in an uncertain situation
per se, or any combination of these reasons. Indeed, risk aversion is not only an exogenous assumption
in the von-Newmann-Morgenstern framework but it is also not necessarily an assumption that should
be associated solely with curvature of the utility curve. Rather, risk aversion could well be consistent
with some intrinsic perception of probabilities. Since the expected utility is the sum of outcomes
multiplied by their probabilities, there is no reason to pick one component of the product and not the
other. Just as outcomes could be distorted when perceived in our minds, so could probabilities.
Distortions in perception, whether of outcomes or probabilities, could have been (hard wired) in our
brains through evolution. In other words, assuming the independence axiom holds, risk preferences
may well be consistent with different explanations other than just diminishing appreciation of money.
Indeed, a unified approach was originally suggested by Karl Menger in the 1920s. Menger suggested
compounding the intuitions about the distortions of both the payoffs and the probabilities. People not
only undervalue large returns (diminishing marginal utility) but also undervalue small and high
probabilities (those that are close to 1). In fact, people treat very small probability as impossible. Only
medium probabilities are valued in a way that corresponds to the mathematical expectation. Menger,
The role of uncerta inty in Economics, (printed in 1934) reprinted in ESSAYS IN M ATHEMATICAL
ECONOMICS, IN THE H ONOR OF OSCAR M ORGENSTERN 211, 212 -3 (Shubik ed., 1967). Interestingly
Menger’s work was most influential upon two different schools of thought. First, to Von Newmann &
Morgenstern who admitted that they were inspired by his work. (“we were greatly stimulated by the
splendid paper on the St. Petersburg paradox by Karl Menger.”) Oscar Morgenstern, Some reflections
on utility, in E XPECTED UTILITY T HEORY AND THE ALLAIS PARADOX 175, 181 (1979). Second, to
Kahneman and Tversky who in constructing the Prospect Theory formalized the non-linearity of the
probabilities.
127
Indeed, Marshall and other 19 th century economists, who believed that the principle of diminishing
marginal utility was indisputable, disputed risk-seeking individuals’ rationality, or morality. Ellsberg at
536. The problem of morality arises due to the solution economists supplied to solve the discrepancy
between the theory and their observation of actual risk seeking behavior in the real world. This was to
assume that people derive utility from the activity of gambling itself, even when they lose. This was
considered immoral. “[I]t may be remarked that when we say [fair, RA] gaming is a sure way to lose
utility [in the long run, RA], we take no account of the utility – that is, the pleasure attaching to pursuit
of gaming itself; we only regard the commercial loss or gain. If a person with a certain income prefers
to run the risk of losing a certain portion of it at play…it must no doubt be conceded that the political
economist, as such, can make no conclusive objection.” Jevons, supra note 77, at 173-4. For a more
comprehensive proof that neoclassical economists indeed solve the discrepancy in this way see Schlee,
Marshall, Jevons, and the Development of the Expected Utility hypothesis, HISTORY OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 24(3) at 740-1 (1992) (Hereafter Schlee). Certainly, the enjoyment of gambling for its own
sake is not part of von-Newmann-Morgenstern’s framework because in their framework a person has
no preference between a simple lottery and a compound lottery, provided they have the same
probabilistic payoffs. Interestingly, some scholars have rejected the Bernoulli utility theory altogether
because of its impossibility to represent rational risk taking behavior. Perhaps the most famous
economist that raised this objection is Sir John Hicks, who admitted that Bernoulli theory was
“certainly more satisfactory than the crude view which bases everything on the money expectation,”
thought that the existence of gambling at unfair odds implied that “it is improbable that it contains the
whole truth”; specifically “when the scheme [probability distribution] includes a small chance of a very
large gain, ‘rational conduct’ (based on the law of diminishing marginal utility) would estimate the
value of this chance as very small indeed. Practice, however, does just the reverse.” The Theory of
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Morgenstern’s framework risk behavior is an external assumption about people’s
preferences and has nothing to do with their rationality. The only qualification of
rational behavior based on von-Newmann-Morgenstern’s expected utility theory is
that people act in a consistent way. One who does so is considered to have acted as if
they chose the highest mathematical expectation of gambles. 128

b. Shavell’s illegitimate interpretation of Bernoulli’s theory
nevertheless contains a strong intuitive appeal and does not detract
from the legitimate results he derived.
According to this objection, Shavell’s intuitive interpretation can help spread
his results among legal scholars who cannot follow his mathematical derivations. The
objection states that even if Shavell’s interpretation of his mathematical result is
illegitimate, one can ignore this interpretation and focus solely on his correct
results. 129
Shavell’s interpretation indeed helped spreading his mathematical results. In
fact, one might argue that these results have become too widespread. The problem
occurs because legal scholars have focused solely on the interpretation and not on the
mathematical results. This interpretation has no normative grounds, however because
it relies on assumptions that most economists do not make, especially not when
dealing with an individual’s decision theory. Cardinality of the differences in the
“bang” people receive from their wealth, and interpersonal comparability between

Uncertainty and Profit, ECONOMETRICA 11 May 170, 181 (1931). For other economists that took this
route see Schlee, at 740-1.
128
“Bernoulli’s theory is mostly a descriptive model, even though the expectation principle at the time
may have enjoyed much face validity normatively,” Schoemaker at 531. Fascinating enough, Bernoulli
never proved his hypothesis that the utility is a logarithm function of wealth, nor did he address the
issue of how to measure utility, or explain why the mathematical expectation as the reductionmechanism for a gamble would be rational. Bernoulli simply showed that modifying the then
conventional wisdom would better explain people’s actual behavior; today he would have been
classified as a behavioral economist.
129
Indeed, it seems that Shavell recognized that his interpretation was problematic. In the second
footnote in Chapter One, Shavell tells us that the convention in economic theory is that “utilities are to
be understood as numbers selected by the analyst to represent a party’s underlying preferences” and
that given this definition of utility, “parties make choices as if they were bent on maximizing some
numerical magnitude, but not because they are in fact doing that.” He further explains, that to argue
that this party maximize their utility “is a statement only about an analyst’s construct.” In Chapter
Eight Shavell argues that risk aversion is equivalent to diminishing marginal utility, but in a footnote he
tells us that this interpretation is made “because it seems to have strong intuitive appeal to readers who
think of utility as objective and measurable.” But then he says that those “readers who have studied the
axiomatic foundations of expected-utility theory will consider such interpretations problematic,
however, because for them the utility-of-wealth function is wholly notional; it is constructed by the
analyst to reflect preferences over uncertain prospects.”
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both von-Newmann-Morgenstern and Bernoulli func tions, are two, perhaps three,
additional assumptions that Shavell has never justified. In fact, most economists doubt
that they could be justified, again, at least not in the case of an individual’s decision
theory. 130
As was shown above Allan Schwartz, Ge orge Priest and Robert Cooter have
advocated eliminating pain-and-suffering damages in tort law entirely, or significantly
limiting it. This position was presumably based on mainstream normative theory, that
of von-Newmann-Morgenstern’s expected utility theory.

The problem is that in

reality the basis for advocacy of elimination of pain and suffering damages was
actually the Bernoulli theory, one which lacks any such normative grounds. 131
More importantly, the Bernoullian interpretation has consequences for
scholars who do empirical work. Recall that according to the legitimate interpretation
people would buy insurance coverage only if their post-accident von-NewmannMorgenstern marginal utility was steeper than that of their pre-accident marginal
utility. This, however, does not necessarily have anything to do with whether they
have a steeper post-accident Bernoulli marginal utility than their pre-accident one.
Unfortunately, at least one scholar has attempted to explore the ‘wrong’ post -accident
marginal utility in order to gain insights about pain-and-suffering damages in tort
law.132
C. Conclusion

This part surveyed the major paradigms in the law and economics literature
regarding the desirability of pain-and-suffering coverage. My approach sides with
Shavell (and other scholars, such as W. Kip Viscusi) who argue that an individual’s
demand for pain-and-suffering coverage is an empirical issue that cannot be
determined a priori . But even then, an important insight here is to realize that the
Shavellian-like argument that people would only arrange for coverage against nonpecuniary losses if such losses would result in a higher evaluation of money by them
is problematic on pure normative grounds because it deviates from the widely
130

In fact, it is considered by Sen and others to be simply a fallacy. See John Weymark, A
Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitariansim, in I NTERPERSONAL C OMPARISONS OF
WELL B EING 255 (Elster and Roemer eds., 1991).
131
See for example Allan Schwartz’s approach.
132
See the discussion below of the work of W. Kip Viscusi.
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accepted Von Newmann-Morgenstern expected utility paradigm. Furthermore it
misled other scholars, such as George Priest, Allan Schwarz, and Robert Cooter, to
essentially adopt the functional approach, which as was argued above, encourages
individuals to develop extravagant lifestyles, and to inflate subjective damages, which
cannot be verified by the courts. 133
As I find this approach unsatisfactory, the remaining issue, therefore, is the
best way to explore whether there is indeed a demand for pain and suffering damages.

133

See supra text around note 64.
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II. TH E CONTEMPORARY EMPIRICAL & EXPERIMENTAL F RAMEWORKS FOR
DEALING WITH T HE D EMAND F OR P AIN-AND-SUFFERING
A. The approach taken by Patricia Danzon
Patricia M. Danzon’s point of departure is that “for a serious injury that affects
the utility of wealth, optimal compensation could be more or less than the monetary
loss” depending on whether the injury increases or decreases the marginal utility of
wealth. 134 Danzon further searches for empirical evidence concerning the demand for
first-party insurance. Danzon analyzes the data and concludes, “The tort norm of full
coverage of all pecuniary loss plus pain and suffering far exceeds the coverage people
are prepared to pay for, given the choice.”135 In other words, she seems to claim that
people perceive injuries in general to decrease their ex-post marginal utility of wealth.
In general, collecting evidence from the market is problematic. The market for
non-pecuniary loss insurance is somewhat thin because of “supply-side” rather than
“demand-side” market failure. For example, consider the problem of asymmetric
information, which can cause both ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard problems. Painand-suffering is subjective in nature, and thus difficult to observe and verify. This is
what makes it non-contractible. 136 Asymmetric information also leads to adverse
selection. Individuals who know that they are at higher risk to suffer non-pecuniary
losses would find insurance for such losses a relatively good deal. This notion would
force premiums upward, as such high-risk individuals may adversely reflect upon
insurance pools. This sort of adverse selection can cause voluntary insurance markets
to fail. Unfortunately, non-pecuniary adverse selection would be harder for insurers
to combat through risk-classification tha n other types of adverse-section. This is
precisely because non-pecuniary losses are subjective and so difficult (perhaps
impossible) to observe ex-ante.
134

Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Mark ets, 13
J.L.S 517- 521 (1984) (Hereinafter: Tort Reform ). As for the optimal damages for deterrence purposes,
Danzon believes it is the value of the injury implied by the victim’s willingness to pay for prevention,
provided that she has optimal insurance. But this is backwards. The optimal damages, for insurance
purposes, should be determined by the victim’s willingness to pay for insurance, assuming optimal
prevention.
135
Id. at 524.
136
One way to overcome the impediments caused by the ex-post moral hazard problem is to market
insurance coverage with scheduled coverage amounts. In a recent working paper I discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of schedules. Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering
Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches and a Proposal for a Change (on file with the
author).
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Danzon responds by arguing that the tort system of damage recovery has no
advantage over private ins urance in combating adverse selection and moral hazard
and therefore whatever the market cannot handle, courts cannot either. Danzon further
argues that the administrative load on liability insurance policies (which is relevant
when a tort system is in place) is higher than on first-party insurance, another reason
to not preferring the tort system. 137 All of this has proved to be incorrect.
With respect to Danzon’s first argument, Croley and Hanson have shown that
the tort system is better in combating both adverse selection and moral hazard. First,
lawyers’ fees serve as an analogue to the first party insurance market’s copayment by
preventing plaintiffs from counting on full recovery. Second, bearing the burden of
proof on the question of causation suppresses plaintiffs’ incentives to take excessive
risk because it makes more difficult the demonstration that the defendant, rather than
the plaintiff, caused the harm in question. Other suppressors include different
defenses, such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence and comparative
negligence, which might eliminate, and more likely reduce, the amount of
compensation that risk-taking plaintiffs will receive in damages, whereas first-party
insurers typically do not discount insureds' benefits according to any comparative
fault rule. Third, the court has different procedural filters to examine the relevance,
probative worth, and prejudicial effect of the plaintiff’s evidence so that juries
evaluate only evidence that survived these filters. Forth, the fact that tort-provided
insurance is mandatory renders adverse selection problems less significant in the tort
context. Fifth, manufacturers seem to be able to better segregate consumer -insureds
than private insurers can.

138

With respect to Danzon’s second argument, the reason why the administrative
load on third-party insurance is higher than on first -party insurance is most probably
due to the pain -and-suffering loss component. This results in expensive litigation. 139
However, this fact should serve first as a motive to simplify the compensation system
(as will be discussed below), rather than abolishing indemnification coverage for
pain-and-suffering damages. 140
137

Id. at 524-526.
Croley & Hanson, supra note 7, at 1903.
139
Mark Geistfeld, Implementing Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson and Twerski,, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. at 639-642 (1992).
140
Danzon could also be criticized for ignoring consumers’ risk misperceptions. Danzon’s response is
that there is no evidence for consumers’ risk misperception. But the truth is that there is a lot of
evidence to support consumers’ risk misperception. In fact, Allan Schwartz concluded that one of the
138
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Interestingly, even if Danzon were correct that insurance markets are a better
place to estimate the demand for pain-and-suffering damages, a close look at her
findings reveals that, despite all impediments, if anything, her findings demonstrate
such a demand.
Danzon finds that about 20 percent of the labor force has private long-term
disability income protection. This coverage is limited to 60-70 percent of the predisability salary. 141 Is it really surprising that people may demand coverage only up
to 70 percent of their pre-disability income? Even putting coinsurance payments, as a
mean to combat moral hazard, to one side, one should remember that these insurance
awards are tax-exempt and therefore anything above that would be considered excess
insurance. 142 But why is it that only about 20 percent of the labor force has private
long-term disability income protection? Danzon admits that consumers base their
demand for disability insurance in light of existing pension plans, Social Security
Disability and Workers Compensation. As she herself admits, 45% of the labor force
has private pension coverage which provides coverage in the event of early disability.
Social Security Disability provides coverage which amounts to about 40 percent for
those who earn above the minimum taxable income and up to 86 percent for those
earning the minimum wage.143 It is estimate d that annual disability benefits paid by
Social Security and Workers Compensation are about eight times those paid by

hottest debates is whether consumers over estimate risks. (Schwartz Alan, The Case Against Strict
Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 819 (1992) and Proposals for Reform), underestimate risks, as Latin
has concluded Latin Howard, ‘Good’ Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA
L. REV . 1193 (1994), or both like Kysar and Hanson have concluded. (Kysar and Hanson argue that
consumers can be manipulated to either under estimate or over estimate risks depending on the
manufacturers’ objectives. Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. R EV. 1420 (1999); Jon D. Hanson and Douglas
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to
Market Manipulation, 6 R OGER W M. U. L. R EV. 259 (2000). As mentioned above, I ignore consumers’
imperfect information.
141
Id. at p 522 -523. Disability insurance protects for wage loss in cases of a disability. These plans
include offset provisions against Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) coverage to prevent excess
coverage.
142
Danzon seems to understand this point as she asserts to make the same policy recommendation
when she recommends providing individualized “compensation for wage loss up to 70 percent of predisability, pre-tax earnings (full replacement of after tax earnings).” Id. at 533. Other studies show that
disability insurance in fact covers about 60% of after-tax income. SEE C. SOULE, D ISABILITY
INSURANCE: THE U NIQUE R ISK (4th ed, 1998). But less than full coverage (deductibles or co insurance)
is a well-known tool to incentivize people to recover form their disability and return to work, that is, to
combat ex-post moral hazard. So even this data, if correct, does not prove there is no demand for such
coverage.
143
Danzon at 523.
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private insurers.144 In addition, one should add tort law as a means for providing
coverage, including pain-and-suffering coverage. In most states, the jury is prohibited
from receiving evidence of compensation or coverage from other sources (“the
collateral source rule”). Thus, to the extent there is any reduced demand in Danzon’s
findings about the private markets, it only reflects an adjustment to the existing law. If
parties understand that they are insured through these other means, their incentives to
purchase insurance through the private market are reduced. 145
Danzon further reports that private insurance markets indicate a low
willingness to pay for medical care.146 But as she this time admits this might reflect,
for similar reasons to those stated above, a rational adjustment to public programs. 147
Interestingly, Danzon reports that 57% of the labor force has accident
insurance, which is the only private insurance that “bears some resemblance to
compensation for pain and suffering,” because these policies are not a replacement of
specific expenses but rather pay a pre -specified sum in the event of an injury. Danzon
is correct, given that all of the pecuniary elements of those losses tend already to be
covered under other types of policies, such as life insurance and health insurance
policies. 148
Taken together, Danzon findings seem to imply that the best explanation for
whatever demand she found is that people feel that tort law does not sufficiently
compensate them for pain-and-suffering losses. Danzon’s findings do not reveal a
lack of demand for pain-and-suffering coverage. In fact, it might indicate exactly the
opposite.149 Indeed, and in light of her analysis somewhat surprisingly, Danzon
herself eventually recommends including pain-and-suffering damages in tort law.150
144

U.S Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 382, 387
(1998).
145
A similar point was made in Bovbjerg, Sloan and Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
Scheduling “pain-and-suffering,” 83 NW U. L. REV. 908, 935 (1989) (Hereinafter: BSB). “Informed
consumers know that pain-and-suffering is compensable in tort cases; they are already covered when
someone else is to blame for their injury. Given that they thus have a limited need for such coverage,
its absence is not proof of its lack of value.” Id. at 933.
146
Specifically she argues that 48% of the population under 65 has no private major medical insurance.
Interestingly, Danzon reports that 36% of major medical plans have unlimited maximum benefits.
Danzon finds it as a low percentage but, given the risk of ex-post moral hazard, I find it high. Danzon
at 523-4.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 524; see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 7, at 1885 -92 for the same point. Yet, Danzon
argues that the total contribution of less than 1 percent of total contribution to health benefits indicate a
relative low demand for such insurance. Id.
149
It is interesting to note that, in her policy recommendations, Danzon adopts a view that does not
reflect her own conclusions. Danzon’s analysis might falsely cause one to understand her argument that
tort awards in general should not raise the level of the victim’s monetary loss. In her conclusions,
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B. The approach taken by Kip Viscusi
If markets are a bad place to explore the demand for pain-and-suffering
coverage, then we must determine a proper forum to do so. Some will argue that nonmarket evidence shows that people demand pain -and-suffering damages. For
example, different consumers groups, like consumers unions, citizen action groups,
consumer federations, etc., have fought against capping pain-and-suffering damages
in tort law.151 Others have claimed that modern jurisprudence (courts and legislatures)
has recognized non-economic losses. These campaigns reflect a social desire for such
personal injury losses to be compensable. 152 Critics of these approaches argue that
public choice theory demonstrates that these bodies do not necessarily reflect the
citizens’ preferences, but rather reflect equilibrium among the self -interested actors,
such as plaintiff lawyers, within these bodies.
The last possible source of information is laboratory studies. In these
controlled environments, individuals are asked to perform different tasks, answer
questions, etc. From their responses, the researchers draw conclusions regarding the
research questions. Indeed, several legal economists have advocated or relied on
laboratory studies to investigate the question of the demand for pain-and-suffering
coverage. 153
Viscusi is the most prominent economist who attempted to systematically
investigate the question of pain -and-suffering damages in tort law. He based this
investigation upon the insight that pain-and-suffering damages raise a conflict
Danzon recommends providing individualized “compensation for wage loss up to 70 percent of predisability, pre-tax earnings (full replacement of after-tax earnings);” and “a schedule of compensation
for pain-and-suffering for serious injuries only.” Id. at 533.
150
The only constraint she puts on pain-and-suffering damages is that they should be paid solely for
serious injuries. Danzon builds on the theory that serious injuries increase victims’ post-accident
marginal utility. But Danzon never defines what a serious injury is. If she means that a serious injury is
any injury that increases a victim’s post-accident marginal utility, she is being tautological and her
recommendation cannot serve as a policy aid. Moreover, according to a conventional insurance theory,
non-serious injuries should not be covered regardless of whether the losses are monetary or nonmonetary. This is because of the relatively high administrative costs associ ated with non-serious
injuries and the inability to control moral hazard and adverse selection. Therefore, insurance should not
cover non-serious losses, whether they are monetary or non-monetary. Danzon’s recommendation to
restrict pain-and-suffering damages to serious injuries is not helpful.
151
Croley & Hanson, supra note 7, at 1842-4.
152
BSB at 935. In a similar manner Croley and Hanson argued in addition that other non-market
evidence such as high jury awards and everyday experience, also support the claim that there is a
demand for pain-and-suffering damages in tort law. Id. at 1831-41, 1844-5.
153
BSB at 934-35. Despite this methodology being the cornerstone of social sciences, there are still
people, especially economists, who are skeptical of insights taken from the laboratory. For further
illustration, see the discussion in footnote 219 below.
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between deterrence and insurance objectives. Viscusi is unique in his steady attempts
to use empiric al methods to evaluate the magnitude of optimal pain-and-suffering
damages as a function of the chosen objective.154
Unlike Priest, Cooter and Schwartz, Viscusi recognizes that the demand for
pain-and-suffering coverage cannot be determined a priori, and depends on the nature
of the injury; more specifically on the impact of the accident on people’s marginal
utility of income. 155 In particular, he argues, “if ill health does not alter the marginal
utility of income, for any given income level, then full insura nce is optimal. If ill
health lowers (raises) the marginal utility of income for any given income level, less
(more) than full income insurance is desirable,”156 where “full insurance” means
insurance for monetary losses. Recognizing that there is no theoretical basis for
determining the shape of the utility function, Viscusi designed several empirical
studies in an attempt to check for people’s actual utility functions. 157
Based upon his empirical studies, Viscusi concludes that as an empirical
matter, except for minor injuries (which increase people’s marginal utility), people
will not choose to purchase coverage for pain-and-suffering losses (because severe

154

“There is no unique value of life; the appropriate value depends on whether our concern is with
accident prevention or compensation.” W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCT LIABILITY 89 (1991).
When deterrence is the main objective Viscusi thinks that the relevant measure is the “deterrence
value” in which people are asked to reveal their risk-dollar tradeoff, namely the price they are willing
to accept in order to subject themselves to a risk. For example Viscusi checked the risk premium
workers receive for bearing an extra risk. W. Kip Viscusi & William N. Evans, Utility Functions That
Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications, 80 A MERICAN ECON. REV. 353
(1990). (Hereinafter Viscusi and Evans I). But, as Viscusi admitted, for this premium to reflect
workers’ attitude towards risk the market must be competitive. Clearly, blue-collar workers do not
enjoy a competition for their labor. Nevertheless, in a later paper Viscusi claimed that “[e]vidence on
worker risk perceptions suggests that subjective risk beliefs are strongly correlated with objective
measures of the industry risk level.” Viscusi, Sounder Rationale, at 145. (In other studies, it is the price
they are willing to pay to eliminate a risk. For example, in Evans and Viscusi II, Viscusi asked
consumers how much they would pay to manufacturer to eliminate some risks in their products). The
rationale behind the willingness -to-accept measure is that from a deterrence perspective it does not
matter whether the potential injurer compensates ex-ante all those who are subject to a risk with an
amount equal to the expected risk or, alternatively, whether she pays the actual victim the full loss; in
both cases there is one statistical loss. From an insurance standpoint however, it matters a great deal
whether we deal from an ex-ante or from an ex-post perspective. Compensating potential victims for
the ex-ante risk they face makes all potential victims whole from a standpoint of their expected wellbeing. In contrast, compensating ex-post the actual victim, say, a paraplegic, will not, in most cases,
restore his well-being before the accident. Id. at 91.
155
Id. at 89.
156
Viscusi and Evans I at 354.
157
Viscusi admits that without knowledge of the shape of the utility functions economic inquiry is
limited to “local rate of tradeoff between risk and money” and thus attempts to estimate people’s utility
functions based on their tradeoffs. Id. at 367.
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losses decrease their marginal utility). Thus, Viscusi argues, that from an optimal
insurance perspec tive, less than full compensation for workers’ injuries is desirable.158
Viscusi’s work is definitely impressive in scope. Unfortunately, as will be
shown below, because of its many drawbacks it cannot serve as a policy guide.

1. Drawbacks in the design of the study
Viscusi is aware that in order to evaluate the “insurance value” of pain-andsuffering, the relevant reference point is not the actual demand for pain-and-suffering
coverage, but rather the amount of insurance the individual would select if economic
markets were perfect, including accurate information by the consumers. 159 This is
because, among other things, individuals are not fully aware of the risks hidden in
different products. Nevertheless, much of Viscusi’s own empirical work relies exactly
on the way lay (uninformed) people perceive the risks in different contexts. 160
Moreover, despite his awareness of the inability of people to accurately
process law probabilities, in designing his studies Viscusi uses low probability
risks. 161 For example, in Viscusi and Evans II, he used a 0.0015 chance of an injury.
In fact, in later and less influential papers, Viscusi designed different studies in order

158

Id. at 370. He summarizes that the appropriate levels of pain-and-suffering awards vary depending
whether the objective is to make the victim whole, provide optimal insurance, provide optimal
deterrence, or foster some other objective. Viscusi, Sounder Ra tionale at 169. In another place he
concludes that the best that can be achieved is to find a middle ground and sacrifice some of the
deterrence objective by limiting the level of compensation and thus limiting the degree of the overinsurance, implied from the analysis of the insurance objective. Id. at 92.
159
Id. at n.7. And see also “Market evidence regarding the failure of insurance firms to offer pain-andsuffering insurance may not be conclusive since the presence of pain-and-suffering and its severity may
be difficult for the insurer to monitor, thus creating problems of moral hazard.” W. Kip Viscusi, The
Consumer Welfare Effects of Liability for Pain and Suffering: An Exploratory Analysis, Comments and
Discussion, in B ROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC A CTIVITY M ICROECONOMICS , Volume 1993(1) 175.
160
To give just two examples, in a study with Magat and Huber, the authors interviewed people at a
mall to elicit choices among residential areas that pose different risks of chronic disease (a nerve
disease and a cancer of the lymph system) and dying in a car accident. From people’s paired choices
between the different residential areas, the authors inferred people’s utility. In another study with
Evans, the authors asked consumers how much they would pay to obtain a specified reduction in the
risk of injury from a risk of 15 injuries per 10,000 bottles of toilet bowl cleaner and of insecticide.
From the responses the researchers attempted to elicit people’s utility functions. Viscusi and Evans II.
Note however that not all of Viscusi’s studies rely on lay people’s demand for insurance. In a study
with Evans, the authors asked chemical workers to reveal their required wage increase needed to
compensate them for working with some hazardous chemicals. From their responses, the authors
elicited their post-injury marginal utility. Viscusi and Evans I.
161
FISCHOFF B. ET AL., A CCEPTABLE RISK (1981).
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to correct exactly this research error after getting what he called “implausible”
results. 162
It is important to note that these early studies of Viscusi were the ones most
often cited by the legal academia. As they are based on shaky methodological
grounds, as Viscusi himself admitted in later studies,163 any conclusions based upon
this method are dubious.164
2. Drawbacks in the interpretation of the findings.

Viscusi’s work has some major inconsistencies between the conclusions he
draws from his empirical studies, and his general analysis of the question of pain-andsuffering damages in tort law. For exa mple, when providing an intuition for why pain and-suffering damages are not required, Viscusi ask us to imagine that we planned to
spend an evening out somewhere but food poisoning prevented us from going out. To
demonstrate how absurd it is to have pain -and-suffering insurance for such an event,
Viscusi asks us: “Do you live it up in order to compensate for the welfare loss you
have suffered or do you skip the planned evening out, saving the money until you are
well?”165 But food poisoning, in relation to the other chemical risks presented in
Viscusi’s own work, is a minor injury. Based upon his empirical findings, Viscusi
argues that only minor injuries increase people’s marginal utility of income (and thus
only minor injuries presumably deserve pain -and-suffering damages). 166 Viscusi’s

162

Frank A. Sloan, W. Kip Viscusi, Harrell W. Chesson, Christopher J. Conover, & Kathryn WhettenGoldstein, Alternative Approaches to valuing intangible health losses: The Evidence for Multiple
Sclerosis , J. HEALTH ECON. 475, 489-90 (1998) (hereinafter - Alternative Approaches ).
163
In later papers, Viscusi admits that a potential approach of building upon responses to questions
involving low probabilities is that “the valuations will be distorted by the perceptual biases, thus
affecting the estimate of the implicit value of the health outcome.” Wesley A Magat, W Kip Viscusi,
Joel Huber, A Reference Lottery Metric for Valuing Health, 42 M ANAGEMENT SCIENCE 1118, 1119
(1996) (herein after Valuing Health); See also, Alternative Approaches at 479. In this paper Viscusi et
al attempted to correct for people misperception of low probabilities.
164
In fact even in 2002 Viscusi’s early studie s are still cited as shown in a survey forthcoming in
Handbook of Public Economics where Kaplow and Shavell referred to Viscusi and Evans I (a study
from 1990), and to this study only, as their empirical evidence for the claim that there is no evidence
for demand for pain-and-suffering coverage. See Louis Kaplow & Steve Shavell, Economic Analysis of
Law, NBER working paper 6960 http://www.nber.org/papers/w6960 at 8. Calfee and Winston refer to
this study as a proof that losses reduce marginal utility in most important kinds of injury. Calfee &
Winston, supra note 12, at 137.
165
Viscusi, Sounder Rationale at 156.
166
Viscusi, Pain-and-Suffering at 156.
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absurd example for why one does not need pain-and-suffering insurance contradicts
his own findings. 167
This is not the only example of a contrast between Viscusi’s own findings and
Viscusi’s analysis. Viscusi, also, objects to ca pping pain-and-suffering damages
where his own empirical findings suggest exactly that. One of the reasons that Viscusi
objects to capping pain-and-suffering damages is because it creates inequity across
injury groups.168 Indeed, victims of brain damage, para/quadriplegia, and cancer will
be most affected by capping pain -and-suffering damages. But Viscusi himself
concludes from his own empirical work that individual will not demand insurance for
severe accidents because these accidents lower their marginal utility. 169 And based on
his own work it makes sense to limit the amount of pain-and-suffering damages for
severe injuries. Viscusi, therefore, provides the policymaker with advice that
contradicts his own work.
Not only does each of his findings (that minor injuries increase people’s
marginal utility and that major injuries decrease it) contradict his analysis, but also it
is hard to imagine a story that could reconcile both of these findings. Imagine how
individuals’ marginal utility would behave under Viscusi’s findings. We first start
with a case of a minor injury, which, according to Viscusi’s findings, increases
people’s marginal utility above their status quo level and thus requires a pain-andsuffering coverage. The more severe the injury is, as long as it is still minor, the
higher the marginal utility becomes and the higher the pain-and-suffering damages the
injury deserves. 170 Then, suddenly, at some point, as the injury gets even more severe,
the marginal utility, which has been increasing up to that point, drops back even
below its pre-accident state, because according to Viscusi’s findings that severe
injuries lower people’s marginal utility below the status quo level. Then, as the injury
gets even more severe, the marginal utility falls even more, im plying a lower amount

167

I will return to the example itself below.
“Capping pain-and-suffering awards might increase the degree of inequity in the manner in which
pain-and-suffering awards are set, because victims with major injuries would be limited in making their
claims while those with minor injuries would be unaffected.” Id. at 107. Indeed the data show that most
severe injuries are already under compensated. Viscusi objects to capping damages also because it will
have little impact because the lion’s share of the pain-and-suffering damages is generated by small
claims, not by the few at the extreme. Id. at 107.
169
Viscusi, Pain and Suffering.
170
Viscusi claims that minor injuries behave like monetary loss, and therefore the higher the loss the
higher the coverage it requires.
168
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of damages to be paid to victims. 171 Viscusi never provides an explanation or an
intuition that could explain this strange trend.
In sum, it seems then that the distinction Viscusi tries to draw between minor
and major injuries lacks any internal consistency. Perhaps more fundamentally, as
will be shown below, this distinction has no basis in Viscusi’s own findings.
3. Drawbacks in analyzing the data .

Viscusi has so many studies that it would be tedious to scrutinize them all
here. Thus, I chose his two most influential studies, which he conducted with Evans.
These studies serve as the a major basis for Viscusi’s conclusion that major injuries
decrease individuals’ marginal utility and minor injuries increase it.172 These studies
also served as major evidence in law and economic literature to demonstrate that
“victims would often not elect to insure against non-pecuniary losses because these
losses would not create a need for money, that is, raise their marginal utility of
wealth.”173 Unfortunately, these studies cannot support the conclusions the authors
drew from them.
In Vicusi & Evans I, chemical workers were asked to reveal their required
wage increase needed to compensate them for working with some hazardous
chemicals. From their responses, the authors elicited their post-injury marginal
utility. 174 The authors found that for TNT and Asbestos, people’s post -injury utility as
well as marginal utility is lower. For chloroacetophenone, (a type of a tear gas) the
authors found that the marginal utility is higher. 175 The authors explained this finding
in that this chemical is just an eye irritant, and it “does not inhibit one’s ability to
derive utility from additional expenditure.” But they never explained why it increases
one’s ability to de rive utility from additional expenditure.
171

For a similar argument see Richard Watt and Francisco J. Vazquez, Optimal Accident Compensation
Schemes, (working paper, on file with the author).
172
The authors concluded that less than full compensation for worker’s injuries is desirable. In
particular, they argue that 85% replacement is optimal if insurance is provided on an actuary fair basis
and 68% if insurance is provided at the current degree of loading. Viscusi and Evans I at 370-1.
173
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 163, at 8. As already mentioned, in a survey forthcoming in
Handbook of Public Economics Kaplow and Shavell referred to Viscusi and Evans I, and to this study
only, as their empirical evidence for the claim cited in the text.
174
Note that this is an indirect approach. Viscusi and Evans did not ask them how much they would
need in case they would be injured but their willingness to accept to be exposed to a higher risk of
injury.

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art11

60

Avraham:

PAIN-AND-SUFFERING DAMAGES

60

It is worth mentioning that when the authors imposed ‘additional structure’ on
the data by assuming a logarithmic utility function, which is tantamount, in their view,
to assuming diminishing marginal utility from money, the differences across the
chemicals were muted. 176 Be that as it may, even without this ‘additional structure’ it
is hard to reconcile the authors’ conclusion with their findings. Specifically, it is not
clear why Viscusi and Evans chose to describe chloroacetophenone as “just an eye
irritant” which causes only minor injuries. 177 As official data by the U.S. Department
of Labor reveals, it is not only an eye irritant but also a respiratory and skin irritant.
Moreover, it can in fact cause severe injuries and even death. 178 Given that the
participants were chemical workers, it can be reasonably assumed that they were
aware of the devastating consequences that chloroacetophenone can cause. Second,
TNT, on the other hand, seems to be less dangerous than one might initially think.
Chemical manufacturing use TNT as an intermediate in the production of dyestuffs
and photographic chemicals. At high air levels (above the level permitted today in the
workplace) workers involved in the production of TNT experienced anemia and
abnormal liver tests. After long term exposure to skin and eyes some people
developed skin irritation and cataracts, respectively. There is no information that TNT
causes birth defects in people.179 I will return to Viscusi and Evans’ classification
below.
In Viscusi and Evans II, consumers at a shopping mall and hardware store
were asked how much they would pay, above the product price, to obtain a safer
product. Subjects were presented with two fictitious products and their prices - $10 for
insecticide and $2 for toilet bowl cleaner. Then, subjects were asked about their
willingness to pay to eliminate a risk of 15 injuries per 10,000 bottles of toilet bowl
cleaner and of insecticide. From the responses, the researchers attempted to elicit
175

Interestingly, the authors found that the overall post-injury utility (to distinguish from marginal
utility) was increased yet that was not found to be statistically significant at the 5% level.
176
Viscusi and Evans I at 363-7.
177
Viscusi and Evans I at 361.
178
According to the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, it is an
eye and respiratory irritant and that burning and irritation of the skin can occur especially if the skin is
moist. Its use as a riot -control agent has caused several deaths. Moreover, overexposure can cause
permanent partial opacity. Severe inhalation exposure causes pulmonary edema, which may have
delayed onset. See
http://www.osha-slc.gov/SLTC/healthguidelines/a-chloroacetophenone/recognition.html#healthhazard.
For the purposes of the studies the more important factor is the participants’ perception of the injuries.
However, the participants were all chemical workers who presumably are informed about the real
hazards in these chemicals.
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people’s utility functions. The authors found that in most cases there was an increase
of the marginal utility.180 The authors explained this by stating the fact that “all
injuries considered tend to have relatively minor health effects” and thus they “do not
alter one’s utility function.”181 It is not clear, however, why they consider these
injuries to be less serious than those at Viscusi and Evans I. As the authors themselves
reported, insecticide is a “fairly severe hazard” which can cause, among other things,
seizures and hospitalization for up to several weeks. 182 Similarly, toilet bowl cleaners
which, when mixed with products containing bleach, can form chloramine gasses
which can cause “lung damage and other potential serious conditions,” and are “the
leading cause of poisoning among adults, except for suicide and other intentional drug
overdoses.”183 Note, that unlike in Viscusi and Evans I, there are no questions of
“real” risks but only of perceived risks because the products presented to the
respondent were fictitious.184
To summarize this point, in each of these studies alone, and definitely when
taken together, there is no basis in the data for the conclusion that major injuries
decrease individuals’ marginal utility and minor injuries increase it. The distinc tion
the authors made between minor and major injuries seems artificial. When viewed
together, and it is a question whether studies that are so different can be analyzed
together, these studies cannot be reconciled. One study shows that some injuries
decrease people’s marginal utility, while the other shows that other injuries may
increase it, there being no reasonable distinction between the severities of the injuries
in each of the studies.185

179

See
a
fact
sheet
by
Massachusetts
Military
Reservation
at
http://www.groundwaterprogram.org/comminv/facts/tnt.htm
180
William Evans & W. Kip Viscusi, Estimation of State-Dependent Functions Using Survey Data. 73
REV. ECON. & STAT. 94, 101 (1991) (Hereinafter Evans & Viscusi II).
181
Id. at 102.
182
Id. at 96.
183
Evans and Viscusi II is based on data reported in W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat and Joel Huber,
An investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 R AND J. ECON.
465, 471 (1987).
184
Evans and Viscusi II at 96.
185
A deeper look at Viscusi and Evans II can further teach us on how the formulation of the model
influences the results. One of the issues the authors were interested in was whether the data sup ports a
move on the non-state-dependent utility function or a change of the function itself. Recall that in
Viscusi and Evans I, the authors investigated whether people’s perception of their post accident
marginal utility is increased or decreased relative to their pre-accident state. Interestingly, Viscusi
claimed that an increase of the post-accident marginal utility supports the monetary-equivalent
approach at which the loss is tantamount to a shift left along the (non-state dependent) utility curve,
whereas a decrease of the post-accident marginal utility supports the state-dependent approach at which
the loss is tantamount to a shift down to a flatter state-dependent utility function. But this is incoherent.
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Further support for this point could be found when analyzing questionnaires
that I distributed in a faculty meeting at Northwestern University law school in
December of 2002. I asked the faculty to rank the riskiness of the same five chemicals
that Viscusi and Evans used in their studies. The thirty-two faculty member s who
chose to fill-in the questionnaires ranked the chemicals in the following order (the
more risky chemical first): Insecticide, Asbestos, Chloroaceptophenone, TNT, and
Toilet bowl cleaner. 186 As can be readily seen, the results show no support for Viscus i
and Evans’ assertion that TNT and asbestos are more dangerous than the other
chemicals. 187
If at all, Viscusi’s studies and logic must lead to the conclusion that pain-andsuffering damages are desired. Viscusi’s studies, as well as other empirical studies
which measure people’s valuation of life and limb (the “value of life” work) show,
unequivocally, that people value the loss of life and limb more than the compensation
they receive through different private and public coverage plans. To mention two
exa mples out of many, one survey elicited values of $50,000 (1971 dollars) for the

Viscusi could have taken the increase in the post-accident marginal utility also support a statedependent utility function in which the loss is tantamount to a shift done to a steeper post-accident
state-dependent utility function. Evans & Viscusi II at 94. It is Viscusi’s own formulation, and not his
findings, which does not allow for the alternative explanation. The same happened in Viscusi and
Evans I. The authors assumed a logarithmic utility function. But in a logarithmic function, the utility
and the marginal utility are both governed by a single parameter so that there is always a link between
whether the total utility decreased as a result of the injury and whether the marginal utility has dropped.
Thus, it is enough that the participants’ responses imply that injuries decrease their post-accident utility
(which is always the case), for the results to imply ipso facto a lower post accident marginal utility,
which is what the authors wanted to prove. Interestingly, in an earlier study the authors were aware of
this problem. Viscusi and Evan I at 364. To summarize this point, Viscusi’s own formulation of the
statistical analysis of the data dictated, rather than exposed, the findings.
186
The ranking was done in two ways. First, the faculty was asked to put the five chemicals in order of
riskiness and, second, to grade their risk on a 1 to 7 scale. There were no major differences between the
two methods. In addition, about half of the respondent received a Fact Sheet which provided a one
paragraph description of every chemical. The descriptions were drawn from Viscusi’s own studies and
from some official websites mentioned at footnotes 178 and 179. There were no differences between
the informed and the uninformed groups in the way they ordered the chemicals. However, there was a
difference in their risk grading. The uninformed group seemed estimate insecticide and
chloroaceptophenone higher than the informed group. Yet, this did not influence their overall ordinal
ranking.
187
One may argue that law faculty does not know much on riskiness of chemicals and therefore their
responses should be taken with a grain of salt. To the extent this is true, my point becomes even
stronger. Viscusi himself based his policy recommendations on exactly such studies. Asking people in
the mall does not strike me as better, for policy making purposes, than asking faculty in a law school,
holding everything else constant. To the extent that asking faculty in a law school questions about
riskiness of different chemicals cannot serve for policy making purposes, whether they are provided
with a Fact Sheet or not, so is asking people in the mall such questions. The point that I make in the
main text, however, is that even when one assumes that such studies are valuable, Viscusi’s assertions
that TNT and asbestos may cause severe injuries and the other chemicals only minor injuries are
unfounded.
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loss of an eye, hand or leg, which far exceeds conventional economic losses. 188
Viscusi himself published studies where he found that the value people place on their
lives was 4.3 million dollars.189 Again, these figures are not in accordance with court
judgments. Probably the best explanation for this phenomenon, in maintaining the
consumer sovereignty norm, is that people do, in fact, value life and limb above
monetary value. 190

C. The approach taken by John Calfee and Clifford Winston

John Calfee and Clifford Winston attempted to study the demand for pain-andsuffering coverage in an original and refreshing way. Unlike Viscusi, who attempted
to infer the optimal value of pain-and-suffering compensation from estimates of
individuals’ utility functions, Calfee and Winston confronted participants directly
with the pain-and-suffering coverage question. As Calfee and Winston emphasized,
they were not simply interested in the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage.
Rather, their main goal was to “assess the disparity (if any) between consumers’
willingness to pay for insurance versus prevention.”191
Their point of departure was the conventional wisdom that losses that decrease
the marginal utility of wealth do not require compensation. The novelty in their study
was the unusual way they chose to identify this type of losses: “[i]f the loss decreases
the marginal utility of wealth, consumers will be willing to pay more for prevention
than for insurance.” Calfee and Winston’s main goal, therefore, was to examine
whether people indeed pay more for prevention of the accident than for insurance

188

BSB, supra note 150, at 934-5.
For example in a study by Moore and Viscusi the authors found that workers receive $43.40 in
additional annual wages (in 1981 dollars) for each additional death per 100,000 workers, and thus
estimated at $4.34 million the cost that this group associated with the loss of one life. Michael J. Moore
& W. Kip Viscusi, Doubling the Estimated Value of Life: Results Using New Occupational Fatality
Data, 7 J. P OL’ Y ANALYSIS & M GMT 476 (1988). This reasoning makes the assumption that the price
which a group places on the statistical death of one of it members is equal to the price an individual
places on her own life when confronted by a fatal risk. This in its turn requires the assumption that
people are linear in their probability preferences, an assumption known to be empirically false.
Whether it is a change from .99999 to 1.0000 or a change from .00001 to .00002 matters. The
“assumption of linearity is clearly false; individual valuations of changes in risk will vary with the
background risk that is modified.” Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Value of Life, 38 C LEV. ST. L. REV. 209,
215 (1990); see also, Graham Loomes, Probability vs. Money: A Test of Some Fundamental
Assumptions of Rational Decision Making, 108 E CON. J. 477 (1998).
190
Assuming that the methodology of these studies is valid.
191
Calfee & Winston, supra note 12, at 192.
189
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against its non-monetary consequences. They argue that if people paid more for
prevention, it would mean that pain-and-suffering coverage is undesired. Therefore,
there would be no justification for pain-and-suffering damages in tort law because
(under strict liability in a contractual relationship) such damages serve as an
unwarranted insurance coverage.
To demonstrate this theoretical claim Calfee and Winston ask us to imagine
parents who consider sending their child to a summer camp. The authors argue that
the parents would pay a substantial amount for a marginal reduction in the risk of
death of their child but would pay very little for insurance against the same risk. This,
in their view, proves the loss of a child in a summer camp is a loss which decreases
the marginal utility of wealth, and which, therefore, renders the insurance coverage
for such a loss undesirable. 192
Calfee and Winston’s methodology employed the contingent valuation method
to elicit preferences for pain-and-suffering insurance and prevention in situations
involving possible injury, or loss of life, to participants, or their children, from a
product, or service. There were total of 10 such “situations.” Each situation involved
two scenarios (“scenario a” and “scenario b”) that “were essentially identical except
that one offered prevention and the other offered insurance.”193 For example, in
scenario 3a (the prevention scenario of situation 3) participants were asked to imagine
they needed to a buy a car and to decide about certain accessories. These included
engine size, whether to have an air -conditioner, and whether to have a safety package
(which halves the chance of a child sustaining crippling injuries that would make it
impossible for her to walk). The price of the car varied depending on the items
chosen. In scenario 3b, (the insurance scenario of situation 3) there was no safety
package but instead participants were offered the opportunity to purchase an
insurance policy that would pay money if a child had a crippling accident and would
never be able to walk. This coverage would be in addition to payments for medical
expenses. Again, the price of the car varied depending on the items chosen. 194

192

Id. at 134. “[A]ssuming the probability of loss to be 0.0001, $100 of the camp fees would be the
implicit insurance premium on a damage award of $1,000,000…but because the insurance is worth
much less than its actuarial value, most of this price increase will be a burden on consumers.” Id. at
134-5.
193
Id. at 140.
194
Id. at 158-9.
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The design of the study was a between-subject design where separate samples
were created for the prevention scenario and the insurance scenario so that each
participant addressed either scenario, but never both.
After conducting their study, Calfee and Winston concluded that
“[c]onsumers…were usually willing to pay more for prevention than for insurance”
and that consequently “awarding payments for pain-and-suffering…has the effect of
forcing consumers to purchase large insurance policies whose values…are less…than
their actuarial cost.”195
Calfee and Winston’s study suffers from several methodological drawbacks,
which cast doubt on the validity of their results. More fundamental is the fact that
their theoretical framework, upon which they designed their study, is incorrect.
Therefore, even if their empirical results were valid, these results could not lead to the
conclusions that Calfee and Winston reached. The following sections present the main
drawbacks and conclude that Calfee and Winston’s study cannot serve as a
policymaking aid.

1. Drawbacks in the theoretical framework.
While it is true that consumers will be willing to pay more for prevention than
for insurance when the loss decreases the marginal utility of wealth, it is equally true
that consumers will be willing to pay more for prevention than for insurance even if
the loss does not change the marginal utility of wealth at all. Moreover, this is
sometimes true, even when the loss increases the marginal utility of wealth.
Therefore, even if Calfee and Winston’s main results (that consumers were willing to
pay more for prevention than for insurance) were valid, it can tell us almost nothing
about the nature of the loss.
Perhaps the easiest way to see this point is by looking at a graph that Calfee
himself drew in another article, with Paul Rubin. In that article, Calfee and Rubin
showed that in cases of pure non-monetary loss (where there is no monetary loss at
all), if there is just a downward shift of the utility function, the optimal insurance is

195

Id. at 154.
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zero, the optimal prevention costs is A196, the marginal prevention costs is U, and the
full compensation is C, where 0<A<U<C. Consider the following chart:

U

A

C

0

W

The optimal prevention cost, A, is the maximum amount one would be willing
to pay to avoid the downward shift of her utility curve. Advance spending of such an
amount (normalized for the probability of loss) would bring one to the same level of
utility she would have if the loss occurs (because such amount was not spent). The
optimal insurance is the amount spent to equalize the marginal utility of wealth
between the two situations. As the graph represents a pure non-monetary loss, the
marginal utility of wealth in a given period has not changed. This demonstrates that
the optimal insurance coverage is zero. As the graph indicates, the main point here is
that people will pay more for prevention than for insurance, i.e. A>0,even when the
marginal utility of wealth has not changed. 197 Moreover, it is not too difficult to show
that even for losses that increase the marginal utility of wealth, the amount that
consumers will be willing to spend on prevention, in most cases, will be larger than
the amount for insurance. 198
Thus, Calfee and Winston presumably showed that participants in their study
were willing to pay more for the prevention of the injuries than for insuring against
the pain -and-suffering consequences. This mere fact, however, cannot tell us whether
these were injuries that have decreased, increased, or have not changed the marginal
utility of wealth.

196

For probability 1, and assuming the individual is not insured.
This would be true even if one considers the marginal prevention costs, U, instead of A.
198
For increased post-accident marginal utility of wealth type of accidents, unless the post accident
curve is extremely steep, the amount for prevention will exceed the amount for optimal insurance.
197
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One may argue that even if their study does not disclose anything about the
nature of the post-accident utility function, it does tell us that people prefer prevention
of the accident to insurance against its pain -and-suffering consequences. Moreover, so
goes the argument, this should be sufficient when considering the elimination of pain and-suffering damages. This would be a hasty conclusion.
As was explained above, as long as prevention costs are efficient, i.e. that the
costs for a reduction of a risk are lower than the reduction in its expected loss, people
will always prefer to spe nd their first dollars on prevention rather than on insurance.
This would be true even if the loss was monetary and people were not at all averse to
the risk. According to fundamental principles of economics, risk-neutral individuals
would pay to reduce risks of even monetary losses for which they would not purchase
insurance. 199 In fact, insurance companies prefer that individuals spend their first
dollars on prevention before they buy insurance to cover monetary losses.200
In sum, when people need to allocate their money between prevention and
insurance, their first priority is to pay for prevention and then to purchase insurance.
Insurance is relevant only after all cost justified prevention is provided. The fact that
people prefer to efficiently prevent losses than to insure against them is true not only
for most types of post-accident utility functions in the case of non-monetary loss, but
also for monetary loss as well. If one were to adopt Calfee and Winston logic, one
would have to recommend eliminating not only insurance for non-monetary losses but
also insurance for monetary loss. For this reason alone, Calfee and Winston’s study
could not serve as a policymaking aid. 201

199

Consider the following example. Suppose that a house is worth $300,000 and there is a 1:1000
chance (0.1%) that it would burn down in a fire. Further, suppose that a smoke detector reduces
expected loss by $100 and that a sprinkler system reduces the expected loss by another $100. If the
smoke detector costs $90 and the sprinkler system $110, a rational risk neutral person will purchase a
smoke detector system and not a sprinkler system. However, a rational risk-neutral person would have
no incentive to buy insurance that offered $100,000 in compensation for a premium of $100 (which is
the minimum the insurance company would require to be willing to offer). The point here is that a
rational risk neutral person will undertake all risk reduction activities up to the point where the
incremental benefit of the activity is equal to the incremental cost.
200
For reasons related to moral hazard.
201
Had Calfee and Winston designed their study such that in addition to the scenarios of prevention
and pain-and -suffering insurance, there would be a scenario for monetary insurance as well, they would
have discovered that participants preferred prevention to monetary insurance as well. One might argue
that the previous critique is tempered by the fact that Calfee and Winston’s study was a betweensubject design. Thus, one can argue that responses about prevention were not tainted by responses
about insurance. Participants’ low demand for insurance cannot be explained, so goes the argument, by
their high demand for prevention because they never had the opportunity to express their demand for
prevention. It is not clear that this critique is valid at all. Participants might express low demand for
insurance because they assume that all costs justified preventative measures have been already taken.
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2. Drawbacks in the methodology.
This section exposes several major methodological flaws that cast doubt on the
validity of Calfee and Winston’s results. But for the last one, all of these flaws have
not been mentioned before in the literature.

a. The design of the scenarios drove the results.
Using, for example, scenarios 3a and 3b, the design can be shown to have
driven the results. In scenario 3b (the insurance scenario), Calfee and Winston were
careful enough to explain to the participants that the insurance coverage they were
considering buying was in addition to payments they would receive for the medical
expenses associated with their children’s severe injury. This could be a good way to
characterize pain -and-suffering payments. 202 Thus, presumably the participants in
scenario 3b focused on whether to purcha se coverage against the pain-and-suffering
loss (and not the monetary loss) associated with automobile accidents that leave their
child unable to walk.
Unfortunately, this is not the situation in scenario 3a. In scenario 3a, participants
needed to consider whether to purchase a safety package that would halve the chances
of their child sustaining crippling injuries. When making this decision, however,
participants cannot avoid taking into account not only the pain-and-suffering loss but
also the medical expenses they might incur as a result of the car accident. In scenario
3a (as in some other prevention scenarios), participants were not asked to ignore the
monetary expenses associated with the car accident.203 As a result, rather than
comparing the willingness to pay for prevention and the willingness to pay for
insurance of a non-monetary loss, they compared the willingness to pay for
prevention of a mixed (monetary and non-monetary) loss with the willingness to pay
for insurance against a non-monetary loss. However, the mixed loss is always larger
Participants in the insurance scenario were not told anything on the possibility of preventing or
reducing the risk they w ere offered to insure against. On the other hand, it seems that each participant
answered several prevention scenarios and several insurance scenario so therefore, it is not clear how
participants perceived the relationship between prevention and insurance.
202
But see the discussion below on the problems in understanding what this really means.
203
And even if they were asked to do this, I have doubts that it would have provided us with valid
results. Mark Geistfeld has offered a similar approach to this one as a way to instruct the jury for
calculating pain and suffering damages. In a recent working paper I discuss in more detail this
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than the purely non-monetary loss. All else equal, participants are almost always
expected to pay more to prevent a large loss than to indemnify against a much smaller
one.204
b. A selective way to estimate the value of life bypassed undesired
results.
Several of the scenarios in Calfee and Winston’s study (like scenarios 3a and
3b above) did not contain explicit probabilities. In order to place a value on life,
Calfee and Winston used the participants’ responses in situation 7 in which explicit
probability of injury allowed a direct calculation of the value of life for prevention
purposes and for insurance purposes. Interestingly, Calfee and Winston selectively
chose the value of life elicited from the prevention scenario (scenario 7a) and applied
it in calculating the value of life in several other insurance scenarios. They did this in
order to “avoid absurd conclusions.”205 If, alternatively, Calfee and Winston had
chosen to infer the value of life from the equivalent insurance scenario 7b, and not
from the prevention scenario, they would have reached the conclusion that, for
example, participants in scenario 1 would be willing to spend $7,800 on insurance and
only $3,900 on prevention. This result contradicts their hypothesis. Indeed, they
chose not to do so. 206

approach. Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current
Approaches and a Proposal for a Change (on file with the author).
204
Even if it were a pure monetary loss, and even if they were not risk averse at all.
205
Id. at 147. A possible way to understand Calfee and Winston’s design is that it is not a pure
between-subject design. Rather, it might be that every participant faced some prevention scenarios and
some other insurance scenarios. Still, the critique in the text would hold.
206
See id . at 147 n.20, where the authors attempted to defend their choice. Reading their study leaves
the reader with an impression that the authors made some other arbitrary choices that cannot be
justified. For example, as the authors admit, “the value of prevention in scenario 5a, which involved a
disability of only three months due to headaches and nausea, was arbitrarily chosen to be $10,000.”
(end of paragraph in origin, RA). Nevertheless, the authors were not able to bypass all their absurd
results. For example, responses in the prevention scenarios in situations 7, 8, and 9 (a vaccine against a
dangerous virus) provided incorrect signs for less pain and fewer shots. This means that subject
preferred to pay extra dollars to get a version of the vaccine that require more shots than the alternative
version and were willing to pay extra dollars to get a version of the vaccine which is more painful than
the alternative version. Id. at 150. This is especially worrisome once one recalls that scenario 7a was
used to elicit participants’ value of life to be exported to situation 1. If subjects in situation 7 got it all
wrong, how can one use their estimation of the value of life at all?
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c. The conclusion that participants were willing to pay for insurance less
than its actuarial value is process-driven.
Consider situation 1, in which participants were asked to imagine they were
considering buying a car. 207 In scenario 1a (a prevention scenario in which the
participants considered buying a car with or without a safety package), the
participants were told that the safety package halves the chance of the participants
(themselves, and not of their child as in situation 3) having a fatal accident. Then, in
scenario 1b (an insurance scenario in which the participants considered buying a car
with or without an insurance policy), the participants were told that the insurance
policy would pay money to their family if they had a fatal accident while driving the
car. Calfee and Winston found that participants were willing to pay $3,900 for halving
the risk of their death and only $316 for buying a $100,000 insurance coverage.
Calfee and Winston assumed that the amount participants were willing to spend on
preventing the loss to life was the correct amount. Based on these figures, they then
inferred, the participants’ implicit probability of death. This probability data was the n
exported to the insurance scenario in order to calculate the actuarial value of the
insurance. Indeed, Calfee and Winston found that the actuarial value of the insurance
was higher than the $316 in premium that the participants were willing to pay. 208
Why did Calfee and Winston presuppose that the amount paid for prevention
was correct? They never say. It is easy to show that one could reach exactly the
opposite conclusion and argue that people were willing spend on prevention in lesser
amounts than its real value. Indeed, Calfee and Winston could have taken the opposite
approach and inferred the probability of death from the amount that participants were
willing to spend on insurance and then export this probability to the prevention
scenario. If they had done precisely that, they would have discovered that people were
willing to spend only $3,900 on prevention whereas its “real” value was $5,600. 209
207

Calfee and Winston used Situation 1 as their representative situation to explain their calculations. Id.
at 146-8.
208
Here is how it works. First, as already mentioned Calfee and Winston imported from scenario 7a the
value life, which was $1,772,000, to scenario 1a and 1b. Second, they divided the $3,900 (the
willingness to pay for prevention by participants in scenario 1a) by $1,772,000 to find that half of the
risk of dying is 0. 0022. Third, they multiplied 0.0022 by 2 to find that the full risk of dying from an
automobile accident is 0.0044. Fourth, they multiplied $100,000 (the insurance coverage) by 0.0044
(the risk of dying from an automobile accident) to find that the actuarial value of the insurance policy is
$440. Fifth, they found that participants’ willingness to pay for a $100,000 coverage ($316) was lower
than its actuarial value ($440). Id. at 146-8.
209
Here is how it works. First, they could divide $316 (participants’ willingness to pay for a $100,000
coverage) by $100,000 (the insurance coverage) to find that the risk of death is 0.00316. Second, they
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Thus, the conclusion that those participants were willing to pay less for insurance than
its actuarial value is process-driven.
d. The study exceeds the intellectual capabilities of layperson
participants.
Consider, for example, the task of participants in situation 1. Participants
were required to rank 13 accessory packages, each with four different features
(engine size, whether there is an air-conditioner, whether there is a safety package (or
insurance policy), and the total price). This is a difficult task for professional
economists, let alone laypersons. 210 Moreover, it is not clear how many of these
features contributed anything to the study. Had participants been asked to rank cars by
price, and whether they have a safety package (the prevention scenario) or an
insurance payout (the insurance scenario), presumably it would have been possible to
reach a conclusive result regarding the demand for prevention versus the demand for
insurance. As Viscusi recognized, this survey “places such severe demands on
respondents that they may be unable to give meaningful answers to the survey
questions.”211
In sum, these methodological flaws, as well as other unmentioned flaws (some
of which were mentioned by Viscusi in his comment to Calfee and Winston’s
study),212 cast doubt upon the validity of the whole study, even if its theoretical
framework were valid. Based on their results, the authors estimated the consumer
burden from over-insurance to be in the range of billions of dollars. 213 The flaws
presented here, as others which are not, significantly alter the author’s estimation.

could multiply 0.00316 by $1,772,000 (the value of life by participants in scenario 7a) to find that the
“real” prevention value was $5,600. Third, they could find that participants’ willingness to pay for
prevention of a loss of $1,772,000 ($3,900) was lower than its real value ($5,600).
210
Viscusi, A Comment, at 184.
211
Id. at 191.
212
For a list of other methodological flaws, see Viscusi, id. at 182-191. For the Authors’ response, see
id. at 192.
213
See for example, id. at 152, where the authors use the $440 actuarial value of the policy in scenario
1b to estimate the annual burden from automobile accidents at 4.7 billion dollars. As was discussed
above the result is process driven.
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D. Summary

This part has surveyed thr ee approaches that were taken to deal with
measuring the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage. These are the approach taken
by Danzon, Viscusi, and the approach taken by Calfee and Winston. My research
does not reveal other approaches for dealing with this problem. 214
As was shown at length, all approaches suffer from many theoretical and
methodological problems that render them useless for any policymaking process.
Despite the significant differences between these approaches, they all reach a
somewhat negative conclusion regarding the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage.
This conclusion should be reconsidered.
The next part presents an approach, which contracts the questions of the
demand for pain-and-suffering coverage in a different way. Like Calfee and Winston,
I have not attempted to estimate individual utility functions, as Viscusi did. Rather, I
confronted the participants with the direct question regarding their demand for pain and-suffering damages. In contrast to Calfee and Winston, however, I have not
explored whether there is a significant difference between participants’ demand for
pain-and-suffering coverage and their demand for prevention. Rather, I have explored
whether there is a significant difference between participants’ demand for pain-andsuffering coverage and their demand for monetary coverage.

214

But for one early study by Jeffrey O’Connell and Rita Simon. See infra text around note 274.
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III. EXPLORING THE DEMAND FOR P AIN -AND -SUFFERING
COVERAGE – THE S UGGESTED APPROACH.
The previous parts revealed the theoretical difficulties and the empirical flaws
in the approach of contemporary scholars. This part presents an alternative theoretical
approach as well as an alternative empirical methodology to investigating the demand
for pain -and-suffering coverage in tort law.
A. The Theoretical Framework
1. Introduction.

How can we know whether to provide pain-and-suffering coverage in tort
law? One possible way is a democratic alternative in which the government designs a
referendum and leaves such decisions up to its constituents. This approach has been
previously applied to a wide variety of issues including environmental issues, student
vouchers, and minimum wage mandates. 215 Yet, this democratic alternative has its
drawbacks: lengthy debates on the framing of the questions, funds invested by interest
groups, thereby hurting the democratic process, and more.216 A second possible way

215

California raised it minimum wage to $5.75 by passing a referendum in 1996 (Proposition 210,
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/initiatives/1996/prop210.html). See, Minimum Wage Petition
Headed for November Ballot, SAN D IEGO B USINESS JOURNAL 4/22/96, available at 1996 WL 8579170.
California also had a referendum in 1996 to consider Proposition 200, which, if enacted, would have
instituted a no-fault insurance regime without pain and suffering damages. Proposition 200, available
at http://www.lao.ca.gov/initiatives/1996/prop200.htm l. Yet it was not eventually passed. See, Auto
Premium Rate Rise Called Slow in State, LOS A NGELES T IMES 2/16/96 Part D, available at 1996 WL
5241489. California also had a referendum in 1996 to prohibit the recovery of non-economic losses in
certain car accidents. Specifically, an uninsured driver or drunk drivers at the time of an accident could
not sue someone at fault for the accident for non-economic losses. Proposition 213, available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/initiatives/1996/prop213.html. In Houston, voters defeated a referendum that
would have done away with affirmative action. Affirmative Actions, T HE NATION 11/24/97, available at
1997 WL 8867001.
216
Large corporations and interest groups can often defeat a proposed law by wielding their
fundraising and grassroots power; creating much controversy about reforming campaign finance law.
See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, Corruption, Pollution, and Politics, 110 YALE L.J 293 (2000)
(review ing ELIZABETH DREW , T HE C ORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS : W HAT WENT WRONG AND
WHY (1999)). For example, the insurance industry spent over $50 million on a campaign to defeat a
California right to sue referendum. See, Campaign 2000 Proposals 30 & 31 Insurance Industry Tactics
Pays Off Despite the Considerable Expense, Use of Referendum to Override Legislature’s Work could
Inspire Similar Efforts, LOS A NGELES T IMES 3/9/00, available at 2000 WL 2218887. Additionally, the
process of having to frame the issue and then reach a compromise on a law can result in a version of
the law different from what the populous desired. See Christopher B. Busch, David L. Kirp, & Daniel
F. Schoenholz, Taming Adversarial Legalism: The Port of Oakland’s Dredging Saga Revisited, 2
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS . & P UB. POL’Y 179, 179-80 (1999) (stating that it took over twenty-five years to reach
an agreement on what action to take in the economic development versus environmental protection
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of deciding on the application of pain-and-suffering coverage would be through
investigation of whether such coverage is efficient. Such coverage would be justified
if economists were able to prove to the policy maker that rational individuals indeed
demand coverage for pain-and-suffering because it benefits them. Unfortunately,
economists have not managed to come up with a valid economic model that can prove
such benefit to the rational consumer. 217 Rather, economists’ advise that the matter be
tested empirically. But, as was shown above the empirical and experimental attempts
that have been conducted to date measuring the demand for pain-and-suffering
coverage (or whether providing pain-and-suffering coverage will make rational
consumers better off) lacked adequate theoretical basis, in addition to being
methodologically flawed and poorly analyzed.

2. Mandated benefits.
The origins of the theoretical framework suggested here are based on
(although not identical to) the literature on mandated benefits. 218 The basic idea is that
there are rules that directly benefit some or all of the manufacturer’s customers while,

dilemma in Oakland Harbor due to interest groups and litigation, among other factors). Finally, the
legislative process can suffer from incomplete or erroneous information and the quality of the research
affects the quality of the policy enacted. See William H. Robinson, Legislative Research: Essential
Roles and Standards of Excellence, 29 INT ’L J. LEGAL INFO. 560 (2001). Other democratic alternatives
have numerous drawbacks as well. For example, when a federal or state legislature delegates its power
to an administrative body, there are problems of capture and accountability. Capture occurs because the
regulator depends on the person he regulates for his existence, which can result in unreasonable
policies. Peter Marra, Have Administrative Agencies Abandoned Reasonability?, 6 SETON H ALL
CONST . L.J. 763, 768 (1996). Agencies undermine the democratic process by their removal from public
accountability, while still being susceptible to influence from lobbying groups and the very industries
they are created to oversee. Leslie L. Marshall, Telford: Casting Sunlight on Shadow Governments—
Limits to the Delegation of Government Power to Associations of Officials and Agencies , 24 SEATTLE
U.L. R EV . 139, 139-40 (2000) (stating that these “associations that set policies, pass resolutions, lobby,
take legal positions in court, and use public funds in political campaigns and on ballot measures. The
executive directors and others who run these associations are not elected by the public and are mostly
unknown to the public. In many respects they now form an unaccountable, powerful, and mostly
invisible new branch of government: shadow governments.”). Use of agencies is beneficial to policy
formation in that the agency can devote a great deal of time to studying the benefits of a proposed rule,
something a legislature cannot.
217
As mentioned above, Alan Schwartz, George Priest, and Robert Cooter did reach a definitive
conclusion regarding the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage, yet, as was argued at length above,
their advise should not serve as a policy making aid, mainly because it is wrong.
218
See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits , 79 A M. ECON. REV .
Papers & Proceedings, at 177 (May 1989). Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules:
Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships , 43 STAN. L. REV. 361. Christine Jolls,
Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN . L. REV. 223 (2000).
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at the same time, increase the manufacturer's expected costs; these costs are passed
on, partially or completely, to all customers through higher prices. 219
Pain-and-suffering damages in tort law cause the expected marginal costs of
manufacturing products to increase by the amount of actuarial cost of providing such
insurance. These costs, however, are passed on back to the consumers through higher
product prices. 220 Thus, consumers are not simply receiving a benefit of pain-andsuffering coverage but rather buying it. Therefore, in order to know whether it is
efficient to provide pain-and-suffering damages, the policy maker would need to
know whether the value that consumers place on this legislative measure outweighs
the costs of this measure. 221

3. The suggested approach.
Rather than mimicking market settings in the lab that infer supply and demand
curves and the new equilibrium price, I chose to investigate an individual’s direct
preferences. 222 More specifically, I measured people’s willingness to pay for non219

The classic example refers to product warranties. The same analysis would apply, however, to any
rules directly regulating the safety or quality of a product (e.g., residential housing codes or laws
requiring crashworthy automobile bumpers). Craswell at 362-3. In competitive markets only the costs
of the cheapest manufacturer will be passed on to consumers. See R ICHARD CRASWELL & A LAN
SCHWARTZ, FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 39 (1994). The assumption of competitive markets is
made just for simplicity and to match previous literature. Nothing material is changed in the analysis if
this assumption is withdrawn. Like Craswell, I assume there is no price discrimination in the market.
Id. at 373 n.19.
220
As Craswell showed, generally the more consumers value the insurance, the more the manufacturers
will be able to pass on the cost of the insurance.
221
The reader might wonder whether the relevant criterion should be “whether the value that
consumers place on this legislative measure outweighs the costs passed on to them ”. The argument for
this criterion would be that satisfying consumers’ preferences means providing the insurance whenever
they value it for more than it costs them, and not more than it costs manufacturers. One possible
response, as shown by Craswell, would be that when consumers are homogeneous and there is no price
discrimination in the market, the two criteria converge. C RASWELL & SCHWARTZ, at 39. I will not
elaborate on this point.
222
In order to draw meaningful conclusion from mimicking markets setting several assumptions, two
of which I focus on here, must be made. The first of these assumptions is that consumers are
homogeneous with respect to their preferences towards the benefit. Id. at 372-85. The second
assumption, which I will not focus on here, is that there is no price discrimination in the markets. See
Jolls at 259-60. Third, it is assumed that the quality is rigid. See Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality
Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules , 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 647. The problem is that once these
assumptions are withdrawn, the theory no longer generates definitive predictions. For example, once
consumers’ heterogeneity is introduced some consumers will be made better off by the pain-andsuffering insurance, while other consumers will ultimately be worse off. Additionally, as Craswell
notes, it is possible for consumers, as a class, to benefit from an inefficient insurance, or for an efficient
insurance to be to their detriment. CRASWELL & SCHWARTZ at 373. Furthermore, as Smith showed,
once quality of the products is (endogenized) then quality changes might complicate the picture and
generating predictions from the models becomes much more tricky. Smith at 651-2. This would also
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monetary insurance. If it exceeds the insurance actuarial costs then it would be
efficient to have this mandate because people price it above its cost.
One possible critique of this approach is that people lack the mental capacity
to make complex calculations (such as calculating the actuarial cost of the mandate)
and, therefore, the mere fact that they were willing to pay for the coverage more than
its costs, should teach us nothing. 223

make any inference from empirical data regarding the meaning of shifts in the supply and demand
curves problematic. And can result in data from inefficient mandates looking similar to data reflecting
efficient mandates. Id. at 702. (“[t]he possibility that price and quantity movements may be motivated
by cost-avoiding shifts in quality rather than, or in addition to, shifts in demand makes the data more
difficult to interpret. Price rises cannot simply be taken as evidence of value placed on the mandate by
the marginal consumer without knowing either that adjustments along various quality margins are not
possible or that such adjustments can be accounted for econometrically. Neither prospect is all that
likely.”). Id. at 706-7. A nother issue to consider is that the analysis up until now has been based on a
partial equilibrium analysis. A more general analysis must untangle the distributional consequences of
such intervention. For example, it might be that employees of the firm pay for the increased liability by
receiving lower wages. If the consumers belong to the upper class and the workers to the lower class,
e.g. when the product is a fancy car, then the result is regressive. Donohue raised a similar point when
commenting on Christine Jolls’ paper. See Donohue, at 14-17. Indeed, partial equilibrium analysis can
be problematic, yet at the same time it can be helpful in serving as an appropriate first approximation.
More importantly, the conclusion of this part, which is that the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage
should not be estimated directly but rather by way of comparison to the demand for monetary
insurance, is, if anything, reinforced by the possibility of such complications in a general equilibrium
framework.
223
My empirical studies, discussed below reinforce this critique. This objection is just one of many
possible objections to experimental studies, of which four major ones I will discuss below. The first
objection is that the behavior of human subjects is variable, compared to physical objects, and therefore
less predictable; the lack of internal validity critique. See for example, Chris Stramar, Experiments in
Economics: Should We trust the dismal Scientists in White Coats? 6 Journal of Economic
Methodology 1 (1999) at 7. This is overcome by the design of the study. As long as any auxiliary
hypotheses, such as do subjects understand the tasks, and the main hypothesis can be distinguished,
then statistical tests can be used to determine whether the theory’s main predictions are valid despite
inconsistencies with human behavior. The second objection is that the experimental setting induces
different behavior from that which would be produced in the natural setting; the lack of external
validity critique. Experimental designs, so goes the critique, do not mirror natural environments
closely enough, among other things, because real world experience is based on life long learning
whereas laboratory work is based on a short term learning process. This critique may be true in certain
circumstances but in the studies presented below the relative differences or similarities between the
demand for monetary and non-monetary insurance is explored and even if lack of learning experience
plays a role on the decision making process there is nothing that would prevent the factor from playing
equal roles in the demand for both types of insurance and therefore allowing the relative results to be
relevant and valid nonetheless. The third objection is that subjects may not understand their tasks and
in any event act to either satisfy or outwit the experimenter. This was solved in several ways. In my
studies there was an instruction booklet prewritten so as to maintain coherence among sessions and
preclude passing expectations on to the subjects in this manner. Different comprehension questions
were planted in the questionnaires thereby signaling whether subjects understood their tasks. Those
who did not understand their tasks were excluded from the database. My research assistant who runs
the experiment was blind to the research hypothesis. Lastly, I ran three pre-tests, where a small group
of subjects (not knowing they are not the “real” subjects) were asked to do the tasks and were then
debriefed to see whether everything was clear, whether they could guess the research goal or
hypothesis, and so forth. The fourth objection is that subjects have no motivation to act as maximizers
but rather their only concern is to finish their tasks as quickly as possible. A solution to this objection is
that subjects can be compensated for their performance thereby creating incentives to accurately
complete their tasks. For a list of conditions which make the laboratory micro-economy fit into
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To deal with this concern, I compare the demand for monetary insurance
mandates with the demand for non-monetary insurance mandates. If I find a similar
demand for both types of insurance, then in spite of the fact that from a quantitative
point of view the magnitude of the demand can teach us nothing, from a qualitative
point of view it can teach us a lot.
Economists conventionally assume that people are risk averse with respect to
non-negligible monetary losses. The von-Newmann-Morgenstern expected utility
theory implies that given the assumption of risk aversion, rational people should buy
full insurance against monetary losses.224 Thus, if we find in the experimental
research that people indeed demand coverage against monetary losses and, in
addition, that they treat both monetary and non-monetary insurance identically, for
example, that they are willing to pay roughly the same premium for the same scope of
coverage, then we can make inferences from the demand for monetary insurance to
the demand for non-monetary insurance. 225
economic theoretical models, see Wilde L. On the use of Laboratory Experiments in Economics in
Joseph Pitt (ed) THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS (1980). But even then there is the question of
judgment as to what constitute adequate compensation. In a recent study, which reviewed 74
experimental papers in which the level of financial performance-based incentive given to participants
was varied, the authors concluded that “in … risky choices the most typical result is that incentives do
not affect the mean performance.” Colin F. Camerer and Robin M Hogarth, The Effects of Financial
Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital -Labor-Production Framework, J. R ISK &
UNCERTAINTY, 19, 34 (1999). In any case, in my studies this critique is less powerful, however, as I
was interested in the relative demand for monetary and non-monetary insurance and therefore any lack
of incentives would presumably be the same for both type of demand. In any case, my only claim is
that the results produced in my studies should be taken as prima fascie evidence to be further
investigated. I, myself, am skeptical regarding the extent of information that can be learned from any
single experiment, but as many others think that a lot can be learned from a series of independent
studies. See, e.g., Chris Stramar, Experimental Economics: Hard Science or Wasteful Tinkering? T HE
ECONOMIC JOURNAL 109, F5-6 (1999).
224
Assuming no administrative costs or problems of moral hazard or adverse selection exist.
225
The logical chain of reasoning is as follows. The von-Newmann -Morgenstern expected utility
theory implies ht at rational and risk averse individuals demand fair insurance for non -negligible
monetary losses. According to the mandated benefits framework, the value people place on monetary
insurance is more than the actuarial costs they pay for it. If the empirical studies reveal that people treat
both types of insurance identically (in the sense described above), then we can conclude that people
also place a higher value on non-monetary insurance than what they would have to pay for it (holding
the scope of coverage constant). This implies that people would be better off with pain-and -suffering
insurance than they would be without it; just as they are better off with monetary insurance than they
are without it. One might wonder why the literature dealing with mandat ed benefits bothers to deal
with warranties that are types of monetary mandates. Apparently, if people are risk averse they should
always demand any monetary mandates. One possible answer would be that warranties are usually
small in magnitude (compared to the health costs and the loss of income associated with injuries).
Therefore, it is not clear that people would not prefer to self-insure for this loss. That is, it is not clear
that people are risk averse with respect to such small losses. Another possibility is that warranties may
solve informational problems where consumers find it costly to measure quality at the point of sale.
See, for example, Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J. L. & ECON . 27,
32-34 (1982); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L. J. 1297,
1303-07 (1981).
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Below I report three empirical studies I conducted in order to investigate
whether the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage outweighs its costs, and whether
it is significantly different than the demand for monetary coverage.
B. The Empirical Framework: The Demand for Pain-and-Suffering Coverage

I designed three experiments for examining three distinct yet related questions.
The first was to test people’s demand for pain-and-suffering insurance in the context
of product liability. Second, I attempted to verify whether the demand for pain-andsuffering and for monetary insurance differs. Lastly, I wanted to understand the effect
of information on people’s decision making in this context.
1. Study 1 Experimental Design
a. Participants
The participants were 120 undergraduate from the University of Michigan.
Participants were recruited through ads posted around campus and by sending emails
to members of the Greek System as well as to a list maintained by the Economics
Department of students interested in participating in research studies. Participant were
promised $10 for 40 minutes long sessions.
b. The design 226
Participants faced four insurance decisions involving the purchase of four
different types of products: padding for roller skates ($40), a computer monitor
($250), a saw ($100), and tires for a car ($800). For each product, participants had to
state the price they were willing to pay, above the price of the product, for monetary
and for pain -and-suffering insurance. Before answering the questions, participants
were presented with a cover page explaining to them that they had no other rights
whatsoever to a remedy for any loss as result of an accident besides the insurance
coverage that they were about to buy. Then, participants were presented with the

226

See Appendix for the full text of the questionnaires.
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following explanations about the nature of pain -and-suffering versus monetary
insurance: 227
Insurance for non-monetary harm :
This provides compensation for pain and suffering
resulting from an injury. This could include physical
or emotional pain, or any suffering involving the
hassle of changing your lifestyle to adjust to living
with a loss of mobility, a loss of function, or a
disability. It does not include any compensation for
any monetary expenses like medical costs or lost
wages.
Insurance for monetary expenses:
This

includes

full

compensation

for

medical

expenses and rehabilitation following an injury, and
for lost wages due to time away from work. It does
not include any compensation for any non-monetary
harm like pain and suffering.

Lastly, participants were asked to immerse their arms in ice water for 10
second.

227

I scrambled the order of the explanations about the nature of the monetary versus the pain-andsuffering insurance. 51 participants saw the explanation for the monetary insurance first and 63 saw
the explanation for the pain-and-suffering insurance first. The order of the explanations was not found
to be significant. Immediately after part two (where participants wer e required to immerse their arm in
ice water, and which will be described below) was over, we ran a third part in which participants in
both groups were asked to again fill out the insurance questionnaires they had filled out in part one.
Participants were told that this was not a memory test and that they could go back and see their
responses to questionnaires in the first part. They were also told that based on our experience some
people usually change their responses and some usually do not, and that we do not care. When they
finished filling out the questionnaires the draw began. The purpose of this third part was to see whether
immersing their arms in ice water would cause participants to change their responses to the pen-andpaper questionnaires. We ran a student t test, a McNemar’s test and a non-parametric rank sum test
(Wilcoxon Scores) and found that there was no significant difference between participants’ responses
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c. Information.
All 120 participants faced insurance decisions under risk, that is, participants
were informed of the probability of an accident occurring and of the magnitude of the
expected damages, so they had enough information to calculate the expected value to
help them decide on the amount they were willing to pay for the insurance. To make it
as easy as possible on students I held the expected value of the insurance coverage
constant across products, as can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1- The probability of a breakdown and the average magnitude of harm
Product
Padding
Saw
Monitor
Tires

Probability of breaking
down
1/1,000 (0.1%)
1/10,000 (0.01%)
1/10,000 (0.01%)
1/100,000 (0.001%)

Average magnitude of Expected value
harm
$1,000
$1
$10,000
$1
$10,000
$1
$100,000
$1

d. Study one experimental results.
i. “Cleaning the data set”
I first eliminated participants’ responses for whom the amount of money they
were willing to pay in total for the product was not equal to the sum of the amounts of
money they were willing to pay for the different types of insurance they chose plus
the cost of the product itself. Eight such insurance decisions were ignored. 228 In
addition I faced the problem that some participants were willing to pay extremely
high premiums for different types of insurance. I therefore decided to ignore any total
payment reported by participants which was above $4,000, $1,500, $700 and $250 for
the tires, monitor, saw and padding (respectively); thus, six participants were erased
from my database, leaving me with 114 participants.

(for both “students” and “control”) for part 1 and part 3. Therefore, we decided to report only the
analysis for part one.
228
As I specifically asked participants to avoid this error there were only a few incidences like this.
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ii. The general demand for both types of insurance.
I compared the overall number of participants who were willing to buy the
different types of insurance. Table 2 presents the percentage of participants who were
willing to pay (weakly) above the $1 expected value for each type of insurance.229

Table 2- The demand for Pain-an-Suffering and Monetary insurance.

1
Product
Padding
Saw
Monitor
Tires

2
Buy monetary
insurance
72%
88%
76%
93%

3
Buy
pain
and
suffering insurance
68%
84%
69%
90%

Table 2 reveals that most people demanded pain -and-suffering insurance for
all four products. Table 2 also shows that, across all products, the demand for pain and-suffering insurance is up to 7 percentage-points lower than the demand for
monetary insurance, yet for mos t products this difference was not found to be
significant. 230

iii. The dollar value of the demand for monetary versus pain-andsuffering insurance.
I examined the group demand for monetary and pain-and-suffering insurance.
Table 3, Chart 1a Chart 1b present the results for the four products.

229

The reason I included only those who were willing to spend the expected value or above was that,
clearly, even participants whose demand for insurance is low, such as risk liking people, will be happy,
sometimes, to pay a very small amount of money for insurance. Notice that I also included here those
who paid the exact amount of the expected value. The justification is that if the budget is balanced (as
is the case when the premiums equal the expected value) then there is no reason not to respond to
people’s preferences and provide them with insurance. For the rest of this study when I refer to the
words “buy” or “purchase” we mean paid the expected value or more.
230
I ran a McNemar test and found that the difference between the demands for both types of
insurance was significant only for the monitor (p=0.0455). It is worth mentioning that the demand for
each type of insurance is either together with the other type of insurance or alone.
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Table 3- Demand for pain-and-suffering versus Monetary insurance.
1
Product (Price)

Padding ($40)

2
Demand
for
coverage
%
72

3
4
Participants’ payment
for
monetary
insurance
Mean
Median

$18
(22)
88
Saw ($100)
$35
(46)
76
Monitor ($250)
$42
(57)
Tires ($800)
93
$107
(133)
*- standard deviations are in brackets.

5
Demand
for
coverage
%

6
7
Participants’ payment
for
pain-and suffering insurance
Mean
Median

$10

68

$20

84

$20

69

$75

90

$14
(21)
$31
(39)
$38
(47)
$102
(159)

$10
$15
$20
$50

Chart 1a- Price Paid for Monetary and NonMonetary Coverage (Study 1)
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Chart 1b- Demand for Monetary and NonMonetary Coverage (Study 1)
100
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Table 3 reveals that there is, across all products, a demand for both types of
insurance. Demand for pain-and-suffering insurance exists but is smaller than
demand for monetary insurance in two respects. Fir st, as we already saw in Table 2,
proportionally fewer participants were willing to buy pain-and-suffering insurance
than monetary insurance (compare columns 2 and 5 in Table 3 and the cylinders in
Chart 1b), yet the difference was found for most products not to be significant.
Second, across all products the average amount of money spent on pain-and-suffering
was lower than the average amount of money spent on monetary insurance (compare
columns 3 and 6 in Table 3 and the cones in Chart 1a). But, these differences were in
general not significant at the p=0.05 level.231 Indeed, a comparison of the medians
shows that whereas for the saw and the tires the price which participants were willing
to pay for the pain-and-suffering coverage was lower than the price for the monetary
insurance, for the padding and the monitor it was the same.232

231

Except for the padding. The same holds when we included all participants (rather than only those
who paid weakly above the expected value) in checking whether the difference between the average
amount spent on both types of insurance was significant.
232
As the distributions are skewed and not well defined, the medians are better predictors of the
distributions than the means.
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Table 3 also shows that participants, as a group, were willing to spend greatly
above the $1 expected value.233 This may mean that participants were extremely riskaverse, or, more probably, that what drives their decision (under risk) to buy insurance
is not their reflection on the expected value, but something else. For now it is enough
to observe that both types of insurance were treated the same. Specifically, focusing
on the medians reveals that for both types of insurance participants were willing to
pay premiums of about 6%-8% of the monitor and tires prices and 15% -25% of the
padding and saw prices.234
I next turn to an analysis on the individual level. I compared the differences
between the amount of money that each participant spent on both types of insurance.
Table 4 presents the results.
iv. The individual demand for both types of insurance.
I explored the difference between the demands by each individual for both
types of insurance. A McNemar test revealed that the vast majority of the participants
treated monetary insurance and pain-and-suffering insurance in the same mannereither buying them both (by paying weakly above the $1 expected value) or buying
neither. Specifically, 82% of the participants treated monetary and pain-and-suffering
insurance for padding in the same manner, 86% treated monetary and pain-andsuffering for monitor in the same manner, 93% treated monetary and pain-andsuffering insurance for the saw in the same manner, and 96% treated monetary and
pain-and-suffering insurance for the tires in the same manner. Of those participants
who did not treat these two types of insurance the same, most preferred monetary
insurance to pain-and-suffering insurance.
I then checked the percentage of people who treated both types of insurance
exactly the same, that is, that were willing to spend exactly the same amount of dollars
for both types of insurance. Table 4 and Chart 2 present the results.

233

The results present the mean and median for those who were willing to pay above the expected
value for the coverage; it excludes those who did not pay anything for it or who paid less than the
expected value. The fact that the mean is higher than the median may mean that, of those who paid
above the expected value, a minority was willing to spend extremely high sums of money.
234
Doing the same analysis as above for the means reveals that the qualitative analysis is not changed:
participants were willing to pay premiums of about 10%-15% of the monitor and tires prices for both
types of insurance, and about 30% -35% of the padding and saw prices, again for both types of
insurance.
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Table 4- Comparison of the differences between the amount of money each
participant spent for the two types of insurance.

1
2

3
4

Padding
(N=110)
# of people who treated 66
the different types of (60%)
insurance exactly the same
# of people who paid more 11
for pain-and-suffering
(10%)
# of people who paid more 33
for Monetary
(30%)

Saw
(N=111)
69
(62%)

Monitor
(N=113)
74
(65%)

Tires
(N=113)
79
(70%)

15
(14%)
27
(24%)

13
(11%)
26
(24%)

10
(9%)
24
(21%)

Chart 2- Comparison of The
Differences (Study 1)
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% Paid More For Monetary
% Paid More For Non-monetary

Table 4 and Chart 2 reveal that 60% to 70% of the part icipants were willing to
spend the exact same amount of money for pain-and-suffering and monetary
insurance across the four products (see row 2). 235 However, among the 30% to 40%
who treated these two types of insurance differently, about two-thirds paid more for
monetary coverage.
235

Specifically, 60% of the participants were willing to spend exactly the same amount of money for
the monetary and pain-and-suffering insurance for the padding, 62% for the saw, 65% for the monitor,
and 70% for the tires.
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e. Study one discussion
The results show that the majority of the participants (on average about 80%)
expressed a demand for pain and suffering insurance. This demand however was
product-dependent, which means that the scope of the demand for pain and suffering
coverage cannot be universally answered, but rather there is a need to further
investigate the nature of the product and the pain and suffering it causes. 236 This is
true, however, also for monetary insurance.
More importantly, the results also show that, in general, the vast majority (on
average about 90%) of the participants treated the two types of insurance the sameeither they buy them both or they buy neither. Moreover, as Table 4 shows, on
average, 60% to 70% of the participants treated both types of insurance exactly the
same- namely, they paid exactly the same amount of money for both types of
insurance.
Of those who did not treat it the same, the vast majority preferred monetary to
pain and suffering insurance. As a result, the overall demand for monetary was higher
than the demand for pain and suffering insurance, yet the differences were not found,
in general, to be significant. 237
Interestingly, the results show that people’s insurance purchase decision is
based on some rough percentage of the product price and not on the probabilities and
values.

2. Study two experimental design
In Study one, participants made decisions under risk, that is, they
were provided with the probability of the products breaking down and
the magnitude of harm that may be caused. As we saw, the premiums
participants paid were not dependent on the expected loss. It is an
interesting question to explore the influence that information has on the
demand for both types of insurance. Do more or fewer participants
236

Specifically, 90% of participants expressed demanded for pain and suffering insurance for tires,
69% for monitor, 84% for saw, and 68% for padding.
237
The demand for monetary coverage was larger in two respects: more participants demanded
monetary insurance (on average, more than 80% of the participants versus more than 75% who
demanded pain and suffering insurance), and, participants were willing to pay, in general, higher
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purchase coverage when provided with information? Is the premium
they are willing to pay higher or lower?
a. Participants
The participants were 141 undergraduate psychology students from the
University of Michigan psychology department. Participants had to subscribe in order
to participate in the experiment. It was part of their requirements in the psychology
department.

b. The design.

Participants faced insurance decisions involving the purchase of, this time
only, three different types of products: padding for roller skates ($40), a computer
monitor ($250), and tires for a car ($800). Like in the previous study, for each
product, participants had to state the price they were willing to pay, above the price of
the product, for a monetary and for a pain-and-suffering insurance. As the design of
this study is otherwise almost identical to the design in Study 1 it will not be
explained again here.
c. Information
There is one major difference between the two studies- study two was a
“between subjects” design. In study two different groups faced different levels of
information. One group of participants had no information at all about either the
probability of the products breaking down or the magnitude of harm that may be
caused. Participants in the other group were informed of the probability of an accident
occurring and of the magnitude of the expected damages, so they had enough
information to calculate the expected value to help them decide on the amount they
were willing to pay for the insurance. As before, I held the expected value of the
insurance coverage constant across products. 238

premiums for monetary than for pain and suffering insurance. As mentioned in the text though, the
differences were not significant.
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d. Study two experimental results
i. “Cleaning the data set”
As before, I eliminated participants’ responses which were extremely high or
which the amount of money paid in total for the product was not equal to the cost of
the product plus the sum of the amounts of money they were willing to pay for the
different types of insurance. 239 I was left with ninety five participants. 240

ii. Order effect

I investigated whether the order of the products that participants faced was a
factor. Specifically, I was interested whether participants might have been willing to
pay more for the product they see first. The reason for this concern is that, by
conventional economic theory, participants’ demand for the next product would be
reduced. I ran a Wilcoxon Scores test and found that in all cases participants
expressed no significant difference in their willingness to pay for the monetary
insurance or pain-and-suffering insurance across different orders of presentation. In
any event, as I randomized over any possible order effect (by scrambling the orders of
the products the participants read), I decided to ignore this issue altogether. 241

iii. The general demand for both types of insurance (with
information).
I start by reporting the results of participants who were in the same condition
as those in Study one. I compared the overall number of participants (with
information) who were willing to buy the different types of insurance. Table 5

238

See Table 1 above.
I ignored any total payment reported by participants which was above $4,000, $1,500 and $250 for
the tires, monitor and padding (respectively). For example, one participant was willing to pay $60,000
and $100,000 for the monetary and pain-and-suffering insurance (respectively) for the $800 tires. Five
participants were erased from the data set. In addition, some participants were wrong for all three
products. Only in these cases did I eliminate them entirely from the data set. Forty-one participants
were eliminated in that way.
240
The reason that in this study more participants were eliminated from the data set than in Study one,
is that in Study two, I did not specifically asked participants to avoid this error.
241
Thirty-two participants (33%) saw the tires first, thirty-seven participants (39%) saw the monitor
first, and twenty-six (28%) saw the padding first.
239
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presents the percentage of participants who were willing to pay above the $1 expected
value for each type of insurance.
Table 5- The demand for pain-and-suffering and monetary insurance (with info).

1

2

Product

Buy

3
monetary Buy

pain-and-

insurance

suffering insurance

Padding

50%

35%

Monitor

59%

51%

Tires

82%

68%

Table 5 reveals that most people demanded pain -and-suffering insurance for
the tires and monitor but not for the padding. Specifically, 68% de manded pain-andsuffering insurance for the tires, 51% for the monitor, but only 35% for the padding.
Table 5 also shows that, across all products, the demand for pain-and-suffering
insurance is up to 15 percentage-points lower than the demand for monetary
insurance. I ran a McNamar test and found that the difference was significant for the
tires (p=0.025), was not significant for the monitor (p=0.317), and was almost
significant for the padding (p=0.09).242

242

The demand for each type of insurance is either together with the other type of insurance or alone.
The next table presents the general demand for both types of insurance (across both levels of
information).
1
Product
Padding
Monitor
Tires

2
Buy
monetary
insurance
65%
71%
92%

3
Buy
pain-and suffering insurance
45%
59%
74%

As can be readily seen, the demand for both types of insurance, is higher than the demand under risk
alone. The reason is that when they are under ignorance more participants were willing to buy
insurance. All the differences in this table between the demand for monetary and the demand for painand -suffering insurance are significant for p=0.05.
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iv. The dollar value of the demand for monetary versus
pain-and-suffering insurance (with information).
As before, I first examined the group demand for monetary and pain-andsuffering insurance for the participants who made decisions under risk. Table 6
presents our results for the three products.

Table 6- Demand for pain-and-suffering versus monetary insurance (with info).

1
Product

2
3
Demand
for
coverage
%
N

4
5
Participants’
payment
for
monetary insurance
Mean
Median

6
7
Demand
for
coverage
%
N

8
9
Participants’
payment
for
P&S insurance
Mean
Median

Padding $40 (n=34)

50

17

$12

35

12

Monitor $250 (n=41)

59

24

$50

51

21

Tires $800 (n=34)

82

28

$24
(31)
$89
(108)
$316
(336)

$200

68

23

$12.5
(12)
$72
(55)
$266
(355)

$10
$50
$100

Table 6 reveals that when participants are informed, there is, across all
products, a demand for both types of insurance. Demand for pain-and-suffering
insurance exists but is smaller than demand for monetary insurance in two respects.
First, as we saw in Table 4, proportionally fewer participants were willing to buy
pain-and-suffering insurance than monetary insurance (compare columns 2 and 6);
yet, this difference was not always significant. Second, across all products the average
amount of money spent on pain-and-suffering was lower than the average amount of
money spent on monetary insurance (compare columns 4 and 8). The differences were
significant for the tires (p=0.05), almost significant for the padding (0.07) but not
significant for the monitor (p=0.5). 243
As before, participants, as a group, were willing to spend greatly above the $1
expected value. Specifically, focusing on the medians reveals that participants were

243

When I included all participants (rather than only those who paid weakly above the expected value)
in checking whether the difference between the average amount spent on both types of insurance (for
participants under risk) was significant, I found similar results. Specifically, the difference was
significant (p=0.05) for the tires, almost significant (p=0.08) for the monitor and non-significant
(p=0.3) for the padding. Recall that I reached the same conclusion in study one.
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willing to pay premiums at about 20%-30% of the products prices for the monetary
insurance, and at about 15%-25% for the pain-and-suffering insurance. 244
I next turn to analysis on the individual level. I compared the differences
between the amount of money that each participant spent on both types of insurance.

v. The individual demand for both types of insurance.
I ran a McNemar test to explore the difference between the demands for both
types of insurance. The McNamar test revealed that the vast majority of the
participants treated monetary insurance and pain-and-suffering insurance in the same
manner- either buying them both (by paying above the $1 expected value) or buying
neither. Specifically, 89% of the participants treated monetary and pain-and-suffering
insurance for tires in the same manner, and 79% treated monetary and pain-andsuffering insurance for both the monitor and the padding in the same manner. Of
those participants who did not treat these two types of insurance the same, most
preferred monetary insurance.
I then checked the percentage of people who treated both types of insurance
exactly the same, that is, that were willing to spend exactly the same amount of dollars
for both types of insurance. Table 7 presents the results.
Table 7- Comparison of the differences between the amount of money each
participant spent for the two types of insurance (with information).

1
2

3
4

Padding
(n=34)
# of people who treated the 17
different types of insurance (50%)
exactly the same
# of people who paid more for 3
pain-and-suffering
(9%)
# of people who paid more for 14
Monetary
(41%)

Monitor
(n=41)
23
(56%)

Tires
(n=34)
15
(44%)

6
(15%)
12
(29%)

3
(9%)
16
(47%)

244

The qualitative analysis is not changed when we focus on the means: participants were willing to
pay premiums of about 40% -60% of the products’ prices for the monetary insurance and of about 30%
for the pain-and -suffering insurance.
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Table 7 reveals that about 50% of the participants were willing to spend
exactly the same amount of money for pain-and-suffering and monetary insurance
across the three products (see row 2). 245 However, among those who treated these two
types of insurance differently, a significant majority paid more for monetary
coverage. 246

Before turning to the question of the influence of information, it is worth
mentioning that, in general, despite some quantitative differences, t he results of Study
2 reported so far are qualitatively consistent with the result in Study 1. 247

vi. The influence of information
Once I identified the demand for both types of insurance when participants are
informed, I was interested to check whether the level of information affects the
results. 248
I compared the number of participants who were willing to purchase the
different types of insurance, slicing it across different levels of information. I also
compared the amount of money that participants, as a group, were willing to spend for
the different types of insurance across products and across levels of information. 249
Table 8 , Chart 3 and Chart 4 present the results.

245

Specifically, forty-four percent of the participants were willing to spend exactly the same amount of
money for the monetary and pain-and-suffering insurance for the tires, fifty-six percent for the monitor,
and exactly fifty percent for the padding.
246
For the monitor, however, the difference between the number of people who paid more for painand -suffering coverage and the number of people who paid more for pain-and-suffering insurance was
not significant even for p=0.9).
247
I will discuss the differences in more detail below.
248
I did not generate a hypothesis because I could not know what participants’ prior probabilities for
the loss were. If participants’ subjective probabilities of a product breakdown were higher than what I
provided, then I would expect to see a lower demand for both types of insurance under risk.
Conversely, if their subjective probabilities were lower, I would expect to see a higher demand under
risk.
249
Table 8 is similar to Table 6 but also includes the data under conditions of ignorance.
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Table 8- Participants’ Demand for Different Types of Insurance across Levels of
Information.

1
Padding ($40)

Ignorance
Information

Monitor ($250)

Ignorance
Information

Tires ($800)

Ignorance
Information
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2
3
Participants
who
monetary insurance
%
N
Mean
77 33
$37
(32)
50 17
$24
(31)

4

5
6
7
bought Participants who bought
pain-and-suffering insurance
Median % N Mean
Median
$30
53 23 $29
$15
(29)
$12
35 12 $12.5
$10
(12)

Participants
who
monetary insurance
%
N
Mean
82
40
$129
(192)
59
24
$89
(108)

bought Participants who bought
pain-and-suffering insurance
Median % N Mean
Median
$50
66 32 $86
$50
(105)
$50
51 21 $72
$50
(55)

Participants
who
monetary insurance
%
N
Mean
100 44
$367
(390)
82
28
$316
(336)

bought Participants who bought
pain-and-suffering insurance
Median % N Mean
Median
$200
80 35 $324
$100
(440)
$200
68 23 $266
$100
(355)

94

Avraham:

PAIN-AND-SUFFERING DAMAGES

94

Chart 3a- Demand for Monetary Coverage across
Levels of Information (Study 2)
100
100
80
60

82

77

82

59

50

40
20
0
Padding

Monitor

Demand Mon Info (%)

Tires

Demand Mon Ignorance (%)

Chart 3b- Demand for Non-Monetary Coverage
across Levels of Information (Study 2)
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Chart 4a- Price Paid For Monetary Insurance
across Levels of Information (Study 2)
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Chart 4b- Price Paid For Non-Monetary Insurance
across Levels of Information (Study 2)
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Table 8 reveals that participants under ignorance were much more likely to
buy (pay more than the expected value for) either type of insurance than participants
under information (compare columns 2 and 5 in Table 8 and see Chart 3). In general,
for all products, about 20 percentage-points more participants under ignorance bought
both types of insurance.250 Interestingly, being informed seems to play, with respect to

250

Specifically, about 15 percentage-points more participants under ignorance bought both types of
insurance for tires, about 18 percentage-points more bought both types of insurance for the monitor,
and about 23 percentage -points more bought both types of insurance for the padding, than participants
under risk.
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the likelihood to buy insurance, a more significant role for monetary than for pain and-suffering insurance.
Focusing on the price participants paid (see columns 3 and 6), Table 8 reveals
that across all products participants under state of ignorance were willing to pay more
(for both types of insurance) than participants under a state of information. However,
with one exception, neither of these differences was found to be significant even at
the p=0.1 level. The exception is the difference between the amount of money
participants paid for monetary insurance for padding under information and under
ignorance, which was almost significant (p=0.08). 251 (And see Chart 4).
I next turn to an analysis on the individual level. I checked differences
between the amount of money each participant spent on both types of insurance in the
state of ignorance and in the state of information. 252
Table 9- Comparison of the differences between the amount of money each
participant spent for the two types of insurance (under ignorance/ information)

1 Type of comparison

Padding

2 Level of information

Ignorance
(n=43)
3 # of people who 15
treated both types (35%)
exactly the same
4 # of people who paid 3
more for pain -and- (7%)
suffering
5 # of people who paid 25
more for monetary
(58%)

Monitor

Tires

Info
(n=34)
17
(50%)

Ignorance
(n=49)
16
(33%)

Info
(n=41)
23
(56%)

Ignorance
(n=44)
10
(23%)

Info
(n=34)
15
(44%)

3
(9%)

8
(16%)

6
(15%)

4
(9%)

3
(9%)

14
(41%)

25
(51%)

12
(29%)

30
(68%)

16
(47%)

251

This latter result is supported when the medians are compared across different levels of information.
Indeed, whereas there was no change in the medians in the cases of the tires and the monitor (see
columns 4, 7) across different levels of information, there was a change in the case of the medians of
the padding. The mean and the median are calculated for the participants who paid above the expected
value. I ran a Wilcoxon Scores test and found that when taking into account all participants (and not
only those who paid above the expected value), the level of information was a significant factor
(p=0.05) for buying monetary insurance across all products as well as for buying pain-and -suffering
insurance for the padding. As the “new” participants included in this test did not buy insurance, this
result implies that information was an important factor for the mere decision to buy insurance but not
for the premium paid.
252
Table 15 is similar to Table 13, but also includes the state of ignorance.
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Chart 5 presents the percentage of participants who paid exactly the same
amount of money for both types of insurance across different levels of information.
Chart 5 is a graphic representation of row 3 in Table 9.

Chart 5- Comparison of Those Who Paid
Exactly the Same Across Different Levels
of Information (study 2)

60

56

50

44
35

40

33
23

20
0
Padding
Paid The Same (Info)

Monitor

Tires

Paid The Same (Ignorance)

Table 9 and Chart 5 reveal that the number of participants that treated both
types of insurance exactly the same is larger in the group which was provided with
information (see row 3). On average, whereas only 30% of the participants treated
both types of insurance exactly the same when in the state of ignorance, about 50%
treat it the exactly same when in the state of information. 253 Moreover, in the group
which was provided with information, fewer participants (about 20 percentage-points
fewer) were willing to pay more for the monetary than for the pain-and-suffering
insurance (see row 5) and slightly more participants (about 1 percentage -points more)
were willing to spend more for the pain-and-suffering than for the monetary insurance
(see row 4).

253

21 more percentage-points in tires, 23 more i n monitor, and 15 more in padding.
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e. Study two discussion
Study 2 replicates the results in Study 1 in the sense that it shows that the
majority of the participants expressed a product-dependent demand for pain-andsuffering insurance. 254 More importantly, Study 2 also replicated the result that the
vast majority (more than 75%) of the participants treated both types of insurance the
same- either they buy them both or they buy neither. Moreover, about 50% of the
participants under information treated both types of insurance exactly the samenamely, they paid exactly the same price for both types of insurance. As in Study 1, of
those who did not treat it the same, the vast majority preferred monetary to pain-andsuffering insurance. As in Study 1, participants under information paid for monetary
insurance 20%-30% of the products’ price, and 15% -25% of the products’ price for
pain-and-suffering insurance.255
Study 2 further sheds light on the role of information. The results show that
participants who had information about the probability and magnitude of the harm
were less likely (about 20 percentage-points difference) to buy pain-and-suffering (see
Table 8).256 Interestingly, once they decided to buy insurance, informed participants
paid less (for both types of insurance and across all products) than uninformed ones.
However, this difference was not found to be significant.257
More importantly, participants with information were more likely to treat both
types of insurance the same. Specifically, whereas under ignorance only 30% of the
participants paid exactly the same amount of money for both types of insurance, under
risk 50% paid exactly the sa me.
In sum, the results show that providing participants with information had
almost no significant effect on the premiums they were willing to pay but only on the
likelihood they would buy insurance.

254

74% demanded pain-and-suffering insurance for tires, 59% for monitor, and 45% for padding.
From the fact that participants were willing to pay premiums which were high above the expected
value demonstrates, again, that, even when provided with information, people neither maximize their
expected utility, nor act as if they maximize it. Unless one is willing to assume that participants were
extremely risk aversive; an implausible assumption in this context.
256
This result, besides demonstrating that information matters, shows that participants had subjective
estimations that were higher than their estimations of the probabilities and harm I provided them. As
the information I provided about the probabilities and harm was not real, this result, by itself, has no
significant value.
257
With one exception- the premium for pain-and-suffering insurance for the padding.
255
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3. Study three experimental design
Another way to explo re the influence of information is to design a “within
participants” design, where the same participants are gradually exposed to more
information. This is the design of Study 3.

a. An overview.
Participants first faced a series of four decisions (D1 to D4) involving the
purchase of three different types of insurance for one product- a $100 portable saw.
The insurance decisions were whether to purchase a warranty, an insurance against
any monetary costs involved in an accident and lastly an insurance against pain-andsuffering involved in an accident. Participants were asked to name the maximum
amount of money that they were willing to pay, if any, to buy each type of insurance
coverage.

b. Information

The only difference among the four decisions the participants faced was the
amount of information they had. In the first decision (D1) participants had no
information at all about either the probability of the saw breaking down or the
magnitude of harm that it might cause. This condition is called “state of ignorance.”
Then, participants were asked to flip the page and move to the next question where
more information was provided to them. In the fourth (D4) decision participants had
enough information to decide on the amount they were willing to pay for the
monetary as well as for the pain-and-suffering coverage. In this condition, participants
had all the information they needed; this stage is called “state of information.”258

258

Specifically, in the second decision (D2), participants were informed of the 2% probability of the
saw breaking down, so they had enough information to calculate the two-dollar expected value to help
them decide on the amount they were willing to pay for the warranty. In the third decision (D3),
participants were informed of the 0.01% probability of the saw breaking down and causing injury, as
well as of the $100,000 average dollar value of these injuries, so they had enough information to
calculate the ten-dollar expected value to help them decide on the amount they were willing to pay for
the monetary coverage. In the forth decision, participants were informed also of the $100,000 average
dollar value of the pain-and -suffering caused by the accidents.
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c. Participants
The participants were 135 students from the University of Michigan Law
School. Questionnaires were distributed one half-hour before the end of the first
classes (tax law and pollution law) in the Fall 2000 term. (The questionnaires were
distributed simultaneously in both classes, so there were no students who filled them
out twice).
d. The design
Similar to the task in the previous studies, participants had to state the
price they were willing to pay, above the price of the saw, for a monetary and
for a pain-and-suffering insurance. Participants were told that the only legal
rights they have against the seller of the saw are those they pay for it in the form
of insurance. Participants were told that they did not have to buy any of the
insurance coverage plans.
Then, participants were presented with a table that offered them three
different Deals; a deal for a warranty, a deal for the monetary insurance, and a
deal for the pain -and-suffering insurance (see Appendix). Participants were
asked to specify the maximum amount of money they would be willing to pay
for each deal, if any, above the $100 that the saw costs. Participants were also
asked to give reasons for each decision they made. 259

e. Study three experimental results
i. “Cleaning the data set”

As before, I eliminated those participants who did not unders tand that the
Deals are additive. Five participants were eliminated in that way. 260 As before, some
participants were willing to pay extremely high premiums for different types of

259

To make sure that participants understood that the insurance Deals are additive, I asked participants,
after they filled out the amount of money they would be willing to pay for each type of insurance, to
sum up the total amount of money they would spend on the saw.
260

I did this by eliminating the participants for whom the amount of money they were willing to pay in
total for the saw was not equal to the sum of the partial amounts of money they were willing to pay for
the Deals plus the $100 cost of the saw. For six more participants I was not certain whether they
understood this point, because they did not answer this question. I, thus, performed the analysis twiceonce with these six participants and once without; there was no significant difference.
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insurance. 261 I therefore decided to ignore any insurance premium reported by
participants which was above $100 (the price of the circular saw); consequently,
results from three more subjects were ignored.

ii. Order effect
In order to control for this order -effect the Deals were scrambled so that three
factorial different questio nnaires were distributed. 262 I then checked whether the order
of the Deals is a factor. I ran two different non-parametric tests, Wilcoxon Scores, and
Median Scores. 263 I found that in most, but not all, cases participants expressed no
significant difference (P value was about 0.8) in their willingness to pay for the
monetary insurance or pain -and-suffering insurance across different orders of
presentation. Because I scrambled the orders of the Deals the participants read, I
decided to ignore the minor order-effect found.
iii. The General demand for insurance under full information 264
As before, I begin by analyzing the stage where participants were provided
with information- the “state of information” (D4). Table 10 presents the percentage of
participants who were willing to buy any type of insurance and the mean and median
of their premiums.

Table 10- The demand for pain-and-suffering and Monetary insurance (under info).

123 participants

Full
D4

Participants’
payment
for
monetary insurance
% buy
Mean Median
information, 48%
$25
$20

Participants’ payment for
pain-and-suffering insurance
% buy
Mean Median
27%
$25
$10

261

For example, the three highest premiums that participants were willing to pay for the monetary
insurance (for which the expected value was $10) were $1000, $400, and $300.
262
Forty-three participants saw (in all four questions- D1 to D4) the warranty first, forty participants
saw the monetary insurance first and forty-one participants saw the pain-and-suffering insurance first.
263
We rejected normality with p=0.0001 Shapiro-Wilk statistic.
264
In the analysis below, I present only the results that relate to the comparison between pain-andsuffering and monetary insurance; I omitted, for reasons of simplicity, the analysis related to the
warranty. The complete analysis is on file with the author.
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Table 10 shows that when under conditions of information, only about 27%
were willing to purchase pain-and-suffering coverage. The demand for monetary
insurance was likewise not very high- less than half of the participants (48%) were
willing to purchase monetary insurance. I ran a McNamar test and found that the
difference was significant (p=0.001). Table 10 also shows that, under full inf ormation
those participants who were willing to buy insurance, spend, on average, exactly the
same amount of money - $25 - on pain -and-suffering and monetary insurance. 265
Lastly, Table 10 shows that participants were willing to spend well above the $10
expected value for both types of insurance.
I next examined the differences between the premiums that each participant
spent on both types of insurance.
The McNamar test revealed that the vast majority of the participants treated
monetary insurance and pain-and-suffering insurance in the same manner- either
buying them both or buying neither. Specifically, 71% of the participants treated
monetary and pain-and-suffering insurance in the same manner. Of those who did not
treat them the same, most participants (25.5%) preferred monetary to pain-andsuffering insurance, whereas only 3.5% preferred pain-and-suffering to monetary
insurance.
I then checked the percentage of people who treated both types of insurance
exactly the same. Table 11 presents the results.

Table 11- Participants’ payments under full information, n=121
1
2
3

# of people who treated the different types of
insurance exactly the same
# of people who paid more for pain-andsuffering
# of people who paid more for Monetary

68
(56%)
10
(8%)
43
(36%)

265

Focusing on the medians shows that most participants who bought both types of insurance coverage
paid below the $25 mean. However, as few of them paid much above it, the total mean is $25. This
effect, of few people paying a lot more than the mean, was stronger for the pain-and -suffering
insurance, than for the monetary one.
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Table 11 reveals that 56% of the participants were willing to spend exactly the
same amount of money for pain -and-suffering and monetary insurance. 266 However,
among those who treated these two types of insurance differently, a significant
majority (36%) paid more for monetary insurance.
iv. The influence of information
I then examined whether the amount of information that participants hold
influenced their preferences. I checked whether the difference between those who
were willing to buy any type of insurance under ignorance (D1) and those who were
willing to do it under full information (D4) is significant. Table 12 and Chart 6
present my results.
Table 12- Participants’ demand for different types of insurance across different levels
of infor mation.

1
Level of information

2
3
4
5
Participants who bought
monetary insurance
N=123 participants
% N Mean
Median
Ignorance D1
49 60 $32
$20
(25.1)
information D4
48 59 $25
$20
(23.1)
* Standard deviations are reported in brackets.

6
7
8
9
Participants who bought
pain-and-suffering insurance
% N Mean
Median
17 21 $29
$25
(16.6)
27 33 $25
$10
(26.9)

266

As we here focused on participants who treated the different types of insurance exactly the same, we
obtained a relatively smaller number, 56%, than the 71% I reported before.
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Chart 6a- The Demand for Monetary and NonMonetary Coverage Across Different Levels of
Information (Study 3)

50
40
30
20
10
0
Demand Mon (%)
Demand Info (%)

Demand Non-Mon(%)
Demand Ignorance (%)

Chart 6b- Price Paid for Monetary and NonMonetary Coverage Across Different Levels of
Information (Study 3)

40
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20
10
0
Payment Mon ($)
Payment Info ($)

Payment Non-mon ($)
Payment Ignornace ($)

For the monetary insurance, information did not change the number of
participants who were willing to spend more than the expected value for the
insurance; under both ignorance and information the number was almost 50% (see
columns 2 and 3). More interestingly, for the pain-and-suffering insurance more
information caused an increase in the demand. Specifically, there was an increase of
almost 60%, or 10 percentage -points, from 17% to 27% (see columns 6 and 7) in the
number of participants who were willing to buy pain-and-suffering insurance under
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full information as compared to under ignorance. This increase was significant
(p=0.007).
Comparison of the means shows that providing participants with information
caused them to decrease their payments for both the monetary insurance (column 4)
and the pain -and-suffering insurance (column 8). But the differences between the
means were not significant. 267
This last test demonstrates that providing participants with information causes
more people to shift towards buying pain-and-suffering insurance but has no
significant effect on their premiums. In contrast, not only does providing participants
with information have no significant influence on the premiums they pay, neither does
it have an influence on the number of people who buy monetary insurance.
I was then interested whether providing participants with information has an
influence on the way they perceive both types of insurance. I ran a McNamar test and
found that providing participants with information caused more participants to treat
the two types of insurance similarly, in the sense that they either bought them both or
bought neither. Specific ally, whereas under ignorance (stage D1) 63.5% of the
participants either bought them both or bought neither of them, under full information
71% treated them identically.
Another comparison I made was among the differences between the premiums
that each participant was willing to pay for different types of insurance under
ignorance and under full information. Table 13 is similar to Table 10 but also includes
the state of ignorance.

267

Note that for the monetary insurance, we could compare (in the paired Wilcoxon test) only 46 pairs
and for the pain-and-suffering only 17 pairs. I also ran a paired T-test and found that the difference was
significant for the pain-and-suffering insurance. However, as the distribution of the dependent variables
is not symmetric, the Wilcoxon test is the more accurate. Indeed, the standard deviations (reported in
brackets below the means) are relatively large; this means that it is difficult to be certain that the
differences between the means are significant.
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Table 13- Amount of money that the participants were willing to pay unde r full
information and under ignorance

1

Level of information

D1

D4

2

# of people who treated
the different types of
insurance exactly the
same
# of people who paid
more
for
pain -andsuffering
# of people who paid
more for Monetary

58
(48%)

68
(56%)

5
(4%)

10
(8%)

58
(48%)

43
(36%)

3

4

Table 13 reveals that, as before, information matters. There is an increase of
17% (or 10 percentage -points) in the number of participants that treated both types of
insurance the same when provided with information (see row 2). Whereas only 48%
of the participants treated both types of insurance the same when in the state of
ignorance, about 56% treat it the same when in the state of risk.
Moreover, when provided with information, fewer participants (25% fewer or
12 percentage-points fewer) were willing to pay more for the monetary than for the
pain-and-suffering insurance (see row 4). Lastly, when provided with information
more participants (100% more or about 4 percentage -points more) were willing to
spend more for the pain-and-suffering than for the monetary insurance (see row 3).
In sum, generally most people treat pain -and-suffering and monetary insurance
in an identical fashion. Of those who do not, the demand for pain-and-suffering
insurance is lower than the demand for monetary insurance. Providing participants
with information causes more of them to treat both types of insurance identically, (as
well as to demand more pain-and-suffering coverage). Information has no significant
effect on the demand for monetary insurance.

f. Study three discussion
I was interested first to test people’s demand for pain-and-suffering insurance
in the context of product liability. The results show that only 27% of the participants
under information were willing to purchase pa in-and-suffering coverage. However,
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and this relates to our second issue of whether the demand for pain -and-suffering and
for monetary insurance differs, this low demand for pain-and-suffering insurance
should be read in light of the similarly low demand for monetary coverage (49% of
the participants). Indeed, and more importantly, about 71% of the participants treated
monetary and pain-and-suffering insurance in the same manner- either buying them
both, or buying neither. Moreover, the participants who were willing to buy insurance
spent, on average, the same amount of money on each type of insurance. As Table 11
reveals, the majority of participants under risk paid exactly the same amount of money
for both types of insurance. Of those who did not treat it the same, the majority
preferred monetary to pain-and-suffering insurance.
The third issue I examined was the effect of information on people’s decision
making in this context. Our results show that providing participants with information
causes a significantly higher percentage of them to purchase pain-and-suffering
insurance, but has no significant influence on the number who buy monetary
insurance (see Table 12). Providing participants with information apparently caused
them to lower the premiums they were willing to pay for both types of insurance; but
this effect was not significant.
Information also has an influence on the perception of the relation between the
two types of insurance. Specifically under full information (D4), more participants
paid more for pain-and-suffering than for monetary coverage and more participants
paid exactly the same amount of money for both types of insurance than under
ignorance (see Table 13).
The results clearly show that providing participants with information had no
significant effect on the premiums they were willing to pay, which was a percentage
of the product price and unrelated to the expected loss, but only on the likelihood they
would buy insurance.268

268

Interestingly, I found only minor gender effects. Specifically, women were much more likely to buy
monetary insurance than men were, and, under full information (D4), were willing to pay more for both
types of insurance than men were; but this latter effect was not significant. In the state of ignorance,
women and men were willing to pay about the same amount of money for both types of insurance.
Providing participants with information, however, increased both genders’ likelihood of buying painand -suffering insurance (see table 8). In addition, both men and women expressed more tendency to
treat both types of insurance the same when provided with information; this effect was stronger for
women.
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C. General Summary

In this part, I will discuss the similarities and the differences that emerged in
the results of all three studies.

1. The demand for pain-and-suffering versus the demand for monetary
insurance.
With respect to the primary question I was interested in, my results in all
studies show that the vast majority of the participants (90% in Study 1, 75% in study
2 and 71% in study 3) treated the two types of insurance the same- either they buy
them both or they buy neither. Moreover, on average, in all studies the majority of
participants under information treated both types of insurance exactly the samenamely, they paid exactly the same amount of money for both types of insurance. Of
those who did not treat it the same, the vast majority preferred monetary to pain-andsuffering insurance.
This result may shed doubt on the approach applied by scholars that people
will always buy a fair monetary insurance but not non-monetary insurance. The
results clearly show that people do not always demand monetary insurance, and are
much more likely to treat both types of insurance in the same manner than scholars
have traditionally thought.
The fact that people were willing to pay well above the expected value, in all
studies, across all products, may tell us that people may add some perceived-asreasona ble premium to the price of the product, neglecting the expected value
altogether. Indeed, most participants in a state of risk were willing to pay an estimated
15% to 35% of the product price, regardless of the expected value of the coverage.
Indeed, in conversations I had with participants in the pretest stages, I discovered that
many participants, when deciding how much to spend, do not take into account the
expected value of the coverage. This result was corroborated by the fact that
information about the expected value was not significantly correlated with a change in
the premiums, but only with the mere likelihood of buying insurance. This pattern of
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decision-making may attract entrepreneurs who might extract surplus from lay
consumers, especially in non-competitive markets. 269
There are two main differences between the results in Study 1, Study 2 and
Study 3. First, there is a significant difference in the overall demand for both types of
insurance (monetary and pain-and-suffering). In Study 1, on aver age 82% and 77% of
the participants were willing to purchase monetary and pain-and-suffering insurance,
respectively, whereas in Study 2, on average 63% and 51% of the participants were
willing to do so and in Study 3 only 49% and 27% of the participants were willing to
do so. Before I try to explain these differences it is important to observe that the
internal ranking of the insurance coverage is the same: in both Study 1 and Study 2,
participants were more likely to purchase insurance coverage and the pr ice they were
willing to pay was higher for tires than for monitor then for padding. This probably
corresponds to the severity of the injury for each product, as was described in the
questionnaire.270 Thus, from a qualitative perspective the demand across studies is in
some sense similar.
As for the quantitative difference between the studies, first, the students in
Study 1 were required to immerse their arm in ice water for 10 seconds. It is possible
that priming pain in this way influenced their demand. Indeed, these students
expressed the highest demand for insurance and were the ones who more than any
other group treated both types of coverage the same.
Second, the difference could be related to the fact that the populations were
different. It might be that psychology undergraduates are significantly different from
law students, who in their turn are significantly different than economics students. It
could be the age, or even that the people who study law as graduate students are
cognitively different than those who study psychology or economics as an
269

For example a local monopoly that sells a specific audio system may well extract surplus (which
would be much above the “regular” monopoly rent) because consumers determine the premium they
are willing to pay for a service-contract (a warranty) by applying a rule of thumb and paying some fix
percentage of the product price. In competitive markets, in contrast, there is a higher chance that
consumers will be charged a price that is closer to the supplier’s marginal cost, which is virtually the
expected value of the insurance coverage.
270
For the padding participants read that “a fall can then result in serious injury to the affected joints,
possibly leading to permanent damage in the form of reduced mobility and function.” For the monitor
they read that “certain form of migraine headache can be directly linked to the radiation emitted by all
standard computer monitors. The migraines resulting from use of computer monitors are very painful,
and are usually accompanied by nausea and spotty vision. They generally occur once or twice a month.
They last for 4 hours and are treated with rest and medication.” Finally, for the tires they read that “the
injuries to the driver can be very severe and can include spinal cord damage resulting in paralysis (i.e.,
permanent immobility of the legs).” See the Appendix for more details.
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undergraduate. However, I do not have a theory that will explain how the differences
would drive the results one-way or the other. 271
Third, it might be that the difference in the design of the three studies was a
factor. Whereas the law students faced a “within participants” design and had to make
decisions about one product (circular saw), the psychology students faced a “between
participants” design and had to make decisions about three products (tires, monitor
and padding). The economics students had to make decisions about four products.
Here, too, I do not have a theory that will explain the differences.
Forth, it might be that the nature of the product was a source of the difference.
If we ignore the results of Study 1, on the theory that immersing one’s hand in ice
water for 10 seconds, significantly changes its preferences, then a closer look at the
demand for insurance in Studies 2 and 3 may shed some light on the results. The
demand, under risk, by psychology students in Study 2 for insurance for tires and
monitor was relatively high, 272 whereas, the demand for insurance for the padding, by
psychology students, and for the circular saw, by law students, was relatively low.273
Analysis of verbal responses made by participating law students reveals that many of
those who did not buy coverage had two main reasons for this decision. First, they
thought they could control the materialization of the harm (“if I am careful with the
saw I should not be injured” (L27), and “I would rather take the chance that I will not
injure myself” (L12)). Second, they thought that they did not “deserve” to be
compensated as they assumed a known risk voluntarily. Both of these reasons apply
directly to padding but not for monitor or tires. Thus, it might well be that the low
demand for both types of insurance, for both the padding and the circular saw, reflects
these lines of arguments.

271

One may argue that this priming effect is exactly what makes this study more reliable because
participants were less likely to ignore the effects of pain on their lives. In other words, participants
were more “informed” about the decision they were suppose to make.
272
82% (67%) were willing to pay weakly above the expected value for monetary (pain-and-suffering)
insurance for tires, and 58% (51%) were willing to pay weakly above the expected value for monetary
(pain-and-suffering) insurance for monitor.
273
50% (35%) were willing to pay weakly above the expected value for monetary (pain-and-suffering)
insurance for padding, and 49% (27%) were willing to pay weakly above the expected value for
monetary (pain-and-suffering) insurance for the saw.
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2. The influence of information
All of the studies show that information matters. First, information caused
more participants to treat both types of insurance in the same manner. One possible
reason for this could be that absent information, it is easier for participants to suppress
the possibility of incurring pain-and-suffering. Once confronted with information
regarding this possibility, participants tend to treat it exactly as monetary insurance,
and to increase their demand for pain-and-suffering insurance.
Second, whereas in Study 3 information caused significantly more participants
to buy pain-and-suffering insurance, in Study 2, informed participants were less likely
to buy both types of insurance.
In both studies, however, information was not a cause for a significant
difference in the premiums participants were willing to pay for both types of
insurance. As participants do not take the expected value as the focal point when
deciding their maximum willingness to pay, one should not be surprised that
information does not influence the premiums participants were willing to pay.
If these results are robust, then there is an argument to compel manufacturers
to publish the rates of failures of their products. Clearly, manufacturers have no
incentives to do that, as they gain from people’s superfluous demand for monetary
insurance in the state of ignorance. Indeed, it is not evidently clear why
pharmaceutical companies must publish their products’ rates of failure (side effects)
while other product manufacturers are not burdened with a responsibility of this sort.

IV. S UMMARY AND FUTURE R EASERCH
A. Summary

The departure point of this article is the conventional economic analysis of
the law. It deals with two interrelated problems. First, whether the economic theory
and the empirical work on pain-and-suffering damages suggest that there is no , and
should not be, demand for such damages in the product liability context. The Article
criticized the theoretical tools scholars have applied in their analysis, as well as the
empirical work done to investigate the actual demand for pain-and-suffering
coverage.
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Second, once it was established that the demand for pain-and-suffering
coverage is an empirical question, the Article proposed a theoretical framework to
explore the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage by means of relative comparison
to the demand for monetary coverage in the context of product liability. Indeed, a
significant demand for pain-and-suffering coverage was found in this way. 274
This result joins other recent evidence that people are willing to pay more in
order to secure pain-and-suffering damages. For example, in 1998 the Office for
National Statistics in the UK researched public perceptions of what the levels of
damages for pain-and-suffering loss should be. 275 The research was based on “face to
face” interviews conducted in September and November 1998 with adult
interviewees, selected in such a way that they form a random and a representative
sample of the population of Great Britain. One thousand nine hundred respondents
were presented with 4 injury cases and were asked how much money they think each
of the injured people should have been awarded for their pain-and-suffering loss.
About 60 percent of the respondents suggested awards at least one and half times
higher than would currently be available in the UK, of this group about 80-90 percent
suggested awards which were at least double current awards. 276 The important point
however is that even when told that higher awards cause higher insurance premiums

274

More accurately, the demand that was found is for the type of pain-and-suffering coverage that was
described to participant s. The description stated that the coverage “provides compensation for pain and
suffering resulting from an injury. This could include physical or emotional pain, or any suffering
involving the suffering of changing your lifestyle to adjust to living with a loss of mobility, a loss of
function, or a disability. It does not include any compensation for any monetary expenses like medical
and rehabilitation costs or lost wages.” One should recall that even if it becomes evident, by means of
further empirical studies, that individuals do not demand pain-and-suffering coverage, there are still
some arguments in the literature that support pain-and-suffering awards. For example, some have
argued that pain-and-suffering awards have a tacit role to help pay the plaintiff’s legal expenses (onethird of the compensation paid to the plaintiff) and thus help to offset the alleged over insurance
provided by pain-and-suffering damages. BSB at 936; Viscusi, Sounder Rationale at 162-3. Indeed one
commentator has proposed that victims forgo awards for pain-and-suffering damages in exchange for
guaranteed payment of lawyers’ fees. J. O’Connel, Proposal to Abolish Defendants’ Payments for
pain-and-suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants’ Attorneys’ Fees, U. I LL . L. R EV. 333 (1981);
Geistfeld argues that the majority of victims never file lawsuits. Geistfeld at 802 -3. Thus, pain-andsuffering damages serve as a multiplier of the compensatory damages sending the correct signals to
potential injurers. Geistfeld concludes that even if the individual consumer does not prefer nonpecuniary coverage, consumers as a class probably prefer full compensation for pain-and -suffering
damages. Id.
275
The Law Commission, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY: NON-PECUNIARY LOSS
(1999), http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lc257/lc257.pdf. The Law Commission is an independent
body set up by English Parliament in 1965 to keep the law of England under review and to recommend
reform when it is needed. There are five Commissioners, all of whom work full-time at the
Commission. The Chairman is a High Court judge. The other four Commissioners are experienced
judges, barristers, solicitors or law professors. See http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/misc/about.htm#what/
276
Id. at 45.
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so that eventually the public, rather than the negligent person who caused the injury,
pay the awards, 80% of interviewees did not change their answers. 277 The research
resulted in a recommendation by The Law Commission to increase the awards for
pain and suffering damages by 50 to 100 percent. In March 2000, the Court of
Appeal, disc ussing the Law Commission’s report, decided, in a seminal case, to
increase the pain and suffering damages awarded in England up to a maximum of one
third, for the most severe injuries. 278
It is not only important to explore whether healthy people are willing to pay
for pain -and-suffering damages to be available but also whether injured people think
the same. The theory behind this idea is that they may know something healthy
participants do not know. Indeed, the only reason that traditionally we have the preaccident “self” decide the insurance premiums is technological: one, usually, cannot
consult with her future post-accident “self” and inquire about her need for coverage.
But this technological problem can be reduced if we let other future “selves” inform
us on their need for coverage. These other future “selves” are the injured. If their
responses were significantly different than those of the healthy, we will have to
develop a mechanism to include their preferences in the social welfare function.
There is some evidence of injured people’s preferences. In a pioneering study
from 1972, Jeffrey O’Connell and Rita James Simon reported a study where 391
compensated automobile accident victims were interviewed via the telephone. 279 Most
surveyed victims favored continuing payments for pain -and-suffering and maintaining

277

Id. at 48. The study does not provide information on who were those who did change their minds.
One might argue that nothing should be learned from the UK as the tort damages in the UK are
significantly lower than in the US, for, among other things, the social security system in the UK
provides broader coverage. Yet, a closer look reveals that the pain-and-suffering awards in the UK are
not significantly different than pain-and-suffering awards in the US, at least in states which cap
damages for pain-and-suffering. For example, the maximum award for pain-and-suffering in the UK, as
published in the Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases, is
130,000 pounds, about $200,000. Still, most people thought it was much too low, even when explained
that the cost of higher damages is born by the public.
278
Heil v. Rankin, [2001] Q.B 272. The court was concerned about the failure to explain sufficient ly
and explicitly to participants what would be the potential effect on premiums charged by insurance
companies in the event that pain and suffering were increased as well as by absence of any indication
to the participants of the significance of an increase in damages on the resources of National Health
Services (NHS). There would be an increase of 133 billion pounds per year in the NHS’s liability for
clinical negligence and an increase of 1 billion pounds per year in the insurance industry’s liability as a
whole. Id. at paragraphs 66, 87 and 95. Nonetheless, the court was criticized by victims’ lawyers for
not adopting The Law Commission’s recommendation of an increase of 50% to 100%.
279
The interviewees were Illinois residents who had been paid during the year 1966 by a given
insurance company. J. O’Connell & R J Simon, Payment for Pain and Suffering: Who Wants What,
When and Why?, 1 U. IL. FORUM 14 (1972).
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present premium rates, as well as would choose to buy their own coverage for pain and-suffering, covering themselves and their families, were it possible. 280
O’Connell and Simon summarize previous studies, most of which reached
similar results. 281
In the UK, a 1993 survey of 761 compensated accident victims ran by the Law
Commission, found that many respondents fail to realize, in the period after the
settlement, for how long they are likely to be affected by their injuries and dependent
on their damages in the future. 282 The researchers found that four in five victims were
still experiencing pain at the time of the interview (84% of the accidents occurred
280

In both cases, it was about two-thirds of respondents. Id. at 29-34.
Id. 34 -43. In a recent 1998 study with several co-authors, Viscusi assesses intangible health losses
associated with multiple sclerosis (MS). They used two different methods: risk-dollars and risk-risk
tradeoffs. The sample included subjects from the general population and persons with MS. The authors
found that marginal utility of income is lower in the state with MS than without it, but that the
difference in marginal utility in the two states was greater for people without MS than for those with
the disease. In addition, people with MS overestimated the probability of acquiring MS to a greater
extent than did people without MS. See Alternative Approaches. Specifically, respondents with MS
were willing to pay much more to avoid acquiring the disease (risk-dollar tradeoff). Id. at 486. But
were much more restraint to undergo a painless operation that would either completely cure their MS
or kill them instantly (risk -risk tradeoff). Id. at 488. These two results seem inconsistent with each
other. When asked to undergo the operation, MS respondents placed less disutility on having the
disease than do others without it, but when asked to pay to avoid it they were willing to pay more,
implying otherwise. Viscusi et al attempt to reconcile these inconsistent results in the following way.
They interpreted the reluctance to undergo an operation, as derived from the risk-risk tradeoff, to mean
that the decrease in the overall utility drop from having MS is not as big as the healthy respondents
seemed to think and that the decrease in the marginal utility of income at the state with MS is larger for
people with MS. Id. at 489. Viscusi et al conclude that “if the question concerns research funding
financed by general revenue, then the estimates from the general sample are germane. They
additionally argued, that preferences of persons with MS should be reflected in the willingness to pay
estimates, yet when these preferences are properly weighted, they represent a very trivial fraction of the
sample. However, for purposes of selecting among alternative therapies, estimates of value from the
inflicted persons are relevant.” Viscsui et. al., Alternative Approaches at 495. Other studies have found
high correlation between responses of patients and the general public. This includes arthritis, cancer
and more. See sources cited at pages 494. In one study however, respondents who have relatives with
chronic bronchitis were more willing to forgo income than the general sample. Krupnick A. & Cropper
M. The Effect of Information on Health Risk valuations. 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 29 (1995). Yet,
they were not willing to increase their risk of auto death to reduce the risk of bronchitis.
282
The Law Commission, Personal Injury Compensation: How much is Enough? (1994, Law Com
225). This is especially true for victims of non -catastrophic injury because their inability to carry out
normal life is less salient at the time of the settlement. The purpose of the study was to gather
information directly from accident victims about their experiences several years after the settlement
(either out of court settlements or awards by the court) of their claims. Indeed, almost all victims
supported the availability of pain-and-suffering damages. Interviews with 52 accident victims led
Professor Genn, who led the study, to relate these findings to the “widespread experience of continuing
pain, even many years after the date of the injury.” Id. at 211. A somewhat similar question rises with
respect to whether damages for pain-and-suffering loss should survive the death of the victim. In this
case, too, marginal deterrence requires that they would (so that it would not be cheaper to kill than to
injure), and optimal insurance presumably requires that they would not (why would the victim pay
premium for a pain-and-suffering insurance she would never personally enjoy ?) Yet, the experience in
Scotland, where damages for pain and suffering loss were excluded from survival actions between
1976 and 1992 reinforce the general conclusion. Public unrest led to a change in the law in 1993. See
T HE D AMAGES (SCOTLAND ) ACT 1993.
281
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between 4 to 11 years prior to the interview) and two in five were still in constant
pain. 283 Moreover, although most victims were satisfied with the awards at the time of
settlement, “this satisfaction drains away over time when the reality of long term illeffects and reduced capacity to work bite.”284 Indeed, one of the most common
reasons for victims’ dissatisfaction was that the settlement represented inadequate
compensation for the impact of the injuries on their whole way of life. 285 The study
concluded that even years after they receive the awards, victims still have need for
psychological support, for ways to debilitate effects of pain, for some work retraining,
as well for some general help to adjust to their circumstances and envision a useful
and productive future for themselves. 286 Indeed, six years later, The Law
Commission’s general conclusion was that the ongoing pain and suffering effects of
many injuries “are far greater than anticipated by victims at the time that they receive
their compensation.”287
In Scotland, researchers in the Disability Management Research Group of the
Rehabilitation Studies Unit at the University of Edinburgh conducted a follow-up
study in 1993 of compensated victims of personal injuries arising out of motor vehicle
accidents and medical negligence. One hundred and fifty-two claim files were
examined and 83 claimants were interviewed. They had their accident occur, on
average, ten years prior to the study and who had received compensation payments.
The researchers found that the costs of care increased beyond those anticipated at the
time the award was made. The care costs of one person with quadriplegia, who
required twenty-four hour attention, doubled in the span of five years and resulted in
the claimant's family having to assume greater responsibility for the management of
the care provided. 288
In Australia, a study from 1983 examined 263 compensated victims of motor
vehicle, work and general accidents who were interviewed an average of six years
283

Id. at page ??? to the introduction.
Id.
285
Id. at 260. The reader should bear in mind that in the UK, only around 12% of victims (sustaining
more than minor injuries) obtain damages through the tort system, so in an important sense, the study
represents the ‘fortunate’ minority’s views. Id. at 262.
286
Id. at 265.
287
For this reason, among other things, the Commission recommended that pain-and -suffering damages
should be increased by 50% to 100%. The Law Commission, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY:
NON-PECUNIARY LOSS 35 (1999).
288
P. Cornes, Coping With Catastrophic Injury, University of Edinburgh, (1993) (As cited in the
Australian Law reform Committee’s report at
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/lawreform/default.htm).
284
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after having received their payments. It was found that about 50 percent of all victims
had an incomes lower than average weekly earnings at the time of the interview and
that about 50 percent received social security benefits. More relevantly, a substantial
majority of the recipients regarded the amount they received as inadequa te. Almost 70
percent of those interviewed reported continuing injury-related expenses six years
after receiving their payments that were not predicted at the time of settlement. 289 In
1992, two researchers from the University of Adelaide Law School intervie wed 227
who had nine years earlier, received damages after having been injured in road
accidents in South Australia. It was found that 18.5 percent were reliant upon social
security for reasons related to the accident and that about 16 percent were living in
families which were below the poverty line (compared with about 12 percent of the
general population). Approximately 22 percent were rated by interviewers as
financially insecure because of the accident whereas 52.6 percent said that their
compensation was insufficient to cover their accident-related losses. More relevantly,
about 60 percent were originally satisfied with the amount of compensation they
received but by the time of the interview, some eight to nine years after settlement,
only 24 percent were satisfied. 290 In another 1992 study, researchers at the Centre for
Socio -Legal Studies at La Trobe University in Melbourne had interviewed 24 people
who had sustained a health/medical care injury. All of the families of injured children
who were interviewed felt that the money they had received in compensation was
inadequate to meet their child's on-going needs and therefore they would be required
to provide financial support themselves. In particular, many of those interviewed were
initially pleased wit h the lump sum but soon discovered that there were subtle forms
of hidden costs that had not been anticipated. 291

289

C. Bass, `Lump Sum Accident Compensation', 1 H UMAN RESOURCES 59, 165-7 (1983). (As cited in
the Australian Law reform Committee’s report at
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/lawreform/default.htm)
290
M. Neave & L. Howell, The Adequacy of Common Law Damages, University of Adelaide,
Adelaide, 1992 (As cited in the Australian Law reform Committee’s report at
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/lawreform/default.htm).
291
Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Health, Housing and Community Services, Review of
Professional Indemnity Arrangements for Health Care Professionals, The Health/Medical Care Injury
Case Study Project, AGPS, Canberra, 1993. As cited in the Australian Law reform Committee’s report
at http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/lawreform/default.htm).
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B. Future research

My next project deals with the measurability question; how to best provide
pain-and-suffering coverage in practice. Responding to this question requires us to
consider two major issues. First, we must decide which institution we feel can best
deal with providing pain-and-suffering coverage. Should this coverage be provided
through legal rules or, perhaps, left to the insurance markets? Second, we must decide
upon the means of application. What is the best way to provide pain-and-suffering
coverage in practice? Should pain-and-suffering coverage be determined by applying
some structured means, such as schedules, or perhaps it should be left to a jury’s full
discretion on a case-by-case basis? In either case, how exactly should the decision
maker calculate the appropriate coverage?
Bovbjerg, Sloan and Blumstein (BSB), offer three different models for
structuring the calculations of pain-and-suffering damages. 292 First, a system of
standardized awards set according to a matrix or schedule of dollar values based on
the plaintiff’s age and severity of injury. 293 Second, a system that employs scenarios
of hypothetical injuries and their corresponding non-economic awards, which are
presented to juries as suggested and non-binding guides to valuations.294 Third, a
system of flexible ranges of monetary awards that would reflect the various categories
of injury severity and victim age.295 Mark Geistfeld, in contrast, suggests that in the
event of a prior contractual relationship between the parties, a jury would assess
damages from an ex-ante perspective; asking how much a reasonable person would
have paid to eliminate the risk that caused the pain-and-suffering loss. This measure,
Geistfeld argues, reflects the consumer’s ex-ante assessment of the cost of the pain and-suffering loss. 296

292

BSB, supra note 150.
Id. at 941. The severity of injury would be categorized according to whether it is permanent or
temporary, and whether it is a minor or major one. As with respect to age, the authors argue that
whereas with bodily injuries, young people are expected to recover faster from temporary pain-andsuffering loss, they would suffer more from permanent loss due to their increased life span.
294
BSB, supra note 150, at 953-6. The authors suggest constructing nine scenarios that would describe
the physical severity of the injury, such as the victim’s age, the pain endured, etc.
295
Id. at 956-960. Recogniz ing that some injuries are much more severe than others, the authors object
to applying a single flat cap. The authors also question the wisdom in assuming that some awards
would be disproportionate to the damages sustained, because of sympathetic juries. It is worth
mentioning that the authors see this alternative as inferior to the matrices and scenarios for in most
cases they give the juries no guidance, but only deal with the problem of outliers. Id. at 959.
296
Geistfeld, supra note 16, at 805-807.
293
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My next paper criticizes these different approaches taken. It then suggests that
the ideal approach would constitute having a jury assess how much a rational and
informed individual would pay ex-ante to insure pain-and-suffering loss in a world
with no tort law. This ex-ante willingness to pay for insurance is the natural measure
based on the theoretical framework.
Unfortunately, as my empirical studies indicated, while individuals’ responses
are reliable as a means of establishing a qualitative demand for pain-and-suffering
coverage, they cannot be considered a reliable means in assessing the scope of the
quantitativ e demand for such coverage. I, therefore, suggest a yardstick to determine
the pain -and-suffering awards by using medical costs as the basis for calculating pain and-suffering losses. Under my approach, a system of multipliers will be associated
with the health costs in order to calculate the pain-and-suffering component. This
system solves the unpredictability problem inherent in pain -and-suffering in tort law
at negligible administrative costs. It combines the advantages of efficiency and
fairness associa ted with having a jury decides on a case-by-case basis, without the
high complexity of assessing pain-and-suffering losses that other proposals have. 297

297

Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current
Approaches and a Proposal for a Change (on file with the author).
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V. APPENDIX
A. The “between-subject” design.

In some legal systems it is not possible to sue manufacturers or vendors when
their products fail. So for example, under such a legal system, if you get injured as a
result of using a defective product, you may not sue anyone for compensation. You
cannot sue the manufacturer, and you cannot sue the vendor.
Under such legal systems, instead of having the right to sue, people are offered
various kinds of insurance. Imagine that you live in such a system. In the pages that
follow, you will be asked to imagine that you have purchased a particular product, and
you will be asked what kind of insurance, if any, you would buy. In particular, you
will be asked about two kinds of insurance.
Insurance for pain & suffering
This provides compensation for pain and suffering resulting
from an injury. This could include physical or emotional pain, or any
suffering involving the suffering of changing your lifestyle to adjust to
living with a loss of mobility, a loss of function, or a disability. It does
not include any compensation for any monetary expenses like medical
and rehabilitation costs or lost wages.
Insurance for monetary expenses:
This provides compensation for medical expenses and rehabilitation
following an injury, and for lost wages due to time away from work. It
does not include any compensation for any pain & suffering like
physical or emotional pain.
Neither of these kinds of insurance is included in the price of the product you
are purchasing. If you decide to purchase either or both then you will have to pay
extra for whichever one(s) you want.
For all of what follows you should assume that you do not currently have any
insurance. That is, assume that you do not have any insurance coverage through
school, through work, through the government, nor through your parents’ health plan.
Any insurance that you do buy will apply only to injuries or illnesses
following the use of the one product in question. And finally, all insurance policies
are paid as a one-time flat rate, and will provide coverage for 1 year. At the end of
that year, you may assume that you will have an opportunity to renew both types of
coverage, if you wish.

10 … (v123.un.n) #______
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Imagine that you have just purchased some wrist guards, knee pads, and elbow pads
which you intend to use while rollerblading. All of this padding costs $40 in total. But
such padding has been known to fail in the past. Sometimes, due to weaknesses in the
material, the plastic padding cracks on impact. A fall can then result in serious injury
to the affected joints, possibly leading to permanent damage in the form of reduced
mobility and function.
When purchasing the padding you are provided with some statistical information that
was collected by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC is a federal
agency that is responsible for, among other things, studying possible causes and
remedies for product accidents an health effects). According to the data provided by
the CPSC, in each calendar year, 1 out of every 1000 sets of padding sold (i.e., 0.1%),
cracks on impact during a fall, resulting in significant injury. The compensation for
pain and suffering following such an injury, if you had insurance, would be in the
amount of $1000. The monetary expense that can be expected following such an
injury is also $1000 (in medical expenses and lost wages due to t ime away from
work.)
Remember, under the current legal system, you do not have the option of suing for
compensation, but you do have the opportunity to purchase insurance. Please answer
the following questions regarding your insurance preferences. In answering the
questions remember that you do not currently have any insurance coverage
whatsoever (not through school, through work, through the government, nor through
your parents health plan.)

1) How much, if anything, will you pay for insurance that will pay you $1,000
for pain & suffering resulting from an injury caused by the failure of this
product. (This includes any kind of physical or emotional pain and suffering
that you endure as a result of the injury.) You will already be spending $40 for
the padding. In addition to this $40, what is the most, if anything, that you will
pay, as a one time fee, to have this kind of insurance coverage for 1 year?
_______________________________________
2) How much, if anything, will you pay for insurance that will pay you $1,000
for monetary expenses resulting from an injury caused by the failure of this
product. (Such monetary expenses include health care costs and lost wages
due to time away from work.) You will already be spending $40 for the
padding. In addition to this $40, what is the most, if anything, that you will
pay, as a one time fee, to have this kind of insurance coverage for 1 year?
_______________________________________
3) In total I will pay for this product ________ dollars. (Please make sure that
the amount you write is equal to the price of the product, $40 in this case, plus
the amounts you wrote in questions 1 and 2).
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Imagine that you have just purchased a computer monitor for $250. Recent research
has shown that a certain form of migraine heada che can be directly linked to the
radiation emitted by all standard computer monitors. The migraines resulting from use
of computer monitors are very painful, and are usually accompanied by nausea and
spotty vision. They generally occur once or twice a month. They last for 4 hours and
are treated with rest and medication.
When purchasing the monitor you are provided with some statistical information that
was collected by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC is a federal
agency that is responsible for, among other things, studying possible causes and
remedies for product accidents health effects). According to the data provided by the
CPSC, in each calendar year, 1 out of every 10,000 people who use a computer
monitor (i.e., 0.01%) develop the kind of migraine condition described above. The
compensation for pain and suffering following such an illness, if you had insurance,
would be in the amount of $10,000. The monetary expense that can be expected
following such an illness is also $10,000 (in medical expenses and lost wages due to
time away from work.)
Remember, under the current legal system, you do not have the option of suing for
compensation, but you do have the opportunity to purchase insurance. Please answer
the following questions regarding your insurance preferences. In answering the
questions remember that you do not currently have any insurance coverage
whatsoever (not through school, through work, through the government, nor through
your parents’ health plan.)
1) How much, if anything, will you pay for insurance that will pay you $10,000
for all pain & suffering resulting from an illness caused by this product. (This
includes any kind of physical or emotional pain and suffering that you endure
as a result of the illness.) You will already be spending $250 for the monitor.
In addition to this $250, what is the most, if anything, that you will pay, as a
one time fee, to have this kind of insurance coverage for 1 year?
_______________________________________
2) How much, if anything, will you pay for insurance that will pay you $10,000
for monetary expenses resulting from an illness caused by this product. (Such
monetary expenses include health care costs and lost wages due to time away
from work.) You will already be spending $250 for the monitor. In addition to
this $250, what is the most, if anything, that you will pay, as a one time fee, to
have this kind of insurance coverage for 1 year?
_______________________________________

In total I will pay for this product ________ dollars. (Please make sure that the
amount you write is equal to the price of the product, $250 in this case, plus the
amounts you wrote in questions 1 and 2).
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Imagine that you have just purchased a portable electric saw for $100.Recent research
has shown that electric saws have been known to fail in the past. Sometimes, due to
weaknesses in the material, the rotor cracks on impact. The most frequent injury
caused by the breakdown of a saw is amputation, usually of a finger or the whole
hand, but occasionally it can be even more severe than that leading to a permanent
disability.
When purchasing the electric saw you are provided with some statistical information
that was collected by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC is a federal
agency that is responsible for, among other things, studying possible causes and
remedies for product accidents an health effects). According to the data provided by
the CPSC, in each calendar year, 1 out of every 10,000 electric saws sold (i.e.,
0.01%), breaks down within a period of a year, resulting in serious injury described
above. The compensation for pain and suffering following such an injury, if you had
insurance, would be in the amount of $10,000. The monetary expense that can be
expected following such an injury is also $10,000 (in medical expenses and lost
wages due to time away from work.)
Remember, under the current legal system, you do not have the option of suing for
compensation, but you do have the opportunity to purchase insurance. Please answer
the following questions regarding your insurance preferences. In answering the
questions remember that you do not currently have any insurance coverage
whatsoever (not through school, through work, through the government, nor through
your parents health plan.)

1) How much, if anything, will you pay for insurance that will pay you $10,000
for pain & suffering resulting from an injury caused by the failure of this
product. (This includes any kind of physical or emotional pain and suffering
that you endure as a result of the inju ry.) You will already be spending $100
for the electric saw. In addition to this $100, what is the most, if anything, that
you will pay, as a one-time fee, to have this kind of insurance coverage for 1
year?
_______________________________________
2) How much, if anything, will you pay for insurance that will pay you $10,000
for monetary expenses resulting from an injury caused by the failure of this
product. (Such monetary expenses include health care costs and lost wages
due to time away from work.) You will already be spending $100 for the
electric saw. In addition to this $100, what is the most, if anything, that you
will pay, as a one-time fee, to have this kind of insurance coverage for 1 year?
_______________________________________
3) In total I will pay for this product ________ dollars. (Please make sure that
the amount you write is equal to the price of the product, $100 in this case,
plus the amounts you wrote in questions 1 and 2).
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Imagine that you are about to purchase some new tires for your Sport Utility Vehicle.
The tires cost $800. As you may know, it has recently been revealed that tire failure
on such vehicles has resulted in numerous deaths and injuries. Following tire failure
the vehicle can spin out of control and flip over. The injur ies to the driver can be very
severe and can include spinal cord damage resulting in paralysis (i.e., permanent
immobility of the legs).
When purchasing the tires you are provided with some statistical information that was
collected by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC is a federal agency
that is responsible for, among other things, studying possible causes and remedies for
product accidents an health effects). According to the data provided by the CPSC, in
each calendar year, 1 out of every 100,000 sets of tires sold (i.e., 0.001%) fails,
resulting in a severe crash where the driver is left paralyzed. The compensation for
pain and suffering following such an injury, if you had insurance, would be in the
amount of $100,000. The monetary expense that can be expected following such an
injury is also $100,000 (in medical expenses and lost wages due to time away from
work.)
Remember, under the current legal system, you do not have the option of suing for
compensation, but you do have the opportunity to purchase insurance. Please answer
the following questions regarding your insurance preferences. In answering the
questions remember that you do not currently have any insurance coverage
whatsoever (not through school, through work, through the governm ent, nor through
your parent’s health plan.)
1) How much, if anything, will you pay for insurance that will pay you $100,000
for pain & suffering resulting from an injury caused by the failure of this
product. (This includes any kind of physical or emotional pain and suffering
that you endure as a result of the injury.) You will already be spending $800
for the tires. In addition to this $800, what is the most, if anything, that you
will pay, as a one time fee, to have this kind of insurance coverage for 1 year?
_______________________________________
2) How much, if anything, will you pay for insurance that will pay you $100,000
for monetary expenses resulting from an injury caused by the failure of this
product. (Such monetary expenses include health care costs and lost wages
due to time away from work.) You will already be spending $800 for the tires.
In addition to this $800, what is the most, if anything, that you will pay, as a
one time fee, to have this kind of insurance coverage for 1 year?
_______________________________________

3) In total I will pay for this product ________ dollars. (Please make sure that the
amount you write is equal to the price of the product, $800 in this case, plus
the amounts you wrote in questions 1 and 2).
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1. Please circle your gender:

MALE

124

FEMALE

2. Please indicate your age: __________________________

Thank you for your participation.
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B. The “within subject” design.

Dear Student;
Thank you very much for your willingness to participate in this
research. Your answers are confidential and will be used for
statistical analysis only. A lthough your answers are very important
to us, we will be using them only for learning about people’s
decision making in the aggregate and are not keeping track of any
individual’s behavior.

The following questionnaire asks about your tastes and
preferences. There are no right or wrong answers. We are
interested in what you think you would really do in each situation.

There are 4 questions labeled 1 through 4; each question has
several parts. Please answer the questions in the order in which
they appear.

Also, please write neatly.
Thank you very much.

The Research Team
In the University of Michigan

File 123
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Question 1:
Imagine that you have decided to purchase a new portable electric saw. You go to a hardware
store and, after browsing, settle upon a particular model. The seller tells you that the price of
the model you chose is $100 and that it has a disclaimer that says that the seller is not liable
for any reason whatsoever. Assume that this deal is acceptable to you. In other words, you
are willing to pay $100 (but no more than $100) for the saw even if you must give up all legal
rights against the seller.
Before you write your check, the seller offers you 3 different additional Deals, described
below. In each of these Deals, assume that the only legal rights you have against the seller of
the saw are those described in each part of the question. (The seller accepts no returns, nor do
you have any legal rights against anybody else, nor do you have insurance to cover you
against such losses—no health insurance, property insurance, or disability insurance).
Note, however, that you have the opportunity to accept any of these Deals, or any
combination of them (including accepting them all). Alternatively, you can refuse all of these
Deals, in which case you pay $100 for the saw, but have no legal rights against the seller.

Deal 1

Deal 2

Deal 3

Besides the $100 price of
the saw, you may pay an
extra amount and get a 5year warranty in which
the seller has to provide
you with a new saw if the
one you purchased should
break down for any reason
whatsoever.

Besides the $100 for the saw,
you may pay an extra amount
of money and get a 5-year
right to have the seller
reimburse you for any direct
monetary expenses that you
may suffer in the event of an
injury caused by the saw.
Such monetary damages
might include, for instance,
medical costs, rehabilitation,
or loss of income you might
have due to injury.

Besides the $100 for the saw,
you may pay an extra amount
of money and get a 5-year
right to have the seller
compensate you for any nonmonetary harm such as painand-suffering that you may
suffer in the event of an
injury caused by a saw. Such
damages reimburse you, for
instance, for pain or any
other suffering you may feel
during or after your health
treatment or rehabilitation.

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in
this Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in this
Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in
this Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is __________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________

Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is __________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________

Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is ___________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________

In sum, I will pay a total amount of $______ for the saw.
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Please, DO NOT go back and change your answers after you read this new question.

Question 2:
Imagine that before you wrote the check the seller offers you some statistical data collected
by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC is a federal agency that is responsible,
among other things, to study possible causes and cures for product accidents). According to
the data provided by the CPSC, out of every 50 portable saws, 1 breaks down within a period
of 5 years (2% of the saws break down within a period of 5 years).
As before, the seller offers you 3 different Deals, described below. Those Deals are the same
as the deals you already considered and we repeat them for your convenience. In each of these
Deals, assume that the only legal rights you have against the seller of the saw are those
described in each part of the question. (The seller accepts no returns, nor do you have any
legal rights against anybody else, nor do you have insurance to cover you against such
losses—no health insurance, property insurance, or disability insurance).
Note, however, that you have the opportunity to accept any of these Deals, or any
combination of them (including accepting them all). Alternatively, you can refuse all of these
Deals, in which case you pay $100 for the saw, but have no legal rights against the seller.

Deal 1

Deal 2

Deal 3

Besides the $100 price of
the saw, you may pay an
extra amount and get a 5year warranty in which
the seller has to provide
you with a new saw if the
one you purchased should
break down for any reason
whatsoever.

Besides the $100 for the saw,
you may pay an extra amount
of money and get a 5-year
right to have the seller
reimburse you for any direct
monetary expenses that you
may suffer in the event of an
injury caused by the saw.
Such monetary damages
might include, for instance,
medical costs, rehabilitation,
or loss of income you might
have due to injury.

Besides the $100 for the saw,
you may pay an extra amount
of money and get a 5-year
right to have the seller
compensate you for any nonmonetary harm such as painand-suffering that you may
suffer in the event of an
injury caused by a saw. Such
damages reimburse you, for
instance, for pain or any
other suffering you may feel
during or after your health
treatment or rehabilitation.

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in
this Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in
this Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in
this Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is __________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________

Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is __________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________

Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is __________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________

In sum, I will pay a total amount of $______ for the saw.
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Please, DO NOT go back and change your answers after you read this new question.

Question 3:
Imagine that the seller provides you with further information from the CPSC study (in
addition to the information she already gave you). She tells you that indeed out of every 50
saws, 1 breaks down, however not all of these breakdowns involve physical injury. In fact,
out of every 10,000 portable saws, 1 saw breaks down AND causes injuries within a period of
5 years (0.01% of the saws break down AND cause injuries in a period of 5 years). The
statistical data reveal that on average the injuries involve direct monetary costs (medical costs
and loss of income) of $100,000.
Again, the seller offers you the same 3 Deals, described below. Those Deals are the same as
the deals you already considered and we repeat them for your convenience. In each of these
Deals, assume that the only legal rights you have against the seller of the saw are those
described in each part of the question. (The seller accepts no returns, nor do you have any
legal rights against anybody else, nor do you have insurance to cover you against such
losses—no health insurance, property insurance, or disability insurance).
Note, however, that you have the opportunity to accept any of these Deals, or any
combination of them (including accepting them all). Alternatively, you can refuse all of these
Deals, in which case you pay $100 for the saw, but have no legal rights against the seller.

Deal 1

Deal 2

Deal 3

Besides the $100 price of
the saw, you may pay an
extra amount and get a 5year warranty in which
the seller has to provide
you wit h a new saw if the
one you purchased should
break down for any reason
whatsoever.

Besides the $100 for the saw,
you may pay an extra amount
of money and get a 5-year
right to have the seller
reimburse you for any direct
monetary expenses that you
may suffer in the event of an
injury caused by the saw.
Such monetary damages
might include, for instance,
medical costs, rehabilitation,
or loss of income you might
have due to injury.

Besides the $100 for the saw,
you may pay an extra amount
of money and get a 5-year
right to have the seller
compensate you for any nonmonetary harm such as painand-suffering that you may
suffer in the event of an
injury caused by a saw. Such
damages reimburse you, for
instance, for pain or any
other suffering you may feel
during or after your health
treatment or rehabilitation.

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in
this Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in
this Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in
this Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is __________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________

Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is __________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
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Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is __________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
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In sum, I will pay a total amount of $______ for the saw.
Please, DO NOT go back and change your answers after you read this new question.

Question 4:
Imagine that the seller further provides you with more information from the CPSC study (in addition to
the information she already gave you). She tells you that in those breakdowns that cause injuries (1 out
of 10,000 saws, or 0.01%) the most frequent injury caused by the breakdown of a saw is amputation,
usually of a finger, but sometimes the whole hand. For this type of injury, courts (in those states which
have tort law) grant pain and suffering damages of (on average) $100,000.

As before, the seller offers you the same 3 Deals, described below. Those Deals are the same
as the deals you already considered and we repeat them for your convenience. In each of these
Deals, assume that the only legal rights you have against the seller of the saw are those
described in each part of the question. (The seller accepts no returns, nor do you have any
legal rights against anybody else, nor do you have insurance to cover you against such
losses—no health insurance, property insurance, or disability insurance).
Note, however, that you have the opportunity to accept any of these Deals, or any
combination of them (including accepting them all). Alternatively, you can refuse all of these
Deals, in which case you pay $100 for the saw, but have no legal rights against the seller.

Deal 1

Deal 2

Deal 3

Besides the $100 price of
the saw, you may pay an
extra amount and get a 5year warranty in which
the seller has to provide
you with a new saw if the
one you purchased should
break down for any reason
whatsoever.

Besides the $100 for the saw,
you may pay an extra amount
of money and get a 5-year
right to have the seller
reimburse you for any direct
monetary expenses that you
may suffer in the event of an
injury caused by the saw.
Such monetary damages
might include, for instance,
medical costs, rehabilitation,
or loss of income you might
have due to injury.

Besides the $100 for the saw,
you may pay an extra amount
of money and get a 5-year
right to have the seller
compensate you for any nonmonetary harm such as painand-suffering that you may
suffer in the event of an
injury caused by a saw. Such
damages reimburse you, for
instance, for pain or any
other suffering you may feel
during or after your health
treatment or rehabilitation.

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in
this Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in
this Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Are you interested in this Deal?
No, I am not interested in
this Deal.
Yes, I am interested in this

Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is __________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________

Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is __________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________

Deal and the

maximum

amount of money I would be
willing to pay above $100 to
get this Deal is __________
The reason I chose to do this
is:_____________________
_______________________
_____________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________

In sum, I will pay a total amount of $______ for the saw.
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Thank you very much for your cooperation.

We would like to remind you
that your answers are confid ential and that we do not keep track on any individual’s answers.

My age is____
My gender is ________
My race is ___________ (optional).
Personal condition:

single
Widow/er

How do you feel today?
1) bad
2) not so bad

married
separated

divorce
living with a partner

3) o.k.

4) good

5) very good

How do you define your level of income? Or in case of family support, your family’s level of
income?
1) much below average
2) below average
3) average
4) above average
5) much above average

Again, we would like to thank you for your participation. Suppose we could offer you a
reward for filling out this questionnaire, and that we offered you either
a)
to participate in a lottery in which one of ten thousand participants in our research gets
$100,000 (a lottery where you have 0.01% chance to win $100,000), OR
b)
to get a certain amount of money for sure.
What is the MINIMUM amount of money that you are willing to get from us for sure and not
participate in the lottery. Why?_________________________________________________
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